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Prolegomena to the Study of
Totalitarian Communication
KIRILL POSTOUTENKO
Introduction
This book is devoted to a double-faced concept which simultaneously
looks at two different research traditions. Depending on the weight
attached to one or another side, one could interpret totalitarian commu-
nication either as an attribute of totalitarian society or as a special case
of social communication. Up to date, the first approach has proved to
be significantly more popular, but its efficiency—some notable excep-
tions aside—leaves much to be desired, as many scholars may well have
sensed: the recent proposal to move “beyond totalitarianism” (Geyer
and Fitzpatrick 2009) was prepared by innumerable subversion attempts,
including, but not limited to, the breakup of the term (“totalitarianisms”)
or encroachment upon its referential jurisdiction (“totalitarianism and
authoritarianism. . . /fascism. . .dictatorship. . . etc.”).
The difficulties are not confined to the fact that such a semantically
vague and ideologically contested term as “totalitarianism” is neither
clear enough nor sufficiently differentiated to serve as a strong a pri-
ori foundation for any sensible deductions. Nor they are limited to the
general preoccupation with the large-scale practices (propaganda) and
preferred communication channels (mass media). The crucial prob-
lem seems to be the underlying perception of totalitarian society as
a special structure composed from ready-made political, moral and
epistemic inequalities between leaders and followers, tyrants and vic-
tims, messengers and recipients etc. Communication, in this model,
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merely amalgamates existing dichotomies, producing synergies needed
for highlighting the gaps (something like ‘immoral tyrannic messen-
gers manipulate recipients’). As long as communication is treated as
a kind of courier service facility within the state apparatus, its crucial
role in shaping and maintaining social distinctions and cohesions will
remain unexplored. Besides, the absolutization of social and cognitive
gaps within the society makes totalitarian communication at once su-
perfluous (gaps do not change anyway), improbable (non-relational
distinctions within society?) and incomparable to its non-totalitarian
equivalents (no systemic identity, separable from “social structure”, is
displayed).
Hence most of the authors of this volume reject this approach, explic-
itly or implicitly, and try to move, as much as possible, in the opposite
direction. “As much as possible” means first and foremost taken for
granted the basic distinction between leaders [executives/rulers] and
followers [subordinates/subjects]. To be sure, this difference can (and
eventually should) be formulated in communicative terms, but at this
point none of us, it seems, really knows how to link its variations to any
meaningful differences between totalitarian and non-totalitarian com-
munication. All other dichotomies are seen as variables—including the
very distinction between the “totalitarianism” and “democracy”. In fact,
although the focus on the usual suspects (such as Nazi Germany, Soviet
Union, Fascist Italy) remained in force, an attempt was made to replace
the Manichean dichotomy ‘totalitarian’/‘non-totalitarian’ with a sliding
scale. In particular, the three poster examples were juxtaposed with the
cases that could be reasonably described as totalitarian by analogy (the
Vichy France), as well as with borderline phenomena such as seasoned
democratic systems with the extreme executive power (the ‘New Deal’
USA or France under Charles de Gaulle) or young democracies with
strong kinship identities (post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan), or even democracies
developed at the cost of disempowered autocracy (United Kingdom).
Furthermore, an attempt was made to forgo the unfruitful fixation on
the state as a whole and move a maiori ad minus, describing totalitarian
communication through the prism of specific practices not specifically
associated with totalitarianism: here the most general interactional rules
(such as turn-taking or repairs discussed below) go hand in hand with
the detailed study of links between the British extreme-right newspaper
Reality and its readership, or relations between the famous Soviet writer
Maxim Gorky and his proletarian apprentices.
On the whole, totalitarian communication appears to be anchored in
12
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the political organization of society; yet the general rules of social inter-
action to which it conforms cannot be always directly linked to politics
or governance. At the same time, the examples of the U.S. during the
war and France after the war show that emerging totalitarian commu-
nication may be a reliable indicator of those authoritarian tendencies
that elude social reflection and attract little notice in political analysis.
Still, these findings, important as they are, stop short of describing to-
talitarian communication as a special kind of communicative system.
This is hardly surprising, giving the breadth of approaches involved (psy-
chology, political studies, history, sociology, linguistics), and a stable
description may not be even necessary at this stage. But a step in this di-
rection seems to be needed, if only to stake out a claim for an alternative
approach to totalitarian communication and provide its working defini-
tion for further discussion. Given the specifics of this approach, it seems
natural to precede this volume with a brief outlook at communication
in general and then proceed to its totalitarian variation. After that, the
intricacies of interdependence between totalitarian communication and
its socio-political environment may be easier brought into the picture.
From Biological to Social Communication
Role Exchange, Turn-Taking, Repairs
Although this project is devoted to a communicative system in its own
right, it would be difficult to ignore the fact that communication is first
and foremost a function of social life which has no identity of its own and
no other goal than to serve its members (collectively referred to as “soci-
ety”). In this sense, communication is the same sort of allopoetic system
as ‘God’ or ‘market’, which fictitious self-reference is hypothesized on the
slim circumstantial basis of correspondences between other-references
of real social actors, i.e. human beings participating in social interac-
tion (for the distinction autopoetic/allopoetic see: Maturana and Varela
1980: 80-81). To be sure, these correspondences, based on binding
norms and expressed through highly universalized codes, are significant
enough to treat the aforementioned systems as “subjects” able to “react
upon themselves, “repeat”, “revise” and “complete” (the examples are
borrowed from: Luhmann 1987: 213). But such a perception, at least
from the sociological standpoint, is not particularly useful. In dissipative
systems (which communication and society unquestionably are), the
relations between the whole and its parts are rather trivial: every system
13
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works nonstop on maintaining its integrity (organizational closeness),
and every subsystem has a potential of breaking away. Communication
undoubtedly has this tendency to becoming an autopoetic system; it
cannot be even ruled out that it has goals extending beyond this com-
pulsory secessionist tribe and subsequent self-preservation. But these
intentions are no more relevant for social life than the intentions of God
or the intentions of the market, since humans have no semiotic com-
petence to decipher codes in which all aforementioned teleologies are
expressed, or even to ascertain existence of such codes (see the same
argument in a different form: Schmidt 2003: 78-79). Hence an empiri-
cal study of communication is inevitably limited to the assessment of
its functions in the context of the mega-project pursued by society in
general—emancipation from the environment.
From its very beginning, such an emancipation has been a dire ne-
cessity crucial for the survival of human race. Endowed with meager
sensory abilities, modest physical strength, low fertility and long rearing
times, humans would not have survived by simply reproducing biolog-
ical identity of their specie (Vine 1975: 367). Of course, this identity
has been in principle capable of adaptive changes, but within a lifetime
of a single individual each of his (or her) biological utterances, being
a single-valued function of gender, remained the same regardless of
what was happening around it. Every new exchange of these “genotypi-
cally determined signals” (Bateson 1972: 419) was similar to the old one,
could not last more than one turn, and its adaptation to environmental
hazards was limited to varying frequency of the same unidirectional
interaction scenario (one sperm cell → one ovum). Indeed, in each
interactive act the number of spermatozoa contacting ovary is quite
sufficient (around 50 million, to be precise), but they are all the same
so that each ejaculation (and all ejaculations) are nothing more than
mechanical repetitions of a single statement (for details see: Stent 1972:
44-45). The sheer number of messages, aimed at preemptively offsetting
the poor quality of communication, created by constantly alternating
environmental hazards, is functionally equivalent to the monotonous
pleading for help in the dark. Alas, such pleading is rarely helpful and
does little to work out a sensible rescue strategy.
Inevitably, the cooperation for the purpose of defense requires com-
pulsory acquisition of social identity by each individual: even among
plants the form and content of messages exchanged are sufficiently
deregulated in order to relate the specific position of each communica-
tor to its environment (see, for instance: Karban and Shiojiri 2009). To
14
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be sure, biological interaction does react upon environment: in many
species mating behavior occurs only at the specialized territories (so-
called stamping grounds) or does not occur at all if conditions are ad-
verse (Ardrey 1966: 69). But the participants of biological exchanges
cannot select their utterance (let alone code): they are inextricably tied
to their one and only message which may be uttered or not uttered
depending on environmental conditions.
In contrast, the way to social cohesion lies through making environ-
mental perceptions communicable, which necessarily requires that com-
municators X and Y are relatively free to choose between messages x and
y and know of each other’s freedom (see the survey of “double contin-
gency” in: Vanderstraeten 2002). Potentially, the decoupling of speaker
and message can fortify society in its battle against the all-devouring
ecological macrosystem: the correlation between environmental per-
ception and the content of interaction makes meaningful interaction
possible (see: Andrade 1999: 148). Furthermore, diversification of codes
and their adjustment to the best developed sensors of the species (for
humans—sight and hearing rather than tactile and olfactory sensibility)
puts at their disposal the codes with the highest throughput capacity
(symbols and icons) and thus raises the chances of timely response to
the common challenges.
However, these potentialities could only become actual if the deregu-
lation measures are counterbalanced with secondary stabilization: in
other words, the individual environmental scans should not only be
different but also comparable. Indeed, whereas the informational value
of such reports is proportional to their perceptional egocentricity, their
social relevance depends on potential transferability of data perceived,
which is impossible without some or other degree of allocentric uni-
versality in the code employed. In the natural language, for instance,
this complementarity of speaker- and environment-based referential
markers keeps together not only a single social self, where the unique
self-performance (‘I’-reference to the present communicator) can only
be communicated by means of the universal self-statement (‘I ’-reference
to all potential speakers), but extends to the most salient aspects of in-
tersubjective coordination such as time (‘now’ vs. ‘at 12:40’) and space
(‘here’ vs. ‘in Constance’).
Arguably the most important mechanism of equilibration between
the individuality of a living being in society and its necessary interac-
tive actualization is the role exchange which separates an autonomous
living being from its societal role. Role exchange simultaneously drives
15
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communication on various levels beginning with basic distinctions (in-
terchangeability between ‘I’ vs. ‘you’ in symbolic language as opposed
to irreducible indexicality of voice tone) and extending to the complex
interaction scenarios (interchangeability of characters in the play as op-
posed to ritual) (see: James 1909: 217; Huizinga 1956: 32; Caillois 1958:
62; Turner 1979: 95; Goffman 1974: 129; or—in a more elaborated form—
Rappaport 1999: 42). Most visible in its norm-setting functions (such
as furnishing society with the cognitive and institutional background),
the role exchange also serves as an impetus for a dynamic social consen-
sus, projecting obligatory reversibility of basal communicative functions
(‘speaker’/‘addressee’) onto complex social roles (‘power’/‘opposition’)
(Huizinga 1956: 52, 87). Furthermore, combined with the sequential
(sometimes called “linear”) order of verbal interaction, it enables exten-
sion of a dialogue beyond a single ‘utterer’/’listener’ exchange (Goffman
1964: 65: Sacks, Schegloff and Gefferson 1974). The contribution of this
turn-taking to the stability and integrity of social system could hardly
be overestimated: at any rate, its salience goes far beyond the habitual
conversational settings (Knorr Cetina 2007) and as far as stability is con-
cerned, it beats political structures hands down (Schegloff 2006: 71).
In general, is perhaps indispensable for peaceful survival as it helps to
tune the form of message to the listener’s cognitive expectations, which,
in its turn, reduces the risk of accidental confrontations based on mis-
understanding. To be sure, neither turn-taking nor communication in
general are aimed at producing consensus between the parties involved
(Luhmann 1987: 237; O’Connell, Kowal and Kaltenbacher 1990). Rather,
as cooperation happens from time to time to counter the ruinous selfish
teleologies, the consensual perception of interactional settings normally
emerges when the wasteful parades of individual differences block infor-
mation exchange. Furthermore, the serial allocentric generalizations of
specific communicational circumstances eventually produce norms and
institutions and lead to formation of “primary frameworks” (Goffman
1974: 21-39) that enable reverse stabilization of social identity through
the retroactive correction of its anomalous (that is, deviant in relation to
the situation) behavior (Goffman 1971: 95-187; Schegloff, Jefferson and
Sacks 1977) Needless to say, the practice of repairs, based on the clear-cut
separation between the living being and its social role, greatly decreases
the centripetal tendencies within social system. As a sort of compul-
sory social insurance, repairs safeguard individuals from peremptory
social exclusion on all levels of society from isolated interaction practices
(upward or downward stylistic self-correction in a conversation) to the
16
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moral and legal foundations of society (prevention of total social exclu-
sion of “the possessed”—or “the incorrigible”—on respectively religious
or moral grounds).
Ideally, the combinations of these three practices ensures stability an
elasticity of communicative codes and customs: lending equivocal sup-
port to some wannabe-systems (such as “families”, “classes”, “national
cultures”) and ignoring others, social communication ideally keeps com-
plexity of the allopoetic system ‘society’ on the level optimal for its
operation—ideally. But some political structures have less patience
with the homeostatic properties of social systems than others, and it
is worth looking at the respective modifications of the communicative
subsystems that serve, or disserve, such societies.
Systemic Features of Totalitarian Communication
Role Exchange is Impossible, Turn-Taking is Not Topical,
Repairs Compound Errors
It would be anthropologically naive and historically untrue to couple
limitations, imposed on role exchange in power relations, with specific
political systems formed in Europe and America after the first World War.
The alternation of norms encouraging or prohibiting role exchange in
politics runs all through the European history: on the one hand, as it was
possible for the thinkers of classical Antiquity to differentiate a living be-
ing from its power function (Kantorowicz 1957: 496), on the other hand,
it was also natural for the 18th century peasants to believe in the miracu-
lous powers of the king’s touch (Bloch 1924). Obviously, the dominance
of ritual in politics, coupled with suppression of its playful, ironical rel-
ativizations (such as carnival), lives in every pore of traditional society.
The fusion of simple communicative prevalence and long-term political
authority is particularly visible in the systems which legitimacy is based,
fully or in part, on transcendental references, hereditary monarchies or
priestly theocracies being the most notable examples.
Nevertheless, the institutional environment of the interwar Europe no-
tably differed from its absolutist past. Most importantly, the obligatory
rotation of political elites, together with their symmetrical functional dif-
ferentiation, was institutionalized in universal practices (elections) and
legal norms (constitutional separation of power). These mechanisms of
legitimacy maintenance, which made some forms of role exchange com-
pulsory, have clashed with the authoritarian tendencies in the postwar
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societies across the globe. It is well known that in some cases the conflict
was resolved in favor of norms reinforcing role exchange (introduction
of the two-term limit in the United States after Roosevelt presidency),
whereas in others the norms were either gradually removed (Führertum
in Nazi Germany) or—in a more paradoxical way—created anew and
progressively rendered senseless (“elections” in Soviet Union).
What seems to be remarkable in the two latter cases is the role of
communication in social enactment of these conflicts. If one agrees that
advanced communicative systems, capable of using symbolic codes,
necessarily differentiate between action and utterance and between
message and information (Luhmann 1987: 193-195), then the ritualistic
character of authoritarian politics reveals itself in partial suspending
of these differentiations (Leach 1976: 37; Rappaport 1999: 58), which
effectively implies the unity of body, its communicative role and its
political power. Whereas offsetting this vast consolidation of social value
in one hand by means of egalitarian interactive devices appears to be
a norm observed on various communicative levels of many societies
(Ruesch and Bateson 1951; Heritage 1997: 170), the cursory glance at
totalitarian communication indicated its movement in the direction of
the pathological scenario described in family sociology (Habermas 1974:
264): grossly overemphasized, the interactional distinction between the
speaker and the audience served as a synecdoche, if not hyperbole, for
the social distance separating political leader from his followers, whereas
the semantic aspects of communication play a relatively minor role.
To prove this hypothesis, the comparison was made between the
public speeches of “toralitarian” (Benito Mussolini (M), Adolf Hitler (H))
and “democratic” (Winston Churchill (Ch), Franklin D. Roosevelt (R))
politicians (see the table below):
Table 1: Public Speeches
1 2 1+2 3 4 5 6 Total (%)
H1 0 0 0 7 (12.3) 0 13 (22.8) 37 (64.9) 57 (100)
H2 7 (43.7) 4 (25.0) 11 (68.7) 0 0 5 (31.3) 0 16 (100)
M1 3 (18.8) 2 (12.5) 5 (31.3) 1 (6.2) 0 21 (48.8) 16 (37.2) 43 (100)
M2 4 (40.0) 3 (30.0) 7 (70.0) 0 0 0 3 (30.0) 10 (100)
R1 0 0 0 5 (62.5) 0 1 (12.5) 2 (25.0) 8 (100)
R2 4 (7.5) 0 4 (7.5) 0 5 (9.4) 13 (24.6) 31 (58.5) 53 (100)
Ch1 2 (9.5) 1 (4.8) 3 (14.3) 8 (38.1) 0 0 10 (47.6) 21 (100)
Ch2 1 (20.0) 1 (20.0) 2 (40.0) 3 (60.0) 0 0 0 5 (100)
To reduce personal factors to a minimum, two different leaders were
chosen for each group. The rhetorical production of each politician was
18
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represented by two roughly equal text samples corresponding to the two
stages of political biographies common for all the actors—seeking power
in opposition (H1 (Hitler 1927), M1 (Mussolini 1918; Mussolini 1919), R1
(Roosevelt 1928; Roosevelt 1932), Ch1 (Churchill 1929; Churchill 1931a;
Churchill 1931b)) and exercising it at the top of the state system (H2
(Hitler 1935; Hitler 1938; Hitler 1941), M2 (Mussolini 1934), R2 (Roo-
sevelt 1936a; Roosevelt 1936b; Roosevelt 1943, Ch2 (Churchill 1941a).
Since the idea was to compare the fixed institutionalized framework
(speaking leader—listening followers) to its reflexive repercussions in
the speeches, the special attention was paid to the sentences duplicating
this framework within the texts by directly referring to the speaker (‘I’)
and the audience (‘you’), or to the audience (‘you’) only. Such sentences
were further subdivided in accordance with the relation between the
framework and the model: naturally enough, it was supposed that the
‘I’-‘you’ constructions could uphold, discuss, undo or invert inequality of
communicative power inherent in the rhetorical construction of public
oratory. Accordingly, the following categories (represented in the table
as columns) were isolated:
1. Upholding power inequality in a c t i o n terms—i.e., invoking
a non-negotiable s p a t i a l subordination of addressees to the
speaker (“You have been called together at my desire. . . ”);
2. Upholding power inequality in s p e e c h terms—invoking a non-
negotiable c o m m u n i c a t i v e subordination of addressees to
the speaker (“At this point, I demand your attention”);
3. D i s c u s s i n g power inequality in action or speech terms—i.e.
invoking a n e g o t i a b l e spatial or communicative subordi-
nation of addressees to the speaker (“I invite you to endorse this
attitude on my part”);
4. U n d o i n g power inequality in action of speech terms—i.e. in-
voking the e q u i l i b r i u m between communicative or spatial
positions of the speaker and addressees (“You and I know a simple
fact. . . ”);
5. I n v e r t i n g power inequality in action of speech terms—i.e. in-
voking a non-negotiable c o m m u n i c a t i v e or s p a t i a l
subordination of the speaker to addressees (“You are the mak-
ers!”);1
1 | It was generally held that positive sentences with ‘you’ as a grammatical
19
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6. Unspecific references to power inequality (“What [. . . ] will be your
line of moral and logical resistance then?”).
The results confirm correlation between the specific political system
and a degree of uniformity of various configurations of social power.
The data on Hitler after 1934 and Mussolini after 1922 shows a drastic
change from self-deprecation to self-aggrandizement: in both cases,
almost two-thirds of ‘I’-and-‘you’-sentences reinforce rather than offset
the communicative imbalance resulting from the hierarchical construc-
tion of public speaking. The changes in Churchill and Roosevelt go
in the same direction but look moderate in comparison. Finally, it is
worth mentioning that the political leaders of USA and Great Britain
react upon their ascension to power by activating the rhetorical mecha-
nisms of checks and balances: whereas Roosevelt’s presidential speeches
earn him the nickname of “youandme-president” (Dos Passos 1934: 17),
Churchill’s oratory contains an explicit endorsement of role exchange on
a political level: “As long as the Socialist Government drop all this non-
sense about Socialism, nationalization of industry, fantastic expenditure
and taxation, wild schemes for ‘monkeying’ with the currency and credit
systems on which we depend, and as long as they do not give away the
rights and interests of Britain to foreign cultures or endanger the safety
and unity of the Empire, everyone will be glad that they should have their
turn and a fair chance to see if they can make things go a little better”
(Churchill 1941b: 4633).2
Having demonstrated how totalitarian communication strengthened
political asymmetries by imitating, multiplying and magnifying them in
preferred interactional scenarios, one should not ignore the reflexive im-
pact of this fixed permanence of interwined politico-interactional roles,
discernible at the lower levels of communication system. In particular,
the lexical layer of natural speech reacts to the decay of role-exchanging
mechanisms by the abnormal growth of defamation vocabulary, built
around such asymmetrical concepts as “bloodsucker”, “beast” or “Un-
mensch” which exclude consensual use (acceptance by the other) in
principle (see: Koselleck 1975). For instance, it is remarkable that in
subject in an active predicative construction invert the communicative superiority of
‘I’ even if it is not present in the sentence.
2 | Uttered by a politician not known for his disinterest in power, this remark may
in fact suggest that the mutual acknowledgment and implementation of regular role
exchange on various social levels may be a better characterization of “democratic”
communication—as opposed to “totalitarian” one—than the traditionally highlighted
“competition” (see, for instance: Aron 1965).
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Franklin Roosevelt’s campaign speech of 1928 where the attacks on the
political adversary were expected, there was only one asymmetrical nom-
inal construction (“reactionary element”) out of nineteenth references to
Republican Party (Roosevelt 1928: 55-58), whereas in a formally neutral
coverage of the Trotskyite activity in Soviet Union in a Pravda editorial
from August 24th, 1936, the same ratio was 30 out of 57. The rarity of
nominal defamation in “democratic” communication could be linked
both to the regular role exchange between “power” and “opposition” and
to the smooth turn-taking as its presupposition generally observed by
all competitors: under such circumstances, carrying rhetorical strife to
the point of no return would be tantamount to throwing a boomerang.
As it could be seen later, it might also be related to the general practice
of avoiding undifferentiated personal stigmatizations which could make
self- and other-corrections impossible and threaten the stability of the
communicative system.
* * *
Lenin’s famous equation—“Communism is the Soviet power plus elec-
trification of the whole country” (Lenin 1920: 30-31)—gave birth to the
tradition linking informational poverty of communication in totalitarian
states to the disproportional development of its technological mediation
(see, for instance: Gorjaeva 2000). Refined from technological fetishism
(radio or television as such do not grant preferences to speakers or listen-
ers), this argument contains a grain of historical truth: given that mass
media have been started up in the 16th century and revolutionized in 20th
century on demand of such informational monopolists as church and
state, it was only natural that the possibility of spatio-temporal distance
between the communicators was used to increase existing inequalities
of communicative chances (Giesecke 2007: 206). But these praxeolog-
ical observations do little to enrich our understanding of totalitarian
communication as a system. In particular, it seems unclear what is the
rationale behind the minimization of role exchange and amalgamation
of power practices, which obviously destabilize communicative system
and increase the chances of its breakup. It is also not immediately ap-
parent how the information flows were actually modified in such a way
that the increasing entropy did not blow up the system (for some time,
at least).
It would be naive to attempt a general answer to these questions: the
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contribution of Lorenz Erren in this volume makes it apparent that in
Soviet Union at some point even the controlled dissipation of totalitar-
ian communication (for instance, the creation of public sphere formally
independent from mass media) was deemed admissible. However, this
small-scale concession for various reasons could not be a universal
practice, and one is tempted to search for communicative mutations
on the higher levels. This brings us back to the general norm of turn-
taking, which cannot be eliminated from communication altogether but
is highly adaptable to the needs of parties involved due to its unparal-
leled flexibility.
It goes without saying that ceremonies greatly constrain the flexi-
ble distribution of turns (see: Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson 1974: 701,
709, 730), although the ways of specifying turns in advance normally
depend on the communicative environment, ranging from individual
application of general norms (shame, fear, guilt or respect) to the all-
embracing external regulation—for example, in a form of bidirectional
center-terminal/terminal-center communication network with delay
times specified by center (Inose 1972: 126). But this utopian (or, rather,
anti-utopian) scheme has never been realized in practice: whereas the
total organization of listeners’ ceremonial behavior by state media was
simply beyond the capacities of Soviet and Nazi authorities (Rossi and
Bauer 1952: 656; Zimmermann 2006: 442), the complete removal of
coordination between the adjacent turns could never happen for com-
municative reasons (Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson 1974: 725; Matoesian
2005: 184): one would be hard-pressed to call “dialogue” a spatial prox-
imity of two or more individuals whose verbal and non-verbal behaviors
show no signs of interdependence. In other words, turn coordination
persists in all kinds of social environment, and its specific criteria may
be a significant differentiating factor: whereas the advance allocation
of turns is evident in most of the “orchestrated encounters” regardless
of social system (Dingwall 1980), the correlation between the adjacent
“replicas” (in whatever code) sheds light on the type of information being
actually transmitted in various communicative systems (Heritage 1984:
1; see also the pioneering case study: Beck 2001). As long as one isolates
the major scenarios of extracting information from a message and pro-
cessing it in a certain way, it seems possible to go beyond ceremony and
look for the serialization of these processing schemes in less rigid acts
of communication. If social systems associated with “democracy” or
“totalitarianism” display the consistent divergence of scenarios across
the interactional settings, this regularity of differences (or difference of
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regularities) may single out the special forms of information packag-
ing, selection and processing which make up for the constricted role
exchange in totalitarian communication.
An almost random selection of ceremonial exchanges under similar
circumstances could serve as a starting point (turns within each example
are marked by Roman numerals):
1
I. (Winston R. Churchill:) “I am sorry to say that I have got no definite
information as to the results, but I feel they can hardly be other than
satisfactory in view of the naval forces of which we dispose in the
Mediterannean sphere.
II. (Aneurin Bevan:) Will the Prime Minister use whatever methods are
available to convey from the House of Commons, this Sitting Day,
our admiration of the confidence in the defenders of Crete?
III. (Winston R. Churchill:) I certainly will” (Churchill 1941: 6404).
2
I. (Benito Musolini:) “Non restava che il terzo attegiamento: quello che
le masse operaie hanno già accolto, realizzato: quello l’adesione es-
plicita, chiara, schietissima allo spirito ed agli istituti della Rivoluzione
fascista.
II. (Audience:) Viva il Duce!
III. (Benito Mussolini:) Se il secolo scorso fu il secolo della potenza del
capitale, questo ventesimo è il secolo della potenza e della gloria del
lavoro” (Mussolini 1934: 130).
3
(1)
I. (Joseph Stalin appears on the tribune)
II. (Audience:) (long standing ovation) + “Ura tov. Stalinu! Da
zdravstuet tov! Stalin! Da zdravstuet Veliki Stalin!
Velikom geni tov. Stalinu ura! Vivat! Rot front! Tov.
Stalinu slava!
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III. (Josef Stalin:) Tovariwi! Konstituionna komissi, proekt
kotoro byl predstavlen na rassmotrenie na stowego
Seda, byla obrazovana, kak izvestno, po speialnomu
postanovleni VII Sezda Sovetov Soza SSSR” (Stalin
1936, 3).
(2)
I. (Joseph Stalin:) to ukreplet veru v svoi sily I mo-
bilizuet na novu borbu dl zavoevani novyh pobed
soializma.
II. (Audience:) (standing ovation) +Ura! Da zdravstvuet tovar-
iw Stalin!+ (singing International)+Ura!+Da zdravstvuet
nax vod tovariw Stalin!
III. (Joseph Stalin leaves the tribune)” (Stalin 1936, 32).
All the examples portray one and the same communicative arrangement:
speakers Winston R. Churchill, Benito Mussollini and Joseph Stalin, who
are also the political leaders of their respective countries, pronounce
public speeches addressed to the audiences which gathered (workers on
the Duomo square in Milan) or were selected (House of Commons in
England, Congress of Soviets in USSR) for that occasion. The ceremonial
character of this setting is based on the pre-allocation of turns, com-
mon for institutional settings from game to funerals and implying the
marked asymmetry of interactional roles: whereas one of the exchange
participants is generally entitled to unhindered self-selection based on
loosely defined institutional relevance of his turn, others are confined to
occasional responses by minimal communicative means (Goffman 1961:
29; Hahn 1999: 99). Still, this rigid frame allows for a significant vari-
ability of turn-taking practices, and the variations may point at general
communicative properties of respective political systems.
1. The first example is a clear case of a non-conventional inter-
ruption:
1a: The second turn (Aneurin Bevan’s words) is performed by
non-minimal means (elaborate sentence requiring a response
rather than exclamations, applause, whistling or booing);
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1b: It cannot be categorized in simple dual terms (ap-
proval/disapproval), but rather exemplifies a topical correlation
with the previous speaker’s turn: as soon as the first speaker (the
Prime Minister) has chosen the Battle of Crete as his topic, he is
asked to pass information from the other speakers (Members of the
House of Commons) to the absent party (the defenders of Crete).
Meanwhile, the retroactive topical correlation is supplemented
by the forward-looking grammatical one, since the interrogative
sentence normally requires an answer in the next turn (Sacks,
Schegloff and Jefferson 1974: 716, 718).
1c. Despite the non-conventional character and significant distrac-
tive effect of the second turn, caused by its length, informational
value, grammatical form and reference to the topic not covered by
the first speaker, the third turn incorporates the second turn into the
dialogue by a topical response which also contains approval in a
form of indirect performative act (I certainly will).
2. The second example represents a conventional interruption:
1a. The second turn (the listeners’ shouts “Long live the Duce!”) is
performed by minimal means (exclamation).
1b. It can be categorized in simple dual terms (approval rather than
disapproval), but its correlation with the previous speaker’s turn is
predominantly indexical: although the exclamations are “invited”
(Atkinson 1985: 409-410)—i.e., uttered in relation to the content of
the speech immediately after Mussolini’s praises to the proletarian
sympathizers of fascism—they as such gloss over this topic and
instead refer to the speaker himself.
1c. In reinforcement of ceremonial rules valid for the current setting,
the third turn incorporates the second turn into the dialogue on the
basis of its minimality (non-interference), although the explicit
approval of the speaker by his audience and correlation (mostly
indexical) of the second turn with the first turn plays some role as
well. Praising or ostracizing, the audience’s replica is too short and
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undemanding to elicit a response, let alone to influence the content
of the next turn. Accordingly, the prevalence of self-selection is
manifest both in the topical correlation of the third turn (the tirade
on the role of labor in the 19th century) with the first turn and in the
first speaker’s nonchalance of the second turn.
3. Lastly, the third example illustrates conventional non-
interruption:
1a. The second turn (listeners’ standing ovation, singing of the
International and exclamation “Hurray!”, “Hurray to comrade
Stalin!”, “Hurray to the Great Stalin!”, “Hurray to the Great genius
comrade Stalin!”, “Viva!”, “Rot Front!”, “Glory to comrade Stalin!”) is
performed by differently coded and qualitatively extensive means
which connective potential is, however, minimal: no response is
required or even expected.
1b. It can be categorized in simple dual terms (approval rather
than disapproval), and its correlation with the previous speaker’s
turn is indexical, as in the Mussolini case. But, unlike the previous
example, this indexicality is not relative but absolute (or at least
close to absoluteness). Indeed, in (1) the second turn starts in
response to the mere appearance of silent Stalin on the tribune,
preceding communication of any non-indexical information to the
audience.
1c. In contrast to the two previous examples, the second turn is not
incorporated by the third turn into the structure of the dialogue,
and this non-incorporation seems to be an intentional technique
aimed at maximizing the ceremonial character of the exchange. In
particular, this maximization upgrades pre-allocation of turns from
general tendency to an inviolable rule and extens it to the “spon-
taneous” elements of a dialogue (such as ovation or exclamations
of approval). This is achieved not only by the likely scripting of the
whole exchange, but by placing the econd turn to the very last posi-
tion in the dialogue (as in (2)), so that its incorporation is prevented
the very interactional frame of the ceremony. Together with the evi-
26
Prolegomena to the Study of Totalitarian Communication
dent invariance of second turns in (1) and (2), their position on the
margins of Stalin’s speech leads to complete dissociation between
the adjacent turns: their connection seems to hinge solely on the
all-embracing indexical reference of audience to the speaker.
One should be cautious not to over-interpret this small sample, which
heuristic value at this stage consists mainly of singling out improba-
bilities (scenario 3 was not found in Churchill’s or Mussolini’s public
appearances at times of their respective leaderships, and scenario 1 is ab-
sent from Stalin’s rhetorical activity in his capacity of Secretary General).
Nevertheless, if provisionally accepted as representative, the sample
confirms the findings of the previous chapter. As with role exchange,
turn-taking seems to function differently in communicative subsystems
of “democratic” and “non-totalitarian” societies.
In the former case, the mutual reinforcement of interactional and
social inequality is prevented by equilibration practices that set commu-
nicative values against political ones. Winston R. Churchill, the Prime
Minister of Great Britain and a designated speaker in his House of Com-
mons appearance on May 22nd, 1941, reacts to the question of his polit-
ical adversary from the Left by adjusting ad libitum the content of his
speech to the topic of the inquiry. Repeated a couple of sentences later
one more time (“I certainly will [. . . ] I certainly will send good wishes
of the House”), this adjustment ensures not only the topical relevance
of the turn change but grants temporary leadership in a dialogue to its
communicatively and politically underprivileged party.
Joseph Stalin, by contrast, displays the same unity of corporeal, com-
municative and political supremacy that was preventing role exchange
on various levels. Firstly, the only relevance in turn-taking between the
Soviet leader and his audiences is built upon the audience’s indexical
reference to the speaker’s body (Plamper 2003; Rolf 2004): in effect, this
renders the symbolic information transmitted in natural language ir-
relevant. Secondly, the placement of the audience response outside
of the speaker’s narrative eliminates even the theoretical obstacles to
his perpetual self-selection, widening the gap between the topical or-
ganization of the speaker’s turns and the indexical organization of the
audience responses. This absolutization of communicative supremacy
as a thinly veiled metonymy for political power is evident in the press
coverage of the 8th Congress of Soviet, where Stalin on November 25th,
1936 presenting the new Soviet Constitution to the delegates: during the
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Congress, the party newspaper Pravda almost exlusively refers to the
Soviet leader as “the speaker” (“dokladqik”) whose audience extends
to the “whole country” and then eventually to “the whole world”.3
Looking at this example, it is hard to avoid the impression that
transmission of new information between the leader and the followers
through channels with high throughput capacity (natural language be-
ing one of them) is a low priority for totalitarian communication. Rather,
it is the circulation of the same pair of familiar messages affirming—
depending on the viewpoint—protection or loyalty and expressed in
incontestable, unequivocal non-verbal terms which gets the upper hand
in the communicative process (for a general perspective, see: Barker
2001: 83; Leese 2007: 631). It is perhaps understandable that the polit-
ical system containing so many asymmetries and so few mechanisms
of their harmonization, stakes at reducing information flows in order to
minimize the emerging complexity and maintain autopoetic closeness
and homeostatic stability. (Indeed, even the better balanced systems
of a similar kind react to the maximum tension by sticking to the fa-
miliar script: this is, for instance, the case of American politics at the
climax of presidential electoral cycle when the candidate’s reiteration of
“convictions” values higher than consistency of any kind (see: Lempert
2009: 233). But it seems also predictable that uncontrolled repetitive-
ness bordering on circularity, utter neglect of symbolic codes and weak
differentiation between action and communication, messages and mes-
sengers start at a certain point posing serious obstacles for transmitting
systemically relevant information.
One of the serial problems caused by this unorthodox distribution
of contingency and stability within the system is the malfunctioning of
its feedback chains—the problem generally known for its destructive
potential (Wiener 1948: 235). When the more or less extensive ideo-
logical message, sent from leader to followers, undergoes reality check
and comes back enriched with some relevant environmental data, the
automatisms of simple indexical codes, coupled with the atrophy of
complexer abstract references, sometimes present the original replica
in a curiously distorted form. On a general level of code management,
the fusion of concrete individuals with their political functions (lead-
ers/followers) and communicative roles (speakers/listeners) encouraged
indiscriminate (and wasteful) code-switching, common for all commu-
3 | Hitler’s discursive performance, by contrast, is presented in German media
as a barely distinguishable part of his general activity (see my other article in this
volume).
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nication contexts centered on power maintenance (Jan 2003; see also:
Gorham 2003).
Consequently, in the followers reception of the leader’s political
speech, all three preconditions of understanding between communica-
tors (physical co-presence, normatively describable social distance, and
conventionally coded semantics of the message) are jumbled up. This
confusion of different codes is detectable on various levels of language,
including the basal subject-predicate relations within a sentence. Thus
in a published sample of 43 letters addressed by Soviet citizens to their
leaders in 1937, the new soviet Constitution, passed at the 8th Congress
of Soviets, is mentioned 10 times (Livshin, Orlov and Khlevniuk 2002:
325-392). While only a half of these references is thematically related to
the source text (including one mistaken and two very unspecific refer-
ences to “rights” and “freedoms”), all of the references indexically link
the soviet General Law to the speaker who introduced it at the Congress
(“stalinska Konstituuia”). The latter word combination brings
to mind the similar neologisms in Nazi vocabulary (from Führereinsatz
to Führerprinzip), all incongruously combining the routine indexical
reference to the leader’s unique personality with just about any govern-
mental activity or norm, big or important enough to justify indisputable
sanction (the lists are provided in: Berning 1964: 244-247; Brackmann
1988: 77-78).
This data attests to the persistence of stabilizing communication out-
side of ceremonial context which, ironically, leads to the even bigger in-
stability as the perfunctory reproduction of protection/loyalty exchange,
common in rituals (Chwe 2001: 29; specifically for Stalinist rule see:
Kertzer 1988: 181; Glebkin 1998: 93; Brooks 2000: 67), spins out of con-
trol: sticking to this trodden circular route, feedback messages fail to
feed the center of the system with the crucial information about its bor-
derline areas. This growing semantic gap between socially relevant turns
in communication exchanges leaves explosive amounts of information
on both ends of the system unprocessed (Hoffmann 1969; Hoffmann
1973: 203; Barry 1994: 93), so that its mere storing, let alone transporting
to the top of the system, becomes a risky affair. The pressure of this
risk might explain the unceasing construction of redundant and ever
more secretive feedback channels, firewalled from the environment and,
increasingly, from the system itself (Rosenfeldt 1991: 145). The case in
point was the simultaneity of Stalin’s consolidation of personal power
and his personalization of security service control (see the most recent
survey and analysis in: Khlevniuk 2008: 248-271). But even this single-
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handed management of system was showing breakup tendencies (Rees
2002: 208), so that at the end of his rule Stalin, if we are to believe Nikita
Khrushchev, mistrusted himself no less than everyone else (Khrushchev
1971: 84).
* * *
Although it has been already hinted at the link between the human
ability to exchange roles and the citizens’ right to retroactively adjust
unfitting remarks or gestures to the situation, the same connection could
perhaps be better described a contrario. It seems like one of the reasons
for the staunch resistance of ritualistic practices to cast substitution is
their semiotic underdevelopment, which reveals itself in the absolute
prevalence of the whole over its parts (Rappaport 1999: 151). The fact
that rituals are not to be interrupted or rolled back is probably due to the
fact that their semantics cannot be subdivided into replaceable symbols
with generic meanings (Baiburin 1993: 14). Indeed, he continuous script
of a ritual imitates the irreversible flow of a “natural” (dissipative) system,
and its halt or replay would be synonymous to death: spontaneous
“backward-looking” duplication of human identity, common in reflexive
thinking and repairing actions (such as apologies), has no place in rites
and ceremonies.
This anthropological given makes probable the positive correlation
between the resistance to role exchange and the banishment of repairs
from social practice. The top-down argument in favor of this correla-
tion is plausible but rather trivial and of questionable systemic rele-
vance. Confession, the best-known institutional practice of social repair
adapted in part by legal systems, had explicit “primary frameworks”
(secular or sacred law) and a relatively stable pragmatic efficiency: few
notable exceptions aside, every apology uttered in a European court
or a confessional would improve the chances for freedom, life or at
least salvation (Dülmen 1997: 45). But as soon as the explicitness, inter-
subjectivity and latency of norms succumbs to the self-referentiality of
leaders’ discourse—as was the case with the “laws” of history and nature
invented by the Third Reich ideologues (Arendt 1958: 474, 477)—the
number of communicative agents qualified for repair shrinks accord-
ingly. Unsurprisingly, the banishment of other-correction on a large
scale excludes it from public communication and turns backwards the
timing of the remedial procedure: the conflict between social norm and
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individual violation is reduced to the discrepancy between the speaker
now and the speaker then, which is invariably resolved in favor of the
most recent (i.e. most ideologically pertinent or strategically advan-
tageous) position. A case in point is the history of Communist party,
which was rewritten five times in fifteen years (1923-1938) in order to
retroactively adjust the canonized (normative) past to the swelling of
absolutism, complemented by the steady growth of the internal enemies’
circle (Wolfe 1969: 296).
It seems like the opposite, bottom-up perspective on confessionmight
shed more light on the systemic differentiations of communication in
“democratic” and “totalitarian” systems by bringing into view the group
of interaction agents, temporarily or permanently disadvantaged in so-
cial, political and communicative sense. Overall, the differentiation
between body and social status, or between social status and commu-
nicative role seems to be theminimal precondition for the “second-order
communication”—reflexivity needed for successful repair (Harré and
Langenhove 1992: 396; Baecker 1999: 188): for instance, the imaginary
“return” to the original state which existed before the awkward move,
wrong deed or false assertion presupposes the unchangeable core of the
subject (for example, its bodily integrity) which guarantees the validity
of self-reference throughout the repairing process (for a summary of
relevant theories see: Postoutenko 2007; Postoutenko 2010). But as long
as body is indistinguishable from social status (as in Nazi racist ethnoc-
racy), or social status is invariably tied to political role (as in Bolshevik
proletarian dictatorship), the productive reflexivity of excuse ceases to
exist (see respectively: Poliakov, Delacampagne and Girard 1976; Ennker
1996: 112-113; Werth 1999: 42). In such a context, the remedial commu-
nication of the “enemy” is refused any informational value and treated as
yet another hostile action (Kharkhordin 2002: 52-53; Studer 2003). Small
wonder that under this circumstances, repairs disappear from all but the
lowest levels of interactional systems on both ends of communication.
The following examples contrast this disappearance with the “normal”
practices.
1. (Franklin D. Roosevelt): “And here and now I invite these nominal
Republicans who find that their conscience cannot be squared
with the groping and the failure of their party leaders to join hands
with us” (Roosevelt 1932: 71);
2. (Adolf Hitler): “Meine Prophezeiung wird ihre Erfüllung finden,
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dass durch diesen Krieg nicht die arische Menschheit vernichtet,
sondern der Jude ausgerottet werden wird” (Hitler 1942, 116);
3. (Nikolai Bukharin): “Vsem vidno mudroe rukovodstvo stra-
no, kotoroe obespeqeno Stalinym. S 	tim soznaniem
 du prigovora. Delo ne v liqnyh pereivanih ra-
skavxegos vraga, a v rasvete SSSR, v ego me-
dunarodnom znaqenii” (Iodkovskii 1938: 344).
Ostensibly, it is precisely the dualism of human nature staking personal
identity as an anchor of stability (essential goodness of human being)
against its mistaken moral (bad consciousness) and political (nominal
Republicanism) stance, which allows Roosevelt to suggest reconciliation
via self-correction to the bitter political rival. For Hitler, by contrast,
the essential faultiness of Untermensch makes any further differentia-
tion pointless, any search for reversible social and political attributes
misplaced and, ultimately, any self- or other correction deceptive. The
last word of Nicholai Bukharin at his 1938 show trial, presents an even
more curious case of non-differentiation: one of the most respected fol-
lowers of Lenin refuses—in defiance of the legal tradition and common
sense—to make any personal statement disputing fantastic accusations
mounted against him, or at least hinting at self-correction in the fu-
ture. Instead, the broken-down Bolshevik invalidates his own possible
remedial statement by adopting the stance of prosecution, including
not only its derisive language but also its interactional stance and even
grammatical form, addressing himself in the third person (“It’s not about
the personal feelings of the repentant enemy”). At this point not only the
equilibrium of the adversary trial, questionable from the start, falls apart,
but the mere distribution of interactional roles turns into a perfunctory
formality.
But the paradoxes of totalitarian communication arguably go beyond
this simplified polarization of interactional stances, taking their roots
in excessive and misapplied stabilization mechanisms of the system in
general. The wobbly asymmetrical construction of authoritarian state
was further destabilized by its multiple hyperbolic reenactment in com-
munication process, but the frantic attempts to control this colossus
with feet of clay by eliminating all uncertainty and doubt were auto-
matically blocking the production of information (Shannon and Weaver
1949: 13; Cherry 1966: 171). As a result, the overdetermined and still
imbalanced communicative system consisting of unchangeable roles,
inflexible turn-allocation and irreparable interactional spheres was re-
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duced to ceaselessly copycatting its past stability. Being out of touch
with its own environment (Rittersporn, Behrends and Rolf 2003: 35),
totalitarian communication could neither preempt nor adapt to exter-
nal challenges and internal ruptures: the loyalty of Soviet media, for
instance, was only partially useful, because they were increasingly seen
by readers as “uninformative” (Dzirkals, Guistafson and Johnson 1982:
67). For such and similar reasons, perhaps, it ended up dissipating into
nonviable subsystems with little relation to each other: the fruitless
search of Kremlinologists for esoteric communication in Soviet media
attests not so much to the misleading lastingness of the Soviet façade as
to its rotten interior (Dzirkals, Guistafson and Johnson 1982: 69).
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Stalinist Rule and Its Communication Practices
An Overview
LORENZ ERREN
In the present article, I will attempt to outline the communicative aspect
of Stalin’s dictatorship and pose for discussion a number of conclusions
I reached while writing my dissertation (Erren 2008). Throughout the
text, the concepts of “social relationship”, “power”, and “domination”
[Herrschaft] will be based on the classical definitions of Max Weber.
Following Niklas Luhmann, I will furthermore presuppose that social
relationships, power, and domination can be established only by means
of communication, while stressing the fact that under Stalin the lat-
ter largely took place in the context of a “public of physically present
individuals”.
Obshchestvennost’ in Social Space and Historical Context
The Soviet Union inherited the forms of communication and media for-
mats that emerged in the constitutional states of the nineteenth century,
where, according to Habermas, they constituted a rational, discursive
“liberal public sphere” [bürgerliche Öffentlichkeit]. With some delay, this
development also occurred in late Tsarist Russia (Habermas 1962; Ha-
gen 1982). The dictatorship of the Bolsheviks eliminated these early
beginnings. Yet even after the October Revolution, elections, popular ref-
erenda, legal hearings, Party and trade union meetings, demonstrations,
newspapers, theater performances, and scientific debates all shaped
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public life—without, however, constituting a “liberal public sphere”.
Why then did the Bolsheviks make such efforts to keep these forms of
participation alive? The allusion to a pseudo-democratic façade is as
insufficient an explanation as the suggestion that they could hardly abol-
ish the representative bodies that had mandated the political takeover
in 1917 and to which the Soviet state owed its name (Carson 1956).
My thesis holds that Stalin’s political achievement consisted in his abil-
ity to create a new type of public sphere based on the inherited forms
of participation. This public sphere allowed him to control, modify,
and destroy social relationships and to refashion them according to his
own views. Similarly to other dictators with paranoid tendencies, Stalin
viewed all social relationships as potential sources of an oppositional ill
will that was directed against him. The communicative structure that al-
lowed him to avert this danger was Soviet obshchestvennost’. Throughout
the present article, this concept will be used to refer to the local public
sphere, organized and controlled by the respective Party authorities, in
which the entire loyal Soviet population was meant to participate. The
term was first widely used in the context of educational institutions and
in those cases where the usual discourse of “Party work” or the “proletar-
ian masses” seemed inappropriate. In the late 1930s, it belonged to the
standard vocabulary of the central press. It was commonly prefixed with
an adjective: nauchnaia obshchestvennost’, for instance, would thus
designate the entirety of scientists, professors, and students who were
organized in a specifically Soviet manner (see, for instance, the list of
references in: Demidov 1999: 253-263).
The most important element of obshchestvennost’ were the notorious
meetings conducted in all Soviet institutions. Before describing their
modes of operation in more detail, we must determine more precisely
the place of obshchestvennost’ in social space and historical context.
It was initially implemented only in places where the Bolsheviks had
already firmly established their rule, where theywere in full control of the
police as well as financial and media-related means of power, and where
the above-mentioned forms of participation already existed. At first, this
was only the case in large cities, where the population (especially clerks,
laborers, employees, and students) could be integrated into the new
public sphere in a relatively quick and uncomplicated manner. There
the regime could rely on the corporate and administrative apparatus, as
well as on mass organizations such as Party, trade union, and Komsomol.
In the provinces, villages, and non-Russian borderlands, this integration
was accomplished much later and only with great effort.
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Soviet meetings and elections always played a significant role in this
process (see: Alekseev 1929: 316-408; Anweiler 1958; Carson 1956; Leng
1973; Zaitseff 1925: 383-392; Bohn 2008: 524-549). They differed from
Western parliaments in the absence of clear statutes and functions. Hav-
ing emerged from meetings of striking soldiers and workers in 1917,
they resembled a kind of “permanent national uprising” during the first
years. Physical presence was of greater importance than the rules of
procedure. Even after the introduction of the first Soviet constitution in
1918 the assemblies of the Soviets retained their meeting-like character
(Gimpel’son 1995: 27). In the 1920s, the Bolsheviks viewed Soviet elec-
tions and assemblies as a “school” of political education (Carson 1956:
12; Kim 1965: 7). They perceived the election campaigns as a welcome
means of gradually integrating the rural world and the Asian periphery
into the Soviet communication space (Kuchkin 1962; Kukushkin 1968).
The casting of votes did not occur in private, but by show of hands dur-
ing election meetings. However, the Party also required the deputies
to account for their work at these campaigns (Anonymous 1928d: 4).
The propaganda organs viewed the representatives’ duty to personally
justify themselves to the voters as proof that Soviet elections were more
democratic than the parliamentary voting system (Anaonymous 1935b;
see also Zlatopolskii 1982: 240-250). In the 1930s, these public reports in
turn took the character of solemn ritual events.
The right to vote became of great significance for the process of inte-
gration in yet another context. Anyone who had belonged to the “prop-
ertied classes”, tsarist officialdom, or the clergy, or whom the regime
mistrusted for other reasons, was deprived of his voting rights and classi-
fied as a “socially alien element”. Hewas deniedmembership in the Party,
the Komsomol, and trade unions, as well as the prospect of an attractive
workplace or admission to a university. The population was thereby
given a clear sign that the revolutionary struggle was continuing. Only
those in possession of the right to vote could integrate themselves into
Soviet obshchestvennost’. It was highly significant that the possession of
the right to vote, of all things, became the criterion for distinguishing
between loyal citizens and presumed “enemies”.
The “Great Terror” of the 1930s affected different groups of people in
very different ways, depending on the nature and degree of their social
integration. Groups that were poorly integrated into the “Socialist public
sphere” due to their “alien” class origins or other “shortcomings,” which
exhibited a large number of “alien elements”, or belonged to certain
ethnicities, were increasingly likely to become victims of so-called “mass
45
Lorenz Erren
actions” or ethnic cleansing. The largest mass operation was initiated
through “operative command No. 00447” of July 30th, 1937, which al-
lowed for the execution and arrest of nearly 270,000 citizens. Apart from
the disenfranchised, the other victims of the countless mass arrests, de-
portations, and executions carried out by the secret services included
farmers who resisted the collectivization (the so-called kulaks), count-
less ethnic groups, and eventually such fringe groups as the homeless.
Members of this group of victims were typically accused of an anti-Soviet
attitude, but not necessarily of plotting terrorist attacks.
On the other hand, social spaces that were closer to the center, had
long been integrated into obshchestvennost’, and were generally not
susceptible to “mass actions” (such as the state apparatus, professors,
the personnel of important industrial firms and, not least, the Party elite
itself) became the site of the “witch hunts” that Western scholarship
has not entirely correctly defined as “purges” for some decades. Such
searches explicitly focused on members of terrorist organizations who
had cunningly “disguised” themselves as loyal Soviet citizens and were
allegedly planning the murders of Stalin and his comrades-in-arms. The
first of these campaigns of exposurewas triggered in late 1934 by the fatal
attack on the Leningrad Party leader Sergei Kirov. Within institutions
close to Party and state, the smoothness of procedures was ensured not
only by police and military means, such as registration cards, prisons,
freight trains, and barbed wire, but also through the mechanisms of
obshchestvennost’. All loyal Soviet subjects were obligated to participate
in the “exposing” of “enemies, infiltrators, saboteurs, conspirators, and
terrorists in disguise” by denouncing colleagues and superiors, or at least
retrospectively approving of their arrest. According to the current state
of knowledge, it is difficult to determine to what extent the outcome of
Soviet meetings influenced the NKVD in its choice of victims. Here it
suffices to point out that obshchestvennost’ supplied the state security
services with insider knowledge and social support.
Both approaches, discretely executed mass actions and the public
“exposure of the enemy” alike, were directed less against the affected
individuals than against the milieus and relationship networks which
the regime considered potentially conducive to political opposition. In
order to better survey these social landscapes, the regime carried out
large-scale eliminations [Flurbereinigungen].
Even though obshchestvennost’ only rarely became an arena for para-
noid hunts of harmful subjects after 1938, its significance continued to
increase. Until the period of Perestroika, it remained the most effective
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instrument for the complete domination of society. It guaranteed that
the regime would only have to resort to physical force in rare cases. It
supported Party functionaries, factory directors, and department chair-
men alike in disciplining individual members of staff. At the same time,
obshchestvennost’ allowed the regime to control whether and how suc-
cessfully these officials carried out their own executive functions.
The Public Assembly (Versammlungsöffentlichkeit)
Soviet obshchestvennost’ constituted itself by means of the assembly. All
governmental and societal institutions, from the Komsomol group and
the city council to the helm of the Party, regularly conducted meetings.
Together with other forms of communication, such as wall newspapers,
company bulletins, local daily news, demonstrations, and collective
sponsorships, obshchestvennost’ formed a large continuum: staff meet-
ings were covered in newspaper articles, whose content could in turn
become the topic of the next meeting. Categories of public law were
largely irrelevant to this process. Questions of ordinance, jurisdiction,
eligibility, and correct procedure were rarely deemed worthy of consid-
eration.
From a formal perspective, many of these meetings corresponded to
the types of committees that are found in liberal constitutional states as
well. And yet their purpose was different. Whereas public authorities
and enterprises in liberal societies expect their committees to ensure
the competent, smooth, and above all discreet solution of any problems,
Stalinist obshchestvennost’ was primarily an institution of the politi-
cal public sphere. Here, grievances were to be addressed vocally and
conflicts to be resolved publicly. It was characteristic of the Stalinist
assembly to outgrow its original function and sphere of competence,
and to permit itself to comment on issues of world politics such as the
Spanish Civil War. All the more so, it was concerned with problems that
were actually relevant to a certain environment. In terms of its structure,
these events were rather flexible and could easily be enriched with other
forms of communication. Depending on the occasion, the assembly
could assume the character of a parliamentary debate, a court hearing,
a memorial service, an exam, or a school lesson.
The direction of obshchestvennost’ was essentially incumbent upon
the official functionaries of each Party cell. Apart from the cell itself,
which consisted of members and candidates, they attended to a network
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of other organizations, such as trade unions, the Komsomol, the “village
poor”, as well as occasional initiative groups, whose members were in-
vited to participate in “open Party meetings”. These officials’ reports to
the higher authorities show that they understood themselves as orga-
nizers who were required to “incorporate” as many eligible people as
possible into political life and who were pleased whenever they could
report active participation in a high number of events. Occasionally, the
quality of Party work in cells at the local level was comprehensively eval-
uated. A key concept of Party activism was “attentiveness”. This meant
that good Party secretaries—in contrast to “ossified bureaucrats”—did
not simply study files, but were expected to dedicate themselves to the
people as well. In practice, officials attempted to fulfill this demand
by coercing citizens in their sphere of responsibility to participate in
assemblies, or even to become members in a Soviet organization.
Since hardly anyone could evade this pressure of integration in the
long run, scholars and historians of the Soviet Union have frequently
described the practice of meetings as an “artificial staging” or a “mean-
ingless ritual”. In my view, however, the term “performative” (or “per-
formance”) is more adequate. It similarly refers to the dramatics and
theatricality of the spectacle, but without prematurely characterizing the
latter as “artificial” or “inauthentic”. The term originates in linguistics.
In the context of speech act theory, it designates statements that simul-
taneously describe and carry out an action, such as binding agreements,
for instance. Even if it occurs in a disingenuous or coerced manner, the
validity of the act is not necessarily compromised. Stalinist assemblies
consisted of a succession of such performative acts. They served as the
stage on which subjects had to “speak Bolshevik” or “act Soviet”, i.e. to
articulate an individual standpoint in politically correct language. Every-
one realized that the request to speak (whether it was meant “sincerely”
or not) could have serious consequences for oneself and others, and that
one could be called upon to justify statements to both the authorities
and one’s environment. Actors and audience were identical; uninvolved
spectators did not exist. On occasion, the plot was highly dramatic, but
never fictional. The assembly was the space where the grand social
drama was demonstrated and made comprehensible on a small scale,
and where abstract concepts of propaganda were filled with concrete
meaning.
The public assembly ensured that the Soviet authorities would not
carry out their sometimes delicate assignments as “mechanical, soulless
apparatuses”, but as vital corporations held together by ties of personal
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obligation. At the same time, it served as an instrument of qualitative
“demoscopy”. It did not conduct opinion polls and was incapable of sup-
plying the authorities with exact statistical data. However, the assemblies
provided them with enough opportunities for taking their subjects to
task, provoking and pitting them against one another, and for attentively
reading their faces in the process.
Political Loyalty
The most important task of the assemblies remained avoiding the emer-
gence of opposition and providing the regimewith social support. Earlier
and more consistently than Carl Schmitt, the Bolsheviks understood pol-
itics of any kind as the differentiation between friend and enemy. Not
only their political language, but the structure of their newly created pub-
lic sphere as well was designed with the goal of continually reproducing
this contrast. Whoever integrated himself into obshchestvennost’ knew
that he was thereby entering the “halls of glory” and exposing himself to
a permanent compulsion to confess. Demonstrations, commemorative
events, voluntary subbotnik shifts, or membership in Party-affiliated or-
ganizations (Komsomol, OSOAVIAKhIM, the Union of House Wives, and
others) all represented relatively convenient opportunities to demon-
strate one’s political loyalty. However, Soviet propaganda demanded
support “not only in word, but in deed as well”. This could encompass
participation in “Socialist competition” and the “voluntary” subscription
to government bonds, but also personal commitment to the enforce-
ment of political measures such as collectivization. In the end, “deeds”
referred to performative acts in the above-mentioned sense of speech act
theory. Just as in democratic parliaments, the rule of themajority applied
during political votes in the Soviet assemblies—with the fundamental
difference, however, that the minority no longer enjoyed immunity. The
transition of the Party from an unprejudiced culture of discussions and
elections to a “monolithic” closeness was completed in the course of the
1920s. At that time, the Stalinist majority first illegalized the Trotskyite
minority through the prohibition of fractions and then outvoted, ex-
pelled, and finally arrested its members. Nearly all Party members who
had voted for the opposition even a single time after 1922 were later shot
(Daniels 1962). This approach was of paradigmatic significance not only
for the Party, but for all of obshchestvennost’. Those who did not wish to
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become “Trotskyist” martyrs had to agree with the majority vote during
political elections, which therefore almost always ended unanimously.
Stalin was virtually obsessed with all procedures that resulted in the
political taking of sides, the formation of camps, and decisive votes.
It is difficult to determine whether he actually believed that Lenin’s
former comrades-in-arms were “enemy conspirators” who intended to
assassinate him. It is clear, however, that he demanded proofs of loyalty
from his followers and subjects that hardly fell short of those of the Old
Testament God. Under Stalin, the political vote was not a civil decision-
making process, but a matter of life and death. It symbolized not the
fight between Stalin and his opponents, but was part of this struggle. It is
therefore no coincidence that the politburo initiated the terrorist “mass
actions” at the same time as the constitution overturned the voting rights
restrictions that had been valid until then. One enabled the other: the
“enemies” were no longer prevented from forming independent political
will by legal, but by terrorist means.
Even the admissions of guilt which were demanded of Trotskyites and
“right-wing dissenters” were essentially nothing else than the belated
retraction of a “false” vote. But their hopes of using such retractions
to reintegrate themselves into the Party would be satisfied only tem-
porarily. In the long run, their increasingly submissive expressions of
remorse did nothing but allow the propaganda to portray them as “two-
faced hypocrites”. Stalin’s paranoid obsession with the notion that each
drastic measure and every true advance would inevitably generate “hos-
tile” resistance and require violent reassertion, was enacted a thousand
times over in the assemblies. Where opposition failed to manifest itself,
the leaders of obshchestvennost’ knew enough ways to incite dispute
through unpopular suggestions and to antagonize their audience until
someone was finally provoked to an expression of disagreement. The
individual could then promptly be declared an “enemy” and “defeated”
in an exemplary manner. The same regime which at other times indif-
ferently accepted the death of thousands, ascribed to each individual,
however insignificant or weak, a grotesquely exaggerated importance
during political elections. Whoever actually or allegedly took the side
of the “enemy” during a vote would immediately attract the attention
of high-ranking Party authorities. Even school children who had made
ambiguous statements were occasionally forced to formally confess
their guilt, to distance themselves from their actions, and to vow self-
improvement (see examples in: Erren 2008: 234-235).
Skilled Party activists were intent on finding morally trustworthy wit-
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nesses for the prosecution. Authority figures were to be attacked not by
just anyone, but by individuals whose statements carried weight, i.e. by
their previously closest co-workers, their favorite students, their best
friends, and their spouse. This was to occur not anonymously, but “be-
fore the eyes of the whole world”. Such an arrangement had the piquant
side effect of morally discrediting entire groups of people even on the
basis of traditional norms; they thereby lost their ability to convincingly
represent oppositional viewpoints. The fact that Party members not only
approved the arrests of millions of people during the notorious assem-
blies, but generally accepted these arrests with almost no objections,
speaks to the skillfulness of Stalin’s methods.
Scholarship often expresses the notion that such meetings primarily
aimed at establishing a “truth” about the persons involved. This is only
true in a very specific sense. The very structure of the assembly made
it unsuitable for conducting insightful biographical or psychological
research. In my view, the interest in the personal history of individuals
was largely a pretext; it was of greater importance to determine how
someone would act in the future. The “personal truth” in question was
not elicited, but produced in this process: the individual turned into the
“Stalinist subject” in the context of a conflict of loyalties, during which
the individual had to decide between the interests of the regime and
his fellow man, between career opportunities and one’s moral integrity.
From that point on, the “truth” about any individual was firmly estab-
lished by each of his decisions (for a similar account, see: Kharakhordin
1999: 164-175). The later dissident movement arose from the desire to
morally resist this type of corruption.
Between Ritualization and Escalation
Obshchestvennost’ in Everyday Life
The history of the public assembly in Russia consistently reflects the
traditionally complicated relationship between the center of power and
local government authorities (see in details: Rosenfeldt 1990; Rees 2002).
Local leaders usually made efforts to suppress or control public com-
munication in their own sphere of responsibility. In order to accurately
assess the psychological effect of the above-described assemblies, one
must consider that strict authoritarian measures were generally taken
for granted in Russo-Soviet administrative and labor relations, and that
public criticism of superiors amounted to the flagrant violation of a
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taboo. During the NEP years, even Communist Party secretaries, Soviet
state officials, and “red” directors were inclined to believe that public
disputes could only harm their institutions. While they could not simply
abolish the institutions of obshchestvennost’ which had been introduced
during the Revolution, they were generally powerful enough to keep
them under control. If anywhere, this proved difficult in the factories of
the capital. The workforce there was accustomed to the representation
of their interests through trade union. As a result, the postulate of “work-
ers’ power” was occasionally interpreted to mean that foremen and other
superiors in “bourgeois” attire were no longer in a position to give them
orders. Sergei Iarov has described how even in these places the author-
ities were able to subdue workers with a paternalistic carrot-and-stick
strategy. The regime increasingly reacted to strikes with lockouts and
arrests, while local management disciplined their personnel with wage
differentiation and the threat of dismissal. In doing so, factory managers
could firmly count on the support of Party and trade union officials, who
gave priority to the increase of production. If union officials paid any
attention to the interests of workers at all, they were concerned with the
quick and discreet resolution of conflicts. The workers soon realized that
supplicating led to greater results than striking. During wage disputes
they continued to defend their position in “heated debates” with the
management, but always unanimously accepted their resolutions at the
end of a meeting (Iarov 2006: 500-501; Ul’ianova 2001: 155).
During the NEP years, company meetings were held only rarely and
not regarded very seriously. Factory supervisors preferred not tomake an
appearance at all, but the workers, too, were prudent enough to refrain
from participating (Schattenberg 2002: 103; Schröder 1988: 116). Wall
newspapers were in effect subject to pre-censorship.
No onewas outraged in the least that officials were distributing elected
offices at their own discretion and thereby confidently defying all con-
ceivable organizational guidelines. No one except Stalin. When he
initiated the “Great Turn” in 1928, he accused local officials of having,
among other things, disregarded procedural regulations and thereby the
dictates of “managerial”, “trade-union” and “Party-internal democracy”.
The propaganda of the time alleged that “bourgeois” and “right-wing
opportunist” officials deliberately mistreated workers in order to foment
anti-Soviet sentiment. In order to put an end to activities of this kind, the
new regulations demanded that every proletarian be given the opportu-
nity to use his voting rights and to “express criticism” in wall newspapers
and assemblies at any time, without any risk, and in an uncensored
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manner. Thereafter, Soviet institutions were required to provide evi-
dence proving that they “practiced democracy” according to the rules.
In some places, charts were used to document how often each factory
conducted meetings and how many workers had vocally participated
in them (Ingulov 1928: 44-45). Party and trade union officials who had
been summarily appointed were subsequently required to formally run
for public office.
The authorities in charge searched for ways to comply with these de-
mands while simultaneously avoiding escalation. They required workers
to discuss critical contributions with the company or union manage-
ment prior to the beginning of an assembly (see: Anonymous 1928e:
1.7). It was generally considered necessary to first instruct workers on
how to appropriately present any justified criticisms politely and in the
proper form. Criticism should not be broad, but instead always address
concrete grievances (see: Anonymous 1928c). Some institutions intro-
duced the rule that only the lower authorities, up to the raion committee,
could be criticized, while those superior to it were off limits (Ingulov
1928: 29-40).
The central press mocked such efforts, while simultaneously sending
an equivocal message. On the one hand, it argued, “criticism from be-
low” could only make professional life more transparent and thereby
more efficient. On the other hand, the press also expressed hope that
workers’ criticism would expose numerous “bourgeois opportunists” or
even “saboteurs” among leading members of the personnel. Yet it was
not so easy to break the workers’ reserve in 1929. They often responded
to calls for criticism by requesting guarantees of immunity (Alikhanov
1928: 119). Eventually, the propaganda organs made it quite clear that
they were intent on provoking scandal as such. The latter arose as soon
as important Party authorities decided to participate in the organization
of “workers’ criticism” themselves. They did so, for instance, by guaran-
teeing their support to controlling organizations such as the “Workers’
and Farmers’ Inspection” or the “light cavalry”. While public criticism
was supposed to remain “objective” and “constructive”, it often devolved
into a spectacle of exposure in practice. The head of the Workers’ and
Farmer’s Inspection, Stalin’s friend Ordzhonikidze, for instance, spoke
enthusiastically about a group of Komsomoltsy who had “inspected” an
institution and subsequently published portraits of employees who, in
their view, worked “too bureaucratically” (Izvestiia, December 21st, 1928,
2-3).
Stalin expected his Party functionaries to be prepared to demonstrate
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the meaning of the current Party line to the organs of obshchestvennost’
under their supervision, by means of punishments that were skillfully
designed to set examples. The regime was far from satisfied when in
1929 theUkrainian Federation of LaborUnions dissolved numerous local
committees that had been improperly elected. While it was pleased with
the result, it disapproved of the way it had been achieved. In its view, the
Federation first should have summoned large assemblies, encouraged
workers to express criticism, and relieved the officials of their offices only
afterwards and before a large audience (Izvestiia, December 6th, 1928, 3).
Because Stalin believed that the atmosphere in both administrative
agencies and factories was generally far too harmonious (the propa-
ganda organs would lament the “lack of self-criticism” and “vigilance”),
he repeatedly ordered comprehensive “purges” (chistki, proverki) to be
carried out. These were effective not because of the expulsion (or even
arrest) of large groups of people, but due to the embarrassing manner
of their implementation. A chistka meant that all issues pertaining to
the personnel were to be publically discussed. Every employee or Party
member was required to account before the collective for his social
origin, political biography, professional qualifications, behavior at the
workplace, as well as for his private life. The lively participation of the
public was expressly desired, especially whenever the goal was to ex-
pose and punish “careerist and over-bureaucratized elements”. In 1937,
similar motives prompted the regime to conduct re-elections in both
the Party and the Soviets. For once, voters were actually to be given the
opportunity of publically criticizing officials and even voting them out
of office. The press spitefully reported about meetings in which anyone
was convicted of misrepresenting one’s past or of abusing one’s position
of power.
During the 1930s, the willingness of employees to become involved in
the processes of obshchestvennost’ gradually increased. In the industrial
sphere, it reached its peak in connection with the Stakhanovite move-
ment, which was, after all, created for precisely this purpose. Dietmar
Neutatz has impressively demonstrated how the regime managed to
install a new, more effective model of dutifulness within the framework
of obshchestvennost’ on the construction site of the Moscow Metro (Neu-
tatz 2001). Instead of silently obeying their superiors, enthusiastic young
Communists explicitly expressed their agreement with the goals of state,
Party, and company management. However, they also gave proof of their
loyalty by complaining about the misconduct of superiors, by indepen-
dently calling into question work procedures, by addressing delicate
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issues and thereby also risking conflict. They unabashedly used public
posters to ridicule colleagues as “idlers” and “deficit workers”. “Within
brigades, groups, and shifts, the meetings or councils on productivity
established a public sphere, which the Communists and Komsomoltsy
utilized to affirm their decisions against the majority and to silence their
opponents” (Neutatz 2001: 459). However, a psychological need for
dramatization became evident not only in the explicit search for “sabo-
teurs”, “spies” and “enemies”, but even in cases where the only goal was
to increase productivity. Occasionally, workers would stage “Socialist
competitions” in the form of sports events, at which the participants
were urged on by their colleagues. The assemblies were also used to
celebrate the outstanding achievements of individual brigades and to
propagate their formulas for success (Neutatz 2001: 350-352).
Even engineers seem to have adopted a “dramatic” attitude toward
their work under Stalin’s rule. They no longer saw their primary task in
the organization of an always smooth and safe working process, but in
risky experiments and the heroic mastery of unforeseen dangers and
difficulties (see: Schattenberg 2002: 420-421).
It should be noted, however, that while company-internal hierarchies
were unsettled by “purges”, “Socialist competitions” and “record chases”,
they always retained their paternalistic character. Dramatic moments
of hysteria and chaos were in turn followed by longer periods of stabil-
ity. As soon as a new management group had firmly established itself,
meetings would once again be conducted less commonly and in a far
less scandalous manner. The organization of elections, the holding of
competitions, the submission of useful criticism from below in the form
of suggestions for improvement could all continue to occur, but under
the guidance and direction of the responsible bosses. These leaders
attempted to neutralize obshchestvennost’ by means of ritualization.
As a consequence, factory collectives might occasionally send the
“wise leader Stalin” a ceremonial speech that was composed in the Stalin
palace of culture of the Stalin factory, located at the Stalin Square in the
city of Stalinsk (Rolf 2007: 225-242).
The addressee himself had a rather ambivalent attitude toward such
developments. Where unanimity had replaced all conflict, obshchestven-
nost’ lost both its “connectionwith themasses” and its ability to establish
legitimacy. Precisely this occurred during the long “stagnation” in the
post-war decades. Even Stalin’s successors failed to break the cycle of
ritualization and renewed escalation. Mikhail Gorbachev’s attempt to
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revive obshchestvennost’ through nonviolent democratization ultimately
led to its disintegration.
Obshchestvennost’ as an Educational Institution
The gradual integration of the populace into obshchestvennost’ also
resulted in the universal pedagogization of public life. In the 1930s, at a
time when workers were desperately needed everywhere and employees
could hardly buy anything with bank notes alone, the mechanisms of
the labor market had lost much of their disciplining effect. In this phase,
the authorities learned how to utilize “Socialist competition”, comrades’
courts and public discussions about individual job performances as
a means of leverage. Union officials spoke enthusiastically about the
cathartic effect of public humiliation. Workers who had committed
small thefts and remained unmoved by reprimands from their superiors
reportedly burst into tears when taken to task by their colleagues. At
such times, obshchestvennost’ became the stage for touching scenes of
repentance and exoneration, of the type contemporaries knew from the
popular courtroom drama, which was widely popular at the time.
Stalin himself did not seem to have exceedingly high expectations for
the methods of Socialist collective pedagogy that aimed at the wrong-
doer’s re-integration. In any case, he enacted Draconian laws that man-
dated years of imprisonment for even the slightest tardiness or petty
theft.
Nevertheless, a general tendency to solve conflicts and challenges
through pedagogical rather than political means became apparent even
prior to Stalin’s death. Ministers, school children, and writers all had
to anticipate the possibility of being confronted with their sins and
mistakes before a public of their peers. In such cases, it was wisest
to apologize, vow improvement, and to appear generally ingenuous,
unsuspecting, and submissive.
On the whole, however, the Stalinist dictatorship of education should
not be understood as the project of creating a “new man” in the sense
of revolutionary utopias. Central elements of these utopias—such as
the need to overcome national identity, the abolishment of the family or
abstinence from alcohol—were soon forgotten under Stalin’s rule. One
can even argue that the concept of education effective in everyday life
under Stalin was merely a byproduct of the failed attempt to condition
society by threat of violence. Only once the regime realized that not all
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problems disappeared with the elimination of “alien elements”, did it
remember that its subjects—including school children—could also be
regarded as objects of education.
According to Kaganovich, one should “not beat to death” the guilty,
but “thrash” themonly until they bettered themselves. His statementwas
meant reassuringly (Izvestiia, November 1st, 1929). Anyone who had not
been declared an “enemy” was considered susceptible to education in
this sense. “Education” encompassed all measures which the authorities
took with regard to the people suited for education. Under Stalin, “edu-
cation” was little more than a euphemistic circumscription of the overall
treatment of people that were regarded as loyal. This concept of edu-
cation was entirely redundant. In practice, education preferred to use
methods that are generally attributed to “poisonous” or “black pedagogy”
today (Rutschky 1997). In the process, brutal methods of deterrence con-
tinued to coexist with penitent rituals of humiliation. Nevertheless, the
“educational principle” rapidly gained popularity among the subjects of
the regime, since it gave anyone who had been reprimanded an oppor-
tunity to “get off lightly”: the more a Soviet citizen seemed to be in need
of education, the less the authorities tended to ascribe his misconduct
to political motives or “ill will”.
After much effort, the regime and its subjects found a common “Bol-
shevik” language on this wavelength. Stalin accepted the role of the
“head of the household” and of the “benevolent father and teacher”,
while the citizens acted out the role of harmless children. The legitimat-
ing model of the new system of communication was thus represented
not by the enlightened, rational, and Communist Produktionskollektiv
of emancipated “new men”, but by the patriarchal extended family.
Conclusion
Soviet obshchestvennost’ was a formof communication amongphysically
present individuals. In this, it most closely resembles the traditional
village community or the pre-modern urban public sphere. The latter
presupposed the physical presence or at least the quick accessibility
of its participants. It thereby differed fundamentally from the mass
media public sphere of liberal democracy, which is based on methods of
distancing, de-personalization, and immunization such as newspapers,
ballot boxes, and free parliamentary representation. While modern
mass media existed in the Soviet Union as well, they did not produce
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any distance: in order to become effective, the meaning of their message
first had to be discussed, explained, and realized in the participatory
public sphere of obshchestvennost’. Mandatory meetings—rather than
the newspaper, radio ether, or the regulars’ table at the local bar—were
the decisive sounding board for political action. In the Soviet Union,
important conflicts were resolved in social spaces that typically aspired
towards discretion and harmony within the context of bourgeois life. In
these spaces, where everything depended on binding positions rather
than non-committal and anonymously collectable opinions, the regime
consolidated its social base of support. Those in attendance could be
forced to take sides in person. In this manner the regime succeeded
in distributing the responsibility for political crimes over an alarmingly
large number of people.
Stalin’s regime constantly felt itself dependent on the credibility and
authority of its supporters, and thus on a resource it was unable to
produce by its own powers. In the last twenty years, scholarship has
increasingly focused on the fate of the individual and on whether one
should speak of “atomized individuals”, enthusiastic “illiberal subjects”,
or “cynical accomplices”. It is not necessary to find a conclusive an-
swer to this question in order to comprehend Stalinism as a totalitarian
system. It suffices to note, for one, that the regime positioned itself so
skillfully that it was able to garner the support of believers and cynics
alike. It is nowadays generally established that Stalin himself initiated
and directed the Great Terror, and that it was not the consequence of
any blind “radicalization from below”. However, the fact that reputable
Western historians could temporarily reach the opposite conclusion
speaks to the alarming effectiveness of Stalin’s “publicity work” and to
the regime’s ability to corrupt and sway individuals (see: Getty 1993;
Getty 1985; Rittersporn 1991; Thurston 1996). Furthermore, Stalin was
less intent on affecting the individuals themselves than the relationships,
ties, and loyalties existing among them. In his view, individual persons
could be manipulated and exchanged, and were thus only of limited
interest—he thought in terms of political processes, scenarios, and situ-
ations instead. A number of prominent personalities, such as Solomon
Mikhoels and Osip Mandel’shtam, were eliminated simply because they
“disturbed the picture” at the wrong time.
In 1926, René Fülöp-Miller characterized the “theatricalization of life”
as an extremely effectivemeans of politicalmanipulation; themandatory
Soviet assemblies provided the stage for this “theatricalization”. As the
executive producer of obshchestvennost’, Stalin constantly chose from
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a variety of genres in order to project alternating images of triumph
and disgrace. To study the biographies of his victims one must realize
that their fate often depended merely on which scenario he meant to
be staged at a given time. Confessions of guilt and repentance could
at times be appropriate for exposing the enemy in all his “hypocritical
pitifulness”. On other occasions, they allowed the ruler to present himself
as a benevolent, empathetic educator who had once again chosen to
temper justice with mercy.
Stalinist obshchestvennost’ was without any doubt a panoptic mecha-
nism of power. It was arranged in such a way that its participants were
forced to monitor one another. Nevertheless, it did not have the same
effect as the sophisticated disciplinary techniques Michel Foucault de-
scribed in Discipline and Punish (Foucault 1994: 267, 278). In contrast
to them, obshchestvennost’ never guaranteed the “efficient, discrete, and
sustained improvement of performance in individuals as well as all so-
cietal ‘apparatuses”’. The Stalinist participatory public sphere was not
an instrument designed to implement a modern, rational-economical
concept of performance. Instead, it provided the arena and the cast
which allowed Stalin to stage the archaic melodrama of his politics.
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Public Communication in Totalitarian,
Authoritarian and Statist Regimes
A Comparative Glance1
JEAN K. CHALABY
Introduction
This article addresses the following issue: how distinctive was the polit-
ical communication system that prevailed during the de Gaulle presi-
dency? How democratic was it? To this end, this essay places the French
political communication system in a comparative perspective and con-
structs a typology that contrasts different models, placing the emphasis
on the ideology and elite mindset that underpin them. These types
comprise totalitarianism, authoritarianism, statism and liberalism.
This article makes two main arguments. Regarding France, it shows
that statism, particularly since the deGaulle presidency, has had a lasting
influence on the country’s communication system. More generally, it is
argued that political communication systems across the world remain
fundamentally different from each other, and that the democratic model
is better and freer than non-democratic ones.
Typologies of Media Systems
Over the years, several communication typologies have been developed,
none more famous that the one proposed by the authors of Four Theories
1 | An earlier version of this Chapter was published in: Modern & Contemporary
France 13 (3), 273-290.
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of the Press half a century ago. The four models are: authoritarian, Soviet
communist, libertarian and social responsibility (Siebert et al. 1963).
The first two categories constitute a first cluster, communism being a
radical form of authoritarianism, and the last two form another one,
the social responsibility model advocating the protection of freedom of
expression from the excesses of corporate capitalism. The classic study
constituted a landmark in the history of communication studies and
started a scholarly tradition of communication typologies (Nerone 1995;
Nordenstreng 1997).
In the United States in the early 1970s, Ralph Lowenstein and John
Merrill kept the original libertarian and authoritarian categories but
replaced ‘Soviet communist’ with ‘social-centralist’ (in order to include
all the nations of the defunct ‘Eastern bloc’), and substituted ‘social re-
sponsibility’ for ‘social-libertarian’. A fifth system was added, ‘utopian’,
to underline that none of the existing press systems was perfect (Merrill
and Lowenstein 1971). John Merrill subsequently developed his own
model, organised in concentric circles converging towards two poles,
anarchy and totalitarianism, and including four categories: libertarian-
ism, democratic capitalism (which can deteriorate into state capitalism),
democratic socialism (which can degenerate into state socialism) and
authoritarianism (Merrill 1974: 40-43). In the following decade, William
Hachten kept hold of authoritarianism and communism, widened liber-
tarian into ‘Western’ and added two categories in order to reflect changes
in the developing world.
‘Revolutionary’ designates press systems that emerge to overthrow
regimes, ranging from the French clandestine press during the German
occupation and the tracts of the dissidents in the Soviet Union to the
newspapers that advocated nationalism and independence in the former
colonies. The ‘developmental’ type occurs where governments of devel-
oping nations try to harness the power of communication for purposes
of nation-building (Hachten 1996: 13-33). Also in the 1980s, Robert
Picard split the globe into two halves, the West and developing nations,
applying three and four categories to each zone respectively. In order
to incorporate the Scandinavian model of public sphere management,
Picard added a ‘democratic socialist’ category to the initial libertarian
and social responsibility concepts. The developing world was divided
into authoritarianism, communism and Hachten’s revolutionary and
developmental types (Picard 1985).
In Europe, typologies have been fewer and far between, probably be-
cause the American attempts were seen as ideologically suspicious and
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as by-products of the Cold War. Preference has leant towards the con-
trasting of ideal types, such as James Curran’s ‘free-market liberal’ and
‘collectivist-statist’, or Colin Sparks’s ‘communist totalitarian’ and ‘bour-
geois democracy’ (Curran 1991; Sparks and Reading 1998: 35-6). Nev-
ertheless, Raymond Williams in the early 1960s suggested a distinction
between authoritarian, paternal (a gentler form of authoritarianism),
commercial (market-driven) and democratic communication systems
(Williams 1976: 129-137). Denis McQuail’s early work stands closest to
that of American authors, completing Four Theories with two categories:
‘development media’ and ‘democratic-participant’ (McQuail 1983: 84-
98). This typology was subsequently revised by a collaborative effort led
by Kaarle Nordenstreng. The purpose was to adapt normative theories
of the press to contemporary trends such as globalisation and the emer-
gence of new media. The authors chose to restrict themselves to demo-
cratic regimes, distinguishing five paradigms, or perspectives, that over-
lap and can co-exist within the same media system: liberal-individualist,
social responsibility, critical, administrative and cultural negotiation
(Nordenstreng 1997; McQuail 2000: 160-162). More recently, Curran and
Park proposed a classification that combines economic and political
criteria. Types include ‘transitional and mixed societies’ (e.g. China
and Russia), ‘authoritarian neo-liberal societies’ (e.g. South Korea and
Taiwan), ‘authoritarian regulated societies’ (e.g. Egypt and Zimbabwe),
‘democratic neo-liberal societies’ (e.g. Japan and the United States) and
‘democratic regulated societies’ (e.g. Italy, Sweden and France) (Curran
and Park 2000).
Intellectually stimulating as these typologies might be, the amount of
criticism levelled against them raises the issue of their purpose. Do they
not constitute a naive attempt to comprehend an increasingly complex
reality? Are they not condemned to betray an ethnocentric vision of the
world media? Much of the answer rests with the manner in which these
models are constructed and applied. Three options establish the nature
of a communication typology.
A model’s internal coherence is determined by the criteria selected to
distinguish different types. These criteria need to be limited in num-
ber, be made explicit, and applied in a systematic manner across the
board. This theoretical underpinning is arguably the analyst’s most diffi-
cult task and the Achilles heel of many models. A typology scope is set
by two possible strategies. The ‘tentpoles’ route consists in selecting
ideal types that constitute benchmarks among a wide array of regimes.
Communication systems either constitute ‘cases in point’ for a partic-
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ular type or can be approximated to these categories and ranged into
sub-genres. Those who follow the ‘continuum’ strategy prefer to avoid
gaps between types and try to cover as much ground as possible with
the main categories. The authors of Four Theories took the first option,
while Hachten or Curran and Park chose the second solution. Finally,
the degree of empiricism of a typology is determined by the objects of the
comparison. Some models contrast actual regimes while others consider
theoretical constructs. In the face of the complexity of contemporary
media systems, the trend has been to shift from systems to paradigms.
For instance, Nordenstreng and colleagues have decided to contrast
different concepts of the press, arguing that ‘each national media system
and individual media—even each individual journalist—shares more
than one paradigm’ (Nordenstreng 1997: 9).
The present typology focuses on the political dimension of communi-
cation systems, articulating the comparison around two series of criteria.
The first set considers the balance of power between state and civil soci-
ety, and between government and citizenry, and the accountability and
visibility of the political elite. The three media-related indicators include
the degree of freedom of expression, media independence and media
pluralism. This model follows a ‘tentpoles’ strategy and sets clearly iden-
tifiable types around which most regimes can be located. Regarding
the degree of empiricism, it contrasts the ideology and elite mindset
that underpin a political communication system as much as the systems
themselves. However, it is asserted that the political dimension of most
media systems falls in or near these types, which remain fundamentally
different from each other. It is also argued that these systems can be
ranged into a hierarchy according to the criteria set for this typology,
and thus that some political communication systems are freer and more
democratic than others. The Russian or Egyptian political communica-
tion system is not as democratic as the French one, which in turn is not
as free as the British or the American ones.
Totalitarianism
Fashioning a New Order
According to Raymond Aron—one of the 20th century’s most lucid ob-
servers of totalitarianism—the five major characteristics of the totalitar-
ian phenomenon are as follows: 1. A single party retains the monopoly
of political activity; 2. This party is armed with an ideology on which it
70
Public Communication in Totalitarian, Authoritarian and Statist Regimes
confers absolute authority and which becomes the state’s official truth;
3. The totalitarian state keeps a monopoly on means of violence and of
persuasion, and thus all media are state-controlled; 4. Most professional
and economic activities become part of the state apparatus and are suf-
fused with the official ideology; 5. As all activities are subjected to the
official ideology, any mistake committed anywhere becomes an ideolog-
ical blunder, resulting in a politicisation and ‘ideological transfiguration’
of all possible mistakes by any individual, in turn leading to physical and
ideological terror (Aron 1965: 284-285).
Totalitarian regimes are driven by revolutionary elites, and their beliefs
and techniques hold the keys to the role media play in such a system. Ac-
cording to the French philosopher, the three traits that best characterise
totalitarian elites are their Machiavellianism, cynicism and violence
(Aron 1993: 192-202). Their Machiavellianism involves a pessimistic
vision of human nature, an exaltation of action, and an attitude to pol-
itics that prompt them to an aggressive amoralism and exclusive will
to power. The same political attitude leads totalitarian elites to deploy
a range of techniques either to achieve or keep power that include the
coup d’état, the destruction of parliamentary democracy, the organisa-
tion of a totalitarian party and extensive use of propaganda.
Under such conditions, all personal freedoms are annihilated, includ-
ing freedom of thought and expression. The media organisations and
their workers lose their independence to become the servants of a will
to power that subjugates everyone and annihilates all civil society in-
stitutions. They become parts of the ideological state apparatus that
embraces artistic and film production, the education system, science
and religion. In the totalitarian state, the party’s monopoly on the means
of communication serves two broad purposes. The first is repressive
in scope and helps stifle dissent and silence opposition to the party’s
autocratic rule. Second, it facilitates the transformation of the media
into instruments of propaganda designed to indoctrinate the masses.
Totalitarian parties engage in vast programmes of socialisation in order
to fashion the new individual that fits in the party’s vision of the new
order.
Themedia in the defunct Soviet Union, at least during Stalin’s rule, pro-
vide an archetype. All aspects of the media, from newsprint production,
printing plants, newspapers and television channels were state-owned
and part of the Communist Party apparatus (Hopkins 1970: 28-31). Ac-
cording to Mark Hopkins, the Soviet press acted as the mouthpiece of the
party, conveying the ideology, indicating the latest political orientation
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and publicising the views and decisions of the government and bureau-
cratic agencies. It did not preclude the occasional and within-limits
‘criticism and self-criticism’ of the government and the Party (Hopkins
1970: 34). Other tasks for the press included mass mobilisation (newspa-
pers trying to secure support for the incoming industrial and agricultural
programmes), and the prescription of the right values and behaviour:
“Accounts in the Soviet mass media of criminal trials, of hooliganism, currency
speculation, pilfering, lying, cheating, loafing, drinking, wife beating, profiteer-
ing, slandering, and brawling are all lessons in how one should not behave, and
Soviet press reports ordinarily are bluntly explicit in saying so. They draw a moral
from the tale. In hundreds of redundant reports, the Soviet mass media sketch
pictures of the worthy citizen, husband, wife, worker, Communist Party member,
collective farm chairman, factory manager, schoolboy, writer, artist, government
bureaucrat, and even the national leader” (Hopkins 1970: 41).
Entirely driven by the agenda of the Communist Party, the content of
the Soviet media bore little relation to reality. The fundamental flaws
of the communist experiment and the countless social issues, from
unemployment to prostitution, were strictly off-limits and taboo (see,
for example: Vitaliev 1990). The privileges of the elite, their special shops,
restaurants, hotels and trains, were never mentioned either. It must have
been a strange—and frustrating—experience to read a Soviet paper, but
people had many reasons to buy a newspaper other than reading it.
Totalitarian regimes are largely a 20th century phenomenon, typified
by the rules of the Nazi Party in Germany and of Stalin in the Soviet
Union. Japan, before and during the Second World War, and China,
during the Cultural Revolution, also experienced the traumas of total-
itarian rule. The last remaining totalitarian regime is North Korea, to
which can be added quasi-totalitarian regimes such as Belarus, Cuba,
Libya and Turkmenistan. The leader of the latter country, President
Niyazov, has just launched the second instalment of his book at a parlia-
mentary ceremony, obligatory reading for adults every Saturday and for
schoolchildren every day.
With the fall of Saddam Hussein disappeared one of the last major
totalitarian regimes. The founder of the Baathist movement in the mid-
20th century, Michel Aflaq, drew heavily on the principles of the Nazi
and Soviet Communist parties (Beeston 2003). Saddam Hussein himself
was a great admirer of Stalin and modelled his governance on the Rus-
sian dictator. In Russia in the 1970s, he visited every single residence
once occupied by the tyrant, from the Kremlin to the numerous villas
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on the Black Sea coast. He was a life-long student of Stalin, on whom
he possessed a library of books that had been specially translated into
Arabic. He applied the same methods to gain and retain power: unre-
lenting terror applied first to the party comrades and then to society at
large, transforming himself into a mass murderer in the process (Sebag-
Montefiore 2004). As in the Soviet Union, the state-controlled media
subjected the Iraqi people to propaganda. State television offered blan-
ket coverage of the numerous commemorative events decreed by the
regime in order to rewrite history and glorify its leader. These included
the ‘Day of the People’, ‘Flag Day’, ‘Attitude Day’, ‘Day of the Noble Call’
(celebrating the invasion of Kuwait), ‘Science Day’ (for the first Scud
missile fired at Israel), the ‘Day of the Great Victory’ (marking the end of
the Iran war), the ‘Day of the Great March’ and Saddam’s own birthday,
leading to several days of official celebration (Cases 2003: 3-4).
Authoritarianism
Keeping the Legitimation Crisis Under Control
A fundamental difference between totalitarian and authoritarian regimes
is that the latter are not revolutionary in character. In fact, authoritarian
rulers often justify their methods by invoking the alleged threat from ex-
tremist groups. Authoritarian regimes rule conservatively because they
are geared towards self-preservation and the protection of the political
and financial interests of the clique of cronies that form the entourage
of the leader. There is no specific constitutional arrangement for author-
itarian regimes, which range from monarchies to presidential regimes
and quasi-single-party systems. Some authoritarian regimes try to mas-
querade as democracies and organise pseudo-elections, but their nature
is revealed by the longevity of the leader’s rule and his ability to pass on
power to his chosen heir.
The media systems that prevail in authoritarian regimes are shaped by
the administration’s communication needs. Authoritarian rule can never
be fully justified—even less today than ever in the past—and thus these
governments find themselves in a situation of perpetual legitimation
crisis. In order to keep this crisis as latent as possible, they try to control
the public sphere and adopt a repressive attitude towards the media.
Terror and propaganda may not be as systematic and widespread as
under totalitarian rule, but they are deployed with more discernment.
Authoritarian regimes last longer because their use of violence—both
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physical and symbolic—is rational and measured to the threat. The
same authoritarian regime that may feign magnanimity towards a fringe
movement will be ruthless against a significant danger.
It is not rare for these regimes to keep complete control over the
broadcasting media, often through state monopoly. Commercial broad-
casting companies can exist on the margin of the system but they are
usually controlled either by regime cronies or cash-rich state compa-
nies from outside the media sector. The press may enjoy more freedom,
but remains dominated by official newspapers. When they are allowed,
opposition papers are stifled with stringent censorship rules that typi-
cally proscribe criticism of the army and government and prohibit any
meaningful debate under the pretext of ‘state security’. Censorship is rife
and exercised through an array of means that range from administrative
procedures, subsidies, taxation, intimidation and violence. The judiciary
lacks any autonomy and therefore journalists brought before the judges
stand no chance of a fair trial. The climate of fear breads self-censorship,
despite assurances from the regime that journalists are absolutely free
to write what they please.
Censorship keeps criticism at bay, but the government needs to drum
up support for a corrupt administration which is out of touch with public
opinion and takes decisions that protect the interests of very few people.
The official press and its sycophantic journalists are on hand to praise
the government and acclaim the leader. The state broadcaster’s news
bulletins (protocol news followed by sport and weather) relay the good
news to the illiterate millions.
While totalitarian regimes try to change the way people think because
they might entertain the possibility of establishing a new order, authori-
tarian elites are driven by greed rather than ideology and simply seek to
maintain the status quo. Thus they do not care much about what people
think as long as they keep their mouths shut. This explains why the mea-
sures taken by authoritarian regimes against the media are not as drastic
as under totalitarian rule. Authoritarian media systems are more open
to foreign media outlets (as long as their reach is limited) and can re-
place relentless propaganda with escapism and entertainment. Comedy,
soap operas and theatrical drama, while often laden with commissioned
propaganda messages, can also provide a safety valve for those who can
read between the lines. Media reporting may not diverge from reality
as far as it does in a totalitarian system, but authoritarian regimes still
function without a proper public sphere. Authoritarian elites are little
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more accountable and have nothing to fear from public opinion and the
citizenry: leaders only lose power to plotters who are regime insiders.
Authoritarian regimes are in retreat in Latin America, where a perfect
historical illustration is provided by Mexico under the long rule of the
Institutional Revolutionary Party from the 1930s to the 1990s (Lawson
2002). Authoritarian rule is still frequent in Africa, however, and consti-
tutes the norm in Central Asia and the Middle East. In the latter region,
power is in the hands of a few autocrats, who reign with near absolute
power over hapless and destitute people, plundering the resources of
their nations and amassing formidable wealth in the process.
Statism
Reinforcing the Nation-State
I have previously defined statism as follows: “the system of thought
and the ensemble of actions and decisions that aim at reinforcing the
political, legal and symbolic means placed at the disposal of the state
in order to strengthen its role and influence in the social and economic
life of the nation” (Chalaby 2002: 227). Typical statist policies include
inward-looking industrialisation, interference in everyday economic
life, a degree of central planning, control over market mechanisms, and
widespread state ownership (Wolf 2004: 130-133). These policies flour-
ish under certain conditions, notably during the developmental periods
of nations. They are often pursued by regimes that are neither (or no
longer) authoritarian nor (or not yet) democratic, such as the Latin Amer-
ican nations in transition from military juntas in the 1970s and 1980s,
and several Eastern European countries after the collapse of the Soviet
Union in the early 1990s. Statist policies can also be adopted when the
ruling class feel that state power, legitimacy and infrastructures need to
be strengthened. In addition, the market economy is typically weak and
the administration does not wish to (or cannot) embark on a liberalisa-
tion programme. This can be due to several factors, including a strong
socialist heritage, the presence of powerful left-wing or communist par-
ties, and a sense from the elite that they would lose too much of their
power in a liberal economy.
Thus statism can be defined as amode of governance to the extent that
it entails a spectrum of typical policies and is fairly common in nations
in transition from authoritarian to democratic rule. Although statism is
a doctrine that can be found under several constitutional arrangements,
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these nations often adopt a presidential constitution, which typically
entails an elected legislature and a directly elected president in charge of
the executive (Linz 1994: 6). This political system aims to create a strong
executive by conferring key powers on the president. The ideal-typical
statist political communication system presents the following features
(allowing for important variations):
1. The state remains a key player in the public sphere and continues
to exert strong control over public communications. Broadcasting
is either under state monopoly or dominated by a very strong state
broadcaster. While the press can be set free, it will be subject to
tight regulation. When necessary, the government will not refrain
from direct intervention to reassert its influence in times of crisis.
2. Television is mobilised for general nation-building purposes. It is
considered a national institution, and the channels of the state-
run television are imbued with a certain prestige. They are granted
an official character, in politics as in culture. For the newly inde-
pendent countries, national television is a symbol of sovereignty,
like the flag, the national anthem and the seat at the United Na-
tions. Television is also used to promote a national identity, and
news and factual programmes must convey an image of the coun-
try that fits into the official imagery. History, official ceremonies,
achievements in science, sport and diplomacy are evoked to cele-
brate the nation and bring people together under one banner.
3. Statism does preclude a level playing field in the public sphere,
but is not a de facto obstacle to press freedom. Although the
government will be the dominant voice in the public sphere, the
opposition can have limited access to broadcasting and the press
can be free. It is often the case that political parties in opposition
compensate for their poor access to television by forging close
links with leading and influential newspapers.
4. The signature constitutional arrangement of statist regimes, the
presidential system, is a strong incentive for state control over
television. By virtue of their powers and status, presidents expect
and demand favourable political coverage from the state broad-
caster. The outcome is biased reporting, the absence of objective
analysis from journalists, and a dearth of public debates between
members of the government, the public, journalists and the oppo-
sition. News reporting is dominated by protocol news, the footage
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reporting the government’s and the president’s official activities.
In addition, presidents consider as vital to their tenure their ability
to establish a direct relationship with the public. They rely on their
charisma to create a personal bond with their constituents; state
television offers them the guarantee that they can communicate
with the electorate above the heads of state dignitaries, journalists
and party officials as often as necessary. Finally, control over tele-
vision is a necessity for the incumbents of powerful presidencies
because personal power is always more difficult to legitimise than
collegial rule.
Regimes with strong statist overtones (and which have often adopted a
presidential constitution) include India during the decades after inde-
pendence, Latin American nations in transition from military regimes in
the 1970s and 1980s, and several Central and Eastern European coun-
tries after the fall of communism, such as Croatia during the Tudjman
era and the Ukraine under Kuchma. Until recently, Russia fitted perfectly
into the statist model. Vladimir Putin had wrestled back control over
broadcasting from the oligarchs but had set the press free. Today, the
Russian president is using the Beslan disaster to consolidate power in
his hands, silence the press, turn the parliament into a rubber-stamping
body, revitalise the secret police and curtail regional powers. According
to present evidence, it seems that Russia is returning to authoritarianism.
France is the country where statist policies have had the most profound
influence on the media as well as other fields of activity. The de Gaulle
presidency from 1958 to 1969 can be considered the archetypical statist
regime, and Gaullism the most sophisticated exposition of the doctrine.
Its impact and legacy on France’s political communication is examined
in the last section.
Liberalism
Freedom and Capitalism
One of the criticisms levelled against the authors of Four Theories is
that their models offer different degrees of concreteness: authoritari-
anism is presented as a set of practices whereas the libertarian model
is constructed as a body of theories. Thus it is unclear how tangible
is the libertarian ideal-type: “Did ‘libertarianism’ define the press of
the nineteenth-century United States? If so, was it because people (the
public, the press, the state) believed in the libertarian theory? Or was it
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because the system (ownership structures, market considerations, legal
requirements) was de facto libertarian?” (Siebert et al. 1963: 18-22).
There can be no doubt of the existence of free press systems, such as
those that prevail in Britain and the United States. In both countries, a
body of laws protects freedom of expression and media organisations
against undue political interference. Political elites are accustomed
to a free press and expect public scrutiny of their management and
criticism of their decisions. Spin doctoring, which seeks to influence
media coverage of the government and political parties (see, for example:
Cottle 2003), cannot be equated to the means of coercion deployed in
other regimes. Politicians have developednewsmanagement techniques
precisely because they have lost control over the media.
A liberal political communication system is based on legal principles
and, above all, a balance of power between two fields: politics and
the media. In Britain and the United States, liberal laws and market
mechanisms have led to the emergence of a relatively independent press
in the course of the 19th century. Progressively, the press emerged out of
the shadows of party politics. Newspapers became self-sufficient as their
growing income from sales and advertising diminished their reliance on
political bribes and subsidies (Aspinall 1949: 66-102). As the relationship
between the newspaper and reader became increasingly important, the
tone of the press became less partisan and its content depoliticised.
Editors expanded news sections, coverage of non-political topics and
confined overtly partisan commentaries to editorials (Baldasty 1992).
Journalists and reporters acquired new fact-centred discursive practices
such as the news report and the interview (Chalaby 1996). By the end of
the 19th century, a relatively independent journalistic field had emerged
in Britain and the USA. This field has developed its own rules, norms,
practices, standards and institutions, set independently from the world
of politics (Chalaby 1998).
The relationship between journalists and politicians is that of inter-
dependence. Journalists use politicians as a source of information and
politicians need journalists to publicise their views. This relationship
involves both collusion and conflicts between the two groups of actors.
There can be convergence of interests between journalists and politi-
cians: political correspondents may hope for better access to senior
political figures, or their news organisation may pursue some regulatory
favours. Politicians need the media to communicate to other elites and
their electorate. Conversely, conflicts can arise between the fields of
journalism and politics. Journalists can be accused of bias or inaccuracy
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in their reporting, as illustrated by the standoff between the BBC and the
British government following allegations made by a BBC reporter about
the government’s Iraq dossier in May 2003. Politicians also occasionally
complain about the quality of political coverage and privacy issues.
Although liberal democracies promote freedom of expression by con-
stantly adapting their regulatory framework, no regime is without issues
concerning press freedom. In the United States, public liberties activists
are on the alert following several incidents in the run-up to the presi-
dential election, including Disney’s decision not to distribute Michael
Moore’s Farehenheit 9/11 and Warner Bros.’ refusal to release an anti-
war documentary. The rumours that Disney did not want to anger the
Bush family in order to avoid scrutiny of tax issues at its theme park in
Orlando, Florida, prompted the trade magazine Variety to comment:
“Just imagine: Lawyers and lobbyists perennially on the qui vive to determine if
any marketing gimmick, any news item, any movie, any loudmouth talkshow
host could cause trouble in [Washington] D.C., jeopardize a deal in China or hurt
cooperation between moguls. Such a scenario of congloms second-guessing
themselves at every turn is not so far-fetched” (Guider 2004).
As real as they are, these issues must be placed in context. These in-
stances of censorship receive a high level of publicity but remain iso-
lated.2 The side-effects of capitalism and corporate power should not
distract us from the liberal foundations of democratic communication
systems. In no other model do politicians have so little control over their
communication environment. Their acts and decisions are subject to
constant scrutiny and they live in the full glare of the public eye. The se-
ries of political scandals that have agitated British and American public
life over past decades, from the Profumo scandal to the Lewinsky affair,
attest to the vulnerability of politicians to public disclosure (Thomp-
son 2000). This stands in sharp contrast to the lack of accountability
enjoyed by the political personnel in non-democratic nations, notably
due to the absence of media scrutiny. Beyond the controversies over
sexual scandals, no other media system guarantees such transparency
of decisional and political processes. From a comparative perspective,
the openness of a democratic political communication system stands in
sharp contrast to the opacity of non-democratic models.
2 | For instance, Disney’s decision harmed the media company more than it hurt
Moore and did not prevent the documentary from becoming a commercial success.
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Gaullism, Statism and Political Communication
Modern France illustrates the impact statist policies can have on a polit-
ical communication system. Such policies were particularly prevalent
during the de Gaulle presidency (1958-69), since statism lies at the heart
of the Gaullist political doctrine. In the communication field, de Gaulle
spurned the chance to liberalise broadcasting twice in the course of his
tenure.
Shortly after arriving in power, a first reform approved early in 1959
maintained the state monopoly in broadcasting and the control of the
Ministry of Information over the Radiodiffusion-télévision française
(RTF). Facing constant criticism, de Gaulle’s successive ministers of infor-
mation were soon pleading with him to let them confer more autonomy
on the RTF. Following years of pressure from Alain Peyrefitte—the minis-
ter of information he had appointed in June 1962—de Gaulle reluctantly
acquiesced to a project of reform towards the end of February 1964. The
government forced it through the National Assembly in June 1964 and
kept concessions to liberalism to a strict minimum. The law might have
changed the name of the state broadcaster to Office de radiodiffusion-
télévision française (ORTF), but it maintained the state monopoly and
kept the ORTF under the ‘tutelage’ of the Ministry of Information. The
ORTF director was still to be nominated by the Cabinet, who could dis-
miss him at short notice. Half of the members of the newly created board
of trustees were appointed by the Cabinet as state representatives, and
none of the other eight members could be appointed without the gov-
ernment’s approval. The president of the board, Wladimir d’Ormesson,
had been selected by de Gaulle himself on the grounds that he was a
‘loyal servant of the State’ (Peyrefitte 1997: 175).
These two ‘reforms’ show the hallmarks of the Gaullist broadcasting
policy: state monopoly and governmental control. These policy choices
originate in the statist beliefs of de Gaulle and the presidential charac-
ter of the regime he inaugurated.3 Gaullism can be interpreted as the
non-socialist version and a French adaptation of a set of beliefs that
was common currency in post-war Europe. Time and again, de Gaulle
insisted that only a powerful and centralised state could govern for the
general interest and face down sectarian political parties, trade unions
and lobby groups (see, for example: de Gaulle 1954: 31-36, 86-87; 1959:
14-15, 41, 53, 285-290).
3 | This article focuses on the influence of statism. On the impact of presidential-
ism, see: Chalaby 2002.
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During his first spell in power, between 1944 and 1946, the French
leader (in agreement with the rest of the political class), nationalised
energy production (coal, oil, gas and electricity), the banking system,
the means of transportation and the main industrial conglomerates
(Bernard 1995: 56-58). He created an array of powerful institutions, gov-
ernmental agencies and regulatory bodies to give the state the means
to play a central role in the social, economic and cultural life of the na-
tion. Among these creations figure the Ecole nationale d’administration
(ENA), founded in 1945 to homogenise the recruitment and formation of
the French political elite, and the Compagnies Républicaines de Sécurité
(CRS), the anti-riot police forces (Teyssier 1995; see also: de Gaulle 1959:
330; 1970a: 145-147).4 When de Gaulle came back to power in May
1958, he governed France with a similar political mindset and created
yet another institution that made the French state more powerful and
centralised than ever: the presidency.
In this context, to keep broadcasting under state control was a matter
of balance between the private and public sector. When the state is
already entrusted with energy production, banking, transport and the
manufacture of a variety of products ranging from cars to aeroplanes, it
is logical for it to control broadcasting. Gaullism gave the state enough
power, competence and responsibilities for the broadcasting media to
remain a state institution and the state apparatus was vast enough to
incorporate a broadcasting organisation. French television was a cog
in a vast and ubiquitous state apparatus that dominated the life of the
nation and that of all its citizens.
De Gaulle’s statist doctrine comprises an element of dirigism, which
dictates that the economy should remain under political control. It was
not merely a case of keeping broadcasting in the hands of the state, but
also of protecting it from the private sector and market forces. De Gaulle
was adamant: “The market is not above the nation and the State. It
is the nation and the State that must dominate the market” (Peyrefitte
1994: 524). With such a concept of the relationship between the state
and the market, commercial broadcasting could not prosper in France.
Entrepreneurs and commercial ventures were perceived as intrinsically
4 | Notwithstanding the fact that the in aftermath of the Second World War there
was a large consensus in the political class to give the state a central role in rebuild-
ing the country, these measures fully reflected de Gaulle’s innermost ideological
preferences. He began to justify these nationalisations during the war, notably in a
lecture given at the National Defence Public Interest Committee in April 1942, and in
a public address at the Royal Albert Hall, London, two months later. See: de Gaulle
1959: 329; 1970b: 176-181, 197-204.
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alien to the national interest. This left the state with the sole legitimacy
to oversee broadcasting and de Gaulle the freedom to choose a role for
radio and television.
Television and Nation-Building
De Gaulle had several tasks in mind for broadcasting. First, he was
determined to use the state’s mass communication capabilities to restore
its authority. He once said: “This establishment [the RTF] should be the
voice of the state in France” (Peyrefitte 1994: 98). He detailed his thought
to his minister of information in 1962:
“Do you think [says de Gaulle to Peyrefitte] that the Third Republic would have
taken root if it had not been forceful, if it had not taken hold of primary educa-
tion, secondary schools, academia, history textbooks and most newspapers? It
imposed a fait accompli on a ruling class which was massively hostile to it: ‘La
Gueuse’! The monarchists, then the majority, were divided—as the right wing
always is—between three pretenders to the throne: the Orleanist, the Legitimist
and the Bonapartist. Thus Thiers concluded: ‘It is the Republic that is the less
divisive’. For decades, they propounded this theory and impressed it on the
popular mind.
The Left, the Freemasons, the unions and the Black Hussards [primary school
teachers], obstinately inculcated the idea that therewas no other possible regime,
that it was a dereliction of civic responsibility to imagine another one, that any
adversary to the regime was not a good French citizen. Even so, faced with this
opposition, it took the Great War to render the Republic acceptable to almost
everybody! Forty-five years after its proclamation! The new regime has been
established only three and a half years. It will need much more time to become
irreversible!
[. . . ] It is not the moment for a statute for the RTF! By law, you have authority
over the institution, its managers, technicians and journalists! Guard this author-
ity! The future of the regime depends to a great extent on the way this authority
will be exerted. One never knows what will happen! The time to ‘decolonise’, as
you say, has not come yet!” (Peyrefitte 1994: 497-498).
According to de Gaulle, the Fifth Republic would crumble without the
capacity to sustain the ideology needed to gain the adherence of the
French people. For the president, the national broadcaster was a state
institution in the full sense of the term. Broadcasting policy was not
merely about keeping control over television, but about the contribu-
tion television could make to the establishment of the regime and the
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restoration of the state as a central and dominant institution in modern
France.
Second, de Gaulle wished to use broadcasting to reinforce France’s
social cohesion. This was an issue of great concern to the French leader,
who remained deeply impressed by the divisions that arose between so-
cial classes in the late 1930s. He recalled the ‘large fractions of the Right’
leaning towards Hitler and Mussolini and vividly remembered hearing
the commander-in-chief of the French Army hope that the Germans
would help him maintain order (de Gaulle 1954: 37, 59, 70, 79). Once at
the helm of the country, he had a genuine desire to quell these divisions
and make France a united nation again.
A way to promote social cohesion was to bring people together around
the idea of the nation, and thus de Gaulle was constant in his effort
to foster a French national identity. He promoted the use of national
symbols and multiplied the references to national history in his public
addresses. He tried to engage the French people with their own nation,
and television had a role to play in this effort:
“You know [de Gaulle said to the minister of information in December 1963],
television can be an awful or a wonderful thing. Ben Gourion told me that,
first, he was opposed to the arrival of television in Israel. He felt that television
could distract his compatriots from the construction of their state. While they
had to transform the desert into an oasis, enlist people in kibbutzim and in the
army, television might lead them to amusement, idleness and laziness. Then,
he allowed himself to be convinced that television could be useful in giving
a common language and a common culture to Jews coming from all over the
world. As long as he held television in his grip, it played this role. But television
increasingly slipped from the hands of the state and it started to digress, talk
rubbish and criticise for its own sake” (Peyrefitte 1997: 178).
This excerpt best epitomises de Gaulle’s broadcasting philosophy. These
convictions nurtured his determination to keep control over television
and influenced his concept of good programming. This philosophy
emanates from the memo below, dated February 18th, 1963, in which de
Gaulle disparages the broadcast news:
“The news attaches importance to:
• the picturesque (the anecdotal is preferred to the exposition of reality);
• the pessimistic (catastrophes, massacres, crimes, are preferred to what
goes well);
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• individualism (the isolated case, particularly if it is malicious or offensive,
is preferred to the general interest or the attitude of the majority);
• the opposition (everything that is against the established order and the
activities of French public services, inside or outside the country, is pre-
ferred to that which is sanctioned, official and national)” (de Gaulle 1986:
318).
De Gaulle shows here his refusal to accept the inner logic of news and
journalism. While conflicts, disasters and generally unforeseen and
exceptional events are always newsworthy, de Gaulle expects broadcast
journalists to focus on the normal and the traditional and to accentuate
the positive in the life of the nation.
The president applied the same rules to fictional material and histor-
ical documentaries. He disliked dramas and history programmes that
presented France from an unorthodox point of view. During a strike of
ORTF producers in February 1965, de Gaulle instructed the minister of
information to take advantage of this industrial action “to get rid of this
mafia at last” (Peyrefitte 1997: 180):
“We should not let ourselves be impressed by their alleged talent! In reality,
these people are decadent. They always present the catastrophic, pathetic and
deplorable side of things. It is a tendency that has always characterised decadent
people! One has to prevent them from indulgently showing the pathological
rather than the healthy, the sluggish rather than the striving, failures rather than
successes, the shames of history rather than its glories! These men show interest
only in the ugly and the sensational” (Peyrefitte 1997: 180)
De Gaulle used to say that ‘there is only one history of France and only
one people of France’ (Peyrefitte, interview with author, May 4th, 1999).
and demanded that television programmes convey a similar vision of
the nation. He was incensed when programme makers approached their
subjects from an anecdotal or sensationalist angle. For instance, he
reproached Stellio Lorenzi for presenting Louis XIV as if the only inter-
esting fact about the French monarch was that he changed mistresses
about every evening, “without taking into account the grandeur he gave
to France, nor the influence and prestige of the nation in Europe and
the world during his reign” (Peyrefitte, interview with author, May 4th,
1999). De Gaulle and his followers strove for a national television, capa-
ble of strengthening national identity and reinforcing the emotional and
ideological foundations of the nation.
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Conclusion
Scholars who compare democratic and non-democratic regimes often
level off differences between communication systems and sometimes
reserve their sharpest criticisms for the impact of ‘evil’ corporate cap-
italism on the public sphere. Colin Sparks, who accuses the authors
of Four Theories of gross distortion and ‘ideological warfare’, spends
the rest of his book playing down the differences between the commu-
nist and capitalist media systems (Sparks and Reading 1998: 54). Like
the communist press, the British press is ‘partisan’ and its readership
‘class-stratified’, and the US press ‘generally operates in a monopoly sit-
uation’ (Sparks and Reading 1998: 176). The same agenda dictates the
choice of contributions in Curran’s and Park’s edited collection. While
some of their contributors strive to find virtues in the most oppressive
regimes—notably Egypt and Zimbabwe—W. Lance Bennett jumps on
the opportunity to argue that the American media are mostly about ‘the
production and reproduction of power’ (Bennett 2000: 205). In Last
Rights, John Nerone and colleagues rightly address some the inconsis-
tencies and inadequacies of Four Theories, but mostly blame the authors
for their bias in favour of liberalism. The nature of power in liberal and
capitalist societies, the authors contend, is not merely political but is
also economic in character:
“The libertarian theory, as Four Theories constructs it, assumes that in the ab-
sence of state control, the media are free, that deregulation (or non regulation)
necessarily coincides with liberty, and that the state is the only possible source of
obstruction to media operation. What is troubling about this reasoning is that it
does not concede even a theoretical benefit from rules a democratic government
may enact and, much more importantly, it does not acknowledge that there are
sources of control other than the state, notably the ‘free market’ itself. [. . . ] A
truly free press would be free not just of state intervention but also of market
forces and ownership ties and a host of other material bounds” (Nerone 1995:
22, 24).
This argument, frequently voiced by the British political economy tra-
dition, can be sourced to Raymond Williams, who opposed the ‘com-
mercial’ communication system to the ‘democratic’ one, on the grounds
that “commercial control of what can profitably be said [. . . ] also can be
a tyranny” (Williams 1976: 133). A central supposition of this viewpoint
needs to be assessed. It is asserted that democratic and capitalist sys-
tems exchange a set of political constraints for commercial restrictions.
The press might be nominally free in democracies, but the concentration
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of ownership and the search for profit enslave newspapers to market
forces and put them right back in the hands of the dominant class. All
things considered, there is little difference between the Soviet Pravda
and the New York Times, since both repeat themantras of their respective
dominant ideology and, in fine, serve the purpose of the local political
elite.
As this paper has begun to show, a democratic framework is a sine qua
non onwhich freedomof expression rests, and arguably all other liberties.
Democratic communication systems remain much freer than those in
non-democratic regimes. The issues they face are of a secondary order
compared with those confronting the media in other political regimes.
Corporations might have a significant presence in democratic media
systems, but it is the challenge of regulatory agencies to check corporate
power and make markets work for the public sphere.
It is time that we faced the inescapable truth that not all political com-
munication systems are equal. All public spheres are not equally open
and all political elites are not evenly accountable. Neither are these elites
equally competent, nor do they hold the same values: some are more
self-serving and corrupt than others. It is a shocking paradox that the
minimising of the differences between democratic and non-democratic
communication systems is often driven by the very parochial politi-
cal agenda of those who have issues with their own media: they use
comparative media studies to underline the alleged dangerous effects
of capitalism on the democratic public sphere. Radical chic theorists
underestimate the fundamental differences between democratic and
non-democratic media systems, and the advantages of the latter over
the former. They also underestimate the damages caused by poor gover-
nance, the misery inflicted on millions by inept and unscrupulous elites,
and the suffering of those who have to endure the devastating effects of
autocratic regimes.
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Performance and Management of Political
Leadership in Totalitarian and Democratic Societies
The Soviet Union, Germany and the United States in 1936
KIRILL POSTOUTENKO
The political leaders discussed in this paper are Joseph Stalin, Adolf
Hitler and Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Their choice was dictated by a
combination of similarities and differences favorable for comparison:
while all the three were chief executives in their respective countries
between 1936 and 1943 (the period of observation), the first two lead the
totalitarian states and the latter presided over a democratic country. An
inquiry into the discursive performance of political leadership in Soviet
Union, Nazi Germany and the United States of America could be the first
step in comparing the performance of social power in authoritarian and
non-authoritarian states.
But even this first step would be too large for a short paper. Hence I
would like to discuss and evaluate specifically the m y t h s o f “ a c -
t i v e ” a n d “ o m n i p r e s e n t ” l e a d e r s h i p i n a t o t a l i -
t a r i a n s t a t e, generated by Soviet and German propagandists and
taken at a face value by many historians, sociologists, political scien-
tists and linguists. Those myths have grown in different countries and
on the opposite ends of communication networks: the leader’s activity
was primarily articulated by Hitler in his speeches, whereas the leader’s
omnipresence has been staged by the amount of references to Stalin in
Soviet public sphere. In particular, Adolf Hitler and some otherNazi func-
tionaries have frequently used in their texts themetaphors of activity and
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speed, mobility and movement (including movement for its own sake),
action and dynamics (Bork 1970: 19; Faye 1987: 66-67; Voigt 1987: 64;
Maas 1989: 181; Weiss 2003: 319-320; Young 1991: 81-83). Significantly,
the Nazi activist language was not shared by Joseph Goebbels—Hitler’s
de facto PR agent and a prominent public figure (Betz 1955: 792): it
seems likely that this difference, favorable for Hitler, was not quite acci-
dental. Joseph Stalin, in his turn, stood out of the bland communication
landscape of pre-war Soviet Union by the sheer number of his iconic
and symbolic appearances, including posters (at least 500,000 during
his reign), books (16,500,000 in 1934 alone), postcards (10,000,000 of
just one press photo taken in 1929), portraits in shop windows (2:1 in
relation to Lenin at one of the main Moscow streets in 1933) and rep-
etitions of his name in Pravda editorials (at least four times in each
column between 1938 and 1951) (Alekseev 1982: 8, 114-118; Tucker 1992:
160; Sartorti 1995: 195; Overy 2004; Brandenberger 2005: 253).1 This is
not to say that the images of the “active” and the “omnipresent” leader
never overlapped: both Hitler and Stalin were called “ceaseless work-
ers” in press reports, title was endlessly reverberated across the media
spectrum in no less than eighteen morphological innovations such as
Führergrundsatz, Führerprinzip etc., and, after all, every second issue
of Völkischer Beobachter was decorated with the Nazi leader’s portrait
(Berning 1964: 82-84; Brackman 1988: 77-78; Herz 1995: 52). However,
the differentiation between highlighting action and orchestrating ubiq-
uity was quite apparent, and it is supported by secondary linguistic and
historical observations: for example, Hitler was not only admiring ac-
tivity, but clearly placed the action (“fight for the worldview”) above
interaction (“speaking” and “bargaining” parliaments), while Stalin has
proved his omnipresence by intervening in secondary affairs far away
from his competence (such as arts and sciences) (Rigby 1977: 61; Werth
1999: 40).
As valuable as this information is, it is not immediately related to
Stalin’s or Hitler’s performance of political leadership, and so far it does
not give us any clue as to how their self-centered discursive identities
functioned in public sphere. On the one hand, Hitler’s talking about
activity does not necessarily mean his being active by means of talk. On
the other hand, millions of books with Stalin’s name on a cover turn
1 | The similar correlation between horizontal and vertical circulation of iconic
references to the leader is noticeable in Italian context,where the postcards and
magazine covers depicting the leader were in the 1920s-1930s even more ubiquitous
than in Stalin’s Russia (Falasca-Zamponi 2004: 94).
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him into a high priority of a state publishing industry—in the same
league as Alexander Pushkin who also had some 18,000,000 of his books
published in 1934-1937 (Friedberg 1962: 195)—but fail to speak for
his strategy of self-legitimation. Besides, it seems rather pointless to
discuss any features of totalitarianism without comparing them to the
non-totalitarian environment: some similarities between Stalin’s and
Hitler’s political performance may well be, say, the common places of
power self-representation in the 20th century. Hence, to give credible
answers to the question “How the myths of leaders’ a c t i v i t y and
o m n i p r e s e n c e in a totalitarian state are related to their actual
discursive performance of political power?” one has to take into account
not only the crucial social dichotomy between the semantics of first-
person narration and the pragmatics of self-performance, but also three
sets of secondary distinctions:
between the modes of orientation: “egocentric” (1) vs. “objective” (2):
(1) I tell the right thing here
(2) President explains New Deal at the Senate hearings
between the communicative roles: “self (first person)” (1) vs. “other
(third person)”(2):
(1) [Stalin’s speech:] I send my greetings to the workers of
Donetsk basin
(2) [Pravda report:] Stalin sends his greetings to the workers of
Donetsk basin
between the political systems: “totalitarian” (1-2) vs. “non-totalitari-
an” (3):
(1) Soviet Union
(2) Nazi Germany
(3) United States of America.
The materials collected and analyzed for this project address the afore-
mentioned oppositions at different levels. It would be convenient to
describe this correspondence in the reverse order:
• as has been said before, the totalitarianism vs. non-totalitarianism
opposition was taken into consideration by choosing at least one
non-totalitarian country (United States of America) as a backdrop
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for discussing the totalitarian societies (Soviet Union and Nazi
Germany);
• the first-person vs. third-person opposition was addressed by
choosing two kinds of discursive evidence as far as performance
of power was concerned. For the self -references to political lead-
ership, a sample of political speeches for the period between 1936
and 1943 was selected (Hitler 1935, 1938, 1941, 1942; Stalin 1937a,
1937b, 1941, 1942, 1943; Roosevelt 1936a, 1936b, 1936c, 1936d,
1936e, 1941, 1942a, 1942b, 1943).2 In its turn, the other-references
to political leadership were studied on the material of the major
newspapers in three countries (Völkischer Beobachter, Pravda and
The New York Times) for the first three months of 1936 (first pages
only).
• the differentiation between egocentricity vs. objectivity was in part
overlapping with the previous opposition—but only in part: it is
clear that Roosevelt could refer to himself both in the first (‘I ’) and
in the third (‘President’) person, but for his followers only the latter
option was possible. Therefore this differentiation was studied
separately from the previous one on the material of the leaders’
speeches.
• Lastly, the narration vs. performance dichotomy was incorporated
by the sharp distinction between the narrative descriptions’ of
Stalin, Hitler and Roosevelt’s “activity” and “omnipresence” (sum-
marized above) and the grammatical manifestations of these prop-
erties (presented below in the Tables 1-4). The grammatical defini-
tion of “omnipresence” was straightforward and purely qualitative:
the more references to a particular leader were found in respective
texts, the more “present” in a public culture he was considered to
be. The grammatical correlate or “activity” was somewhat more
complex, consisting of two functional definitions—being a subject
and being a subject to an object, so that the sentences ‘I g a v e a
2 | For each leader, an approximate volume of 1000 sentences was analyzed.
Since beginnings, middles and ends of political speeches show very different frequen-
cies of self-referential statements—see, for example, the Hitler figures in Ulonska
(1990: 123)—the slight inequalities in the number of sentences (928 for Hitler, 1022
for Stalin, 1101 for Roosevelt) were considered to be lesser evil than the fragmen-
tation of sentences. The problem of choosing the proportional and homogeneous
samples was exacerbated by the fact that Stalin’s talks were few and Roosevelt’s
addresses tended to be very short.
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talk’ (in leader’s speech) or ‘H i t l e r w a s at the reception’ (in a
newspaper report) would attest to the leader activity, whereas the
sentences ‘The reception was i n m y p r e s e n c e’ (in leader’s
speech), ‘The talk was given b y S t a l i n’ (in a newspaper re-
port), ‘S t a l i n ’ s t a l k was greeted with ovation’ (in a news-
paper report) and ‘M y p a r t i c i p a t i o n in the reception is
important’(in leader’s speech) would not.3
The impossibility of maintaining a ratio “one opposition—one table” is
evident, since the different levels of language are represented by the
same words, sentences and communication acts that cannot be just torn
apart or divided into layers. Because of that, each table has a double
identity—it incorporates one of the dichotomies discussed above and
at the same time constitutes a half of another dichotomy (together, all
the tables present performance as opposed to narration). Having this
difficulty in mind, I formulated questions to each of the tables so that the
oppositions between the tables and inside the tables would be clearly
set apart:
1. How often do the respective leaders refer to themselves as objec-
tive power structures (‘President’, ‘Chancellor’, ‘Secretary General’
etc.) as opposed to others as objective power structures (‘Govern-
ment’, ‘Parliament’, ‘Court’, ‘Party’, ‘People’ etc.)? (Table 1)
2. How often do the respective leaders refer to themselves as the
individual ego-centers of discursive performance (‘I’/‘me’/‘my’)
as opposed to the collective ego-centers of discursive performance
(‘We’/‘us’/‘our’)? (Table 2)
3. How often do the respective leaders refer to themselves as egocen-
tric power structures—agents (‘I did. . . ’/‘we are. . . ’), bystanders
(‘tome,. . . ’/‘for us,. . . ’), or possessors (‘my country. . . ’ /‘our land. . . ’)?
(Table 3)
4. How often do the others refer to their political leaders as objec-
tive power structures - agents (‘Hitler gave a talk’), bystanders
(‘Greetings to Stalin’), or possessors (‘Roosevelt’s speech’)? (Table
4)
3 | I have deliberately chosen six sentences, describing just two states of affairs—
*Stalin giving a talk and *Hitler being at a reception. The contrast between the
situations’ factual similarity and their varying discursive realization underscores the
differences between the communicative setting (which provides the inventory of
codes) and the actual interaction (which produces social power).
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The following interpretations of the Tables come to mind:
Table 1-2 (“Omnipresence”)
Contrary to expectations, Stalin’s presence in his own discourse
appears to be much less pronounced than Hitler’s or Roosevelt’s
in theirs: there are positively no “objective” references and a very
few “egocentric” references to his own discourse. Hitler, by contrast,
demonstrates the highest and most stable level of presence in his
own discourse both as a third-person (be it ‘Chancellor’, ‘Leader
of the Nation’ or ‘Head of the Government’) and as a first-person
(‘I’). Roosevelt’s figures are more changeable—as has been noticed
before, his first-person references to self noticeably decline during
the war (Hinckley 1990: 124). However, from the purely quantitative
standpoint, the self-presentation of Roosevelt in his own discourse
is much closer to Hitler’s than to Stalin’s. Overall, all the three lead-
ers, for natural linguistic reasons, prefer “egocentric” mode of self-
reference to the “objective” one, and their adherence to the high
(Roosevelt, Hitler) or low (Stalin) profile is consistent across both
modes of orientation.
Table 3-4 (“Activity”)
The distribution of the performative roles of the three leaders in
the public discourse shows the many of the same tendencies and
groupings as the Tables 1-2: again, Stalin stands out as the least
“active” of the three leaders, whereas Hitler’s “activity” level is more
constant than Roosevelt’s throughout both periods of observation.
At the same time, two noteworthy differences separate the results in
the Tables 3-4 from the previous data. On the one hand, in the pair
Hitler-Roosevelt, Roosevelt stands as the more active leader both in
self - and in other-references. On the other hand, Stalin’s “activity”
figures are not as consistently low across the communicative roles
as his “omnipresence” figures: one could say that the image of a very
“inactive” (and very “possessive”) leader is much more manifest in
Stalin’s own texts than in the newspaper reports, whereas neither
Roosevelt nor Hitler figures reveal similar discrepancy between their
self - and other-references to “activity”.
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Table 1-4
On the whole, the results presented in the tables seem to put into
question the preconceptions about the interwar political leadership
formulated on the narrative basis. Firstly, the narrative of power and
its actual discursive performance may be at variance: Hitler’s hyper-
active self - and other-presentation in public discourse is consistent
with the myth of his “activity” circulated in Nazi narratives about
Fuhrer, but Roosevelt’s even more conspicuous activeness has no
similarly evident narrative shadow. Secondly, the link between the
rigid control of mass media in a totalitarian society and the maxi-
mization of the leader’s presence in public discourse appears to be
problematic in both directions—totalitarianism may exist without
a strong individualist discourse of its leader, and vice versa. In-
deed, the highest “activity” and “presence” figures characterizing
the discursive performance of a political leader are split between
totalitarian Nazi Germany and non-totalitarian United States of
America, while Stalin’s leadership, seen through the prism of Soviet
public discourse, is highly ambivalent: in his own speeches Soviet
leader appears rarely, in a markedly passive and non-individualistic
role, but in the newspapers (and possibly in other public media as
well)he is shown to be quite visible and even moderately active.
As the first discussion of the Tables 1-4 mostly challenges the simpli-
fied views of the totalitarian leadership by offering empirical counter-
evidence, it inevitable produces more questions than answers. How to
explain similarities between the discursive performance of leadership in
Nazi Germany and Roosevelt’s America, and why such an obvious gap
between the self - and the other-performance of leadership in Stalinist
Russia? More specifically, how two so-called “personality cults” engen-
dered two diametrically opposed systems of leaders’ self-reference in
public—one based on redundancy of ‘egocentric’ and ‘objective’ self -
references (Hitler) and another on their demonstrable scarcity (Stalin)?
Unless the numbers presented above are accidental or unreliable,
their absolute or relational similarities should point at some social affini-
ties between the countries of Hitler and Roosevelt. In fact, many such
affinities (at different levels) have been already noticed by the wartime
scholars (White 1949), although structuring these likenesses has rarely
been trouble-free. The most superficial resemblance (directly related
to the numbers above) was the fact that both political leaders had been
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significantly more self-centered in their political discourses than any
of their predecessors in the respective countries (Winckler 1970: 32-36;
Hinckley 1990: 109-112). What’s more, Roosevelt was also head and
shoulders above his precursors in dominating the public sphere: for in-
stance, the frequency with which his name appeared on the front page of
American newspapers was for his country unprecedented (Dawis 1987:
25). Unlike German dictator and Soviet tyrant, the American president
had at his disposal only indirect means of media control (Keller 1995:
154; for Stalin’s laborious image management see: Davies 2004), one
can assume that the noticeable symmetry between self -reference and
other-reference in Roosevelt’s political discourse was not a product of
administrative regulation from above, but rather reflected the specificity
of President’s political performance.
What remains unclear, though, is the level at which this specificity is
being generated. Some studies derived Roosevelt’s omnipresence in the
media a from the egocentricity of his 1936 presidential campaign which
succeeded in profiling the incumbent’s self as the major part of his mes-
sage (‘Democratic program’ = ‘first and foremost Roosevelt’s personality’)
and reduced the plurality of choices to the single contradictory oppo-
sition (presidential election = ‘voting for Roosevelt’ vs. ‘voting against
Roosevelt’) (White 1949: 173; Crowell 1950: 48-49). Other scholars see
the affinity at a deeper level, pointing at Roosevelt’s unparalleled and
often unconstitutional use of direct presidential action such as executive
orders, presidential messages to Congress, appointments by decrees
and vetoes: in 1930s alone, Roosevelt vetoed 505 measures passed by
Congress, which was 30% of all the vetoes since the beginnings of Amer-
ican presidency (Dawis 1987: 24-25; Cooper 2002: 40; Howell 2003: 6;
Schivelbusch 2005: 23-24, 40). Given these proportions, it is hardly sur-
prising that the similarities between Roosevelt’s New Deal, Mussolini’s
fascism, Hitler’s National Socialism and Stalin’s Bolshevism were widely
(and sometimes sympathetically) discussed in all the respective coun-
tries, except for Soviet Union (Schivelbusch 2005: 25-30).
It is impossible to deny that Roosevelt’s power performance was at
variance with many norms, traditions and discursive practices of demo-
cratic leadership: the fact that the President’s name and activity were
at the center of media attention throughout his term, reveals not only
Roosevelt’s self-centered model of political campaigning, but also his
egocentric praxis of government. But it would be a gross and useless
simplification to call his presidency “totalitarian”, or to ascribe “totalitar-
ianism” to American political system of the 1930s-1940s. Individualism
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and obsessive self-referentiality of the leader’s discursive performance
undeniably attests to the authoritarian tendencies of the social system,
but could hardly be its major indicator: Indeed, Stalin’s discursive per-
formance of power was clearly not individualistic, but his public image
and executive style were: for most of his tenure, Soviet dictator was
prone to micro-management and distrusted any collective body or self-
conscious social group (see: Werth 1999: 40; Ennker 1996: 117; Gill
1980: 171; Khlevniuk 2005: 117). Since it is evidently impossible to es-
tablish a simple one-to-one correspondence between the reflexivity of
the leader’s public discourse and the self-centeredness of his managerial
activity (see: Tosi 1982: 224), it seems practical to subject to a more
elaborate analysis both hypostases of public power performance, and
compare their interrelations in every case. The distinction, including the
breakdown to subcategories, could be presented in the following way:
• In terms of social performance (1), all the three chief executives
could be called charismatic rulers, each willing—albeit to a differ-
ent degree—to stake his mantle of the prophet against traditions
and laws (Weber 1920: 140-143). However, charismatic leadership
in modern society is usually intertwined with bureaucratic and
(less often) patriarchal power performance, and its stability is un-
thinkable without some stabilization—Weber’s Veralltäglichung—
by means of tradition or law (institutions).
• From the standpoint of organizational management (2), Stalin,
Hitler and Roosevelt played in their respective countries the role
of transformational leaders: highly visible among their followers,
they all claimed possession of the great “visions” unachievable
without followers’ sacrifices, and were prone to use the chain of
command to speed up the arrival of the happy future (Burns 1978:
121; Kirkpatrick and Locke 1996: 45; Tosi 1982: 225). Neverthe-
less, as the pure execution of power is only possible in the case of
absolute, transcendental legitimacy (like Divine rule), transforma-
tional leadership style is inevitably combined with transactional
one, based on leader’s communicative exchanges and bargains
with followers (Howell and Hall-Merenda 1999: 681).
Obviously, not only the two major objectives of power performance may
be at odds with each other in every single case of political leadership,
but even within the categories the performance may be inconsistent,
varying between different forms, media and areas of interaction. This
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inconsistency is particularly striking in Stalinist Russia (where self - and
other-references to the leader are so much unalike), but it may also come
to surface in two other countries if one looks closer at their interactional
norms and organizational properties.
Stalin (1): Charismatic Leadership (with some Elements of
Traditionalism) and its Bureaucratic Stabilization
Stalin’s charismatic rule was undoubtedly the most radical assault on
traditions and institutions, as its formative part consisted of progressive
usurpation of power at different levels. At first, Bolsheviks came to power
in an anti-monarchic coup d’état as a tiny group in a broad coalition of
political forces, but managed to force out the majority by means of terror
(see, for example: Fitzpatrick 2008: 49-68). Later on, the same kind of
power monopolization occurred on personal level: being just one of sev-
eral dozen Bolsheviks close to Lenin—he unquestionable leader of the
party and Head of State in 1917-1922—Stalin cunningly and ruthlessly
forced himself into a position of his only heir, having gradually stifled or
exterminated all the competitors (see, for instance: Ulam 1989: 234-286).
Unsurprisingly, the charismatic leadership of Stalin was from the outset
complicated by restrictions and incongruities. The paradoxical nature of
his inherited charisma—messianic communism taken over from Lenin
who, in his turn, adopted it from Karl Marx—made it difficult for Stalin
to prioritize his prophetic role (Thompson 1988: 103). Besides, the ten-
dency to treat Lenin as a communist Messiah was already apparent in
1918, after the assassination attempt on his life (Ovsiannkov 1992: 188;
Tumarkin 1997: 81). Unwilling to take a risk of removing the figure of
Lenin from the center of Bolshevik ideology, the party oligarchy after
some hesitation has opted for the construction of the curious “twin cult”
of a dead and a living ruler which stressed the hereditary nature of great-
ness (‘Stalin is Lenin of our time’) (Gill 1980: 169; Rees 2004: 9; Harris
2005: 75).4 For that purpose, a laborious effort of retroactively inventing
the new “myth of the creation” (‘Stalin as a leader of Bolshevik revolu-
4 | On the importance of double portraits of Lenin-Stalin at this period see:
Sartorti 1995: 196. In the Nazi performance of power, the streamlining of leadership
performance and leadership discourse took place in 1934 following the death of
German president Paul von Hindenburg and the murder of Hitler’s only potential
rival, Ernst Roehm (Mommsen 1981: 43). In the Triumph of Will (1935)—the
famous staged documentary of Leni Riefenstahl—the Fuhrer was the only protagonist
(Dolezel and Loiperberger 1995: 84-88).
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tion’) was launched around 1929, Stalin’s 50th anniversary (Ovsiannkov
1992: 200; Ennker 1996: 94; Suny 1997: 39; Ennker 2004: 85). Besides,
the strong rationalist tendencies of Marxism, retained by Bolshevik ide-
ology and rhetoric (Widmer 1987: 74; Sedov 1989: 441; Rees 2004: 16),
prevented Stalin from assuming the role of an individual mystagogue,
although his trumped-up status of the “coryphaeus of all sciences”—a
sort of Robespierre’s Culte de la Raison come alive—was in many ways
a simple translation of this role into non-mystical terms (Pollock 2006:
1). Lastly, the strong collectivist pathos of Bolshevik rhetoric precluded
abolition of collective bodies within Party and State, although their role
and size during Stalin’s rule was steadily diminishing (Werth 1999: 39;
Ennker 1996: 108, 116).
The role of tradition in Stalin’s discursive performance of leadership
was limited to transmitting charismatic power from the earlier leader
of Bolshevism—any other kind of traditionalism would have inevitably
compromised the revolutionary nature of Bolshevik teleology. On the
other hand, the active role of ordinary citizens in the Marxist ideology
made their purely passive, shadowy representation in Stalin’s power dis-
course as unlikely as the opposition between the hyper-active leader
and the passive environment, so prevalent in Hitler’s discursive self-
performance (Andrain 1972: 201). In fact, the speeches of Soviet leader
are full of tautological litanies to “masses”.5 Given these differences be-
tween respective ideological environments, it seems natural that Stalin
and his milieu opted for the bureaucratic routinization of charismatic
leadership (Weber 1920: 143; Kofler 1970: 39; Kershaw 1994: 38; Ennker
1996: 102; Kershaw and Lewin 1997: 21; Rees 2004: 3) which had no im-
mediate relation to tradition and entailed no ‘hero-worship’ (in Thomas
Carlyle’s terms).6 That said, at certain periods of cult formation and
transformation Stalin could not resist the populist temptation to boost
his leadership by demonizing “bureaucracy” (Werth 1999: 42; Ennker
1996: 102). But the direct expression of Stalin’s leadership in political
discourse occurred mostly in the field of other-reference, where other
scenarios of power stabilization were tried—for instance, the patriar-
chal one (‘Stalin, our beloved father. . . [teacher. . . ]’) (see: Sartorti 1995:
204; Günther 1997; Ennker 2004: 90; Walker 2004: 58). It should be
5 | “We should not, if for a single minute, weaken our bonds with masses” (Stalin
1937b: 226).
6 | On the other hand, the cult of Duce, clearly focused upon the personality of
Benito Mussolini, recycled the preexisting bureaucratic structures of the Italian state
(Bach 1990).
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noted, however, that both in Stalin’s own discourse and in the media, bu-
reaucratic tendency prevailed. Whereas Hitler’s forms of discursive self -
and other-performance reflected his neo-romantic, anti-institutional
stance, legitimated primarily by metahistorical ordo ordonans and only
conditionally by his followers’ approval (Galtung 1987: 52, 54), Stalin’s
individuality was seen in a Soviet discourse more as an alternative in-
stitution (such as ‘universal authorship’ or ‘national fatherhood’) than
as a personal self (Inkeles 1962: 25; Tucker 1992: 31), although from
the middle of 1930s this institutional roles were somewhat personalized
(Ennker 1996: 106). In this circuitous way, Stalin’s political supremacy
was reconciled with his negative self-positioning in his own discourse
(Tucker 1972: 146; Fairhurst 2007: 109-110; for the similar dialectics in
Lenin’s discursive performance of power see: Ovsiannkov 1992: 192).
Hitler (1): Charismatic Leadership (with some Remainders of
Legal Power) and its Traditionalist Stabilization
In contrast to Stalin, Hitler’s charismatic rule was from its very beginning
full of prophetic self-fashioning and anti-traditionalist pathos, but its
break with the institutional power was late and gradual. In a way typical
for messianic ideologies, the political demand for a Savior coming from
afar existed before the major candidates have shown up (Cohn 1970:
281-286): for instance, such Northern European ideologues as Hendrik
de Man or Ernst Junger expressed their yearning for Fuhrer long before
Hitler became well-known figure (see, for instance: Lepsius 1986: 56-57;
Kershaw 1987: 13). Although Hitler first tried to fulfill these expectations
in a Beer Hall Putsch of 1923, he came to power a decade later in a demo-
cratic election which gave his party an undisputed majority (Kershaw
1994: 34; Bessel 1995: 16), and it took the Nazi leader another three years
to adjust his self -performance to the mystical cult created around his
personality by Goebbels and other propagandists (Gruchmann 1973:
188; Kershaw 1987: 82; Dolezel and Loiperdinger 1995: 86). At the same
time German Chancellor little by little took away the legal and (to a lesser
extent) the traditional foundations of his rule, having taken away the
legislative powers of Reichstag and institutionalized his party nickname
(Fuhrer) as an official title (Rebentisch 1989: 44; Bessel 1995: 22).
Hitler opted for charismatic leadership as a means to eliminate cycli-
cal, competitive and impersonal character of power in a democratic
society which presented a direct threat to direct fulfillment of a radical
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teleology. The tendency to style state power as a personal Self, purified
of all institutional objectifications (Lepsius 1986: 60), is manifest not
only in Hitler’s general scenarios of power performance, such as aver-
sion to any written, formalized, “bureaucratic” forms of power execution
(Gruchmann 1973: 198; Paterson 1981: 439; Rebentisch 1989: 29), but
also on the low levels of his public discourse: in this vein, his taking
the personal oath of allegiance from the Armed Forces (Burrin 1999: 57)
corresponds to saturation of political speeches with unusually intimate
self-characterizations (“my brain”, “my sensations”, “my patience” etc.
(Hitler 1941: 104, 108; Hitler 1938: 3)). If the unrestrained individuality of
supreme political will was intended in Hitler’s Germany to serve as a sub-
ject of power performance (Rebentisch 1989: 37), then its predicate was
seen in the ultimate objectivity of the Laws of Nature and History (Arendt
1958: 474, 477). In this vein, the elimination of agens in repetitive passive
constructions (It is clear to all that. . . )—together with pervasive nomi-
nalization (M o b i l i z a t i o n goes forward. . . )—serves as a backdrop
for the Fuhrer’s solitary Ich (Voigt 1978: 287-288; Winckler 1970: 42; Bork
1970: 47; Maas 1989: 173). In its turn, this “objectification” of political
discourse serves as a precondition for the dialectical self-overcoming of
charismatic leadership—its routinization (Weber 1920: 143). To be sure,
Stalin (or, for that matter, Benito Mussolini or Nikolae Ceaus¸escu) also
practiced in his public discourse nominalization and passive construc-
tions for the very same purpose (Ilie 1998; Danler 2006; Weiss 1995: 344).
However, as the mechanisms of this routinization were not quite the
same, their linguistic expression varied accordingly. In Hitler’s texts, “tra-
dition” the abundance of lexical, morphological and syntactic archaisms
suggest traditional roots of the charismatic power, aimed at securing the
latter’s stability in the absence of institutional or legal mechanisms of
power performance (see: Berning 1962: 71, 116; Bork 1970: 260; Weiss
1986: 288; Rees 2004: 16), whereas the same stabilization function in
Stalin’s public discourse is performed by bureaucratic vocabulary and
syntax (Weiss 1994: 384).
Roosevelt (1): Legal Leadership (with some Elements of
Charismatic Power) and its Internal Stability (Relational and
Conditional)
Roosevelt’s charismatic rule is the most problematic of all the three since
none of its major components is as strong, explicit or personalized as
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in the two previous cases. Indeed, the American president’s challenges
to the institutional order, while being serious, did not go far beyond the
conventional populist means: the flood of executive orders, vetoes and
presidential decrees hampered Congress and de facto introduced the
state of emergency in economics, but neither words nor other actions
of the President hinted at replacement of Constitution or regular elec-
tions with another source of personal legitimacy (Schivelbusch 2005: 40,
65). Without a doubt, Roosevelt was not above using old or introducing
the new techniques of modern communication which granted to the
leader communicative supremacy at the expense of the audience: like
Hitler and Stalin, he was tireless in training his voice, rehearsing his
speeches and also the first in his office to deliver them via radio (Ulonska
1990; Dawis 1987: 4; Bessel 1995: 18; Schivelbusch 2005: 56-58;). What’s
more, with his office Roosevelt inherited the spiritualistic individualism
of American presidential discourse, centered upon the divine blessing
of the Nation and—eo ipso—its sole leader (Hinckley 1990: 131-133).
However, Roosevelt’s use of these performative techniques, typical for
charismatic leadership (Kirkpatrick and Locke 1996: 38), was clearly sub-
ordinate to the legal framework of American presidency. As a populist,
he frequently resorted to some of the gadgets of charismatic leadership
in order to highlight his closeness to the “people” and the distance from
“bureaucracy”, but even his own political discourse contests this oppo-
sition: in the texts analyzed in Tables 1-4, references to ‘Government’
eclipse the references to ‘American people’ in all texts except the two last
war addresses. Roosevelt’s self-legitimation through voice, eloquence
and medial accessibility was conditional and temporary; it worked only
insofar as the president’s basic legitimacy was confirmed by the last
popular election and enacted by existing administrative structures.
Stalin (2): Transformational leadership with some elements of
transactional leadership
The earlier discussion of political leadership seemed to confirm its in-
teractional nature: apparently, no leader, king or president, can reign
without habitual legitimation, provided in a dialogue with followers in-
lands and peers abroad (van Dijk 1988: 256; Barker 2001: 83). However,
the erosion of political representation in totalitarian states causes irreg-
ularity of legitimation procedures. Monopolization of communicative
chances inevitably leads to the breakup of feedback chains between
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ruler and the followers, and the gap between the imagined and real
constituency grows as fast as their real difference blurs: the interac-
tion with the inner circle of advisers becomes indistinguishable from
the mass demonstration. This over-projection of self -reference into
other-reference breeds withdrawal, delusion and paranoia—the states in
which political fictions, produced for propagandist use, take the place of
observation and analysis: Stalin’s suspicion that the member of his inner
circle, the half-literate Marshal Clement Voroshilov was the British agent,
is the case in point (Tucker 1992: 41-44). This grotesque example illus-
trates the dead end of purely transformational leadership, cut off from
any legitimating exchanges with followers, and points at its potential
threat to organizational stability: small wonder that even the cowardly
and complacent Bolshevik establishment at the end sabotaged such
paranoid actions of Soviet leader as zealous extermination of peasantry
in 1929-1930 or the mass terror of 1937-1938 (Ennker 1996: 95). But for
the most part of Stalin’s rule, the relation between the transformational
core and the transactional periphery of his power was somewhat more
stable and regular. The general public was a priori excluded from any
kind of spontaneous political communication and relegated to the role
of statists at staged other-references to the leader. Whereas secret po-
lice (directly supervised by Stalin) prevented ordinary citizens from any
spontaneous contact with the leader, the latter, in turn, was prohibited
from walking the streets (the decision issued by Politburo on Stalin’s own
initiative (Werth 1999: 42, 44; Khlevniuk 2005: 111). As for the transac-
tional basis of Stalin’s leadership, it was expectedly formed around the
small size, high-level bureaucratic structures, such as Secretariat and
Special office of the Bolshevik Party Central Committee (Ennker 1996:
107; Ennker 2004: 169; Harris 2005: 64). The line between the transfor-
mational chain of command and transactional bargaining ground was
drawn arbitrarily: while the actual discussions with uncertain outcome
usually took place between Stalin and his trusted advisers and holders of
various government posts, such as Viacheslav Molotov (Skriabin), Lazar
Kaganovitch or Klement Voroshilov, the other Secretariat members were
in most cases “asked” to stamp the decision post factum and pass it over
to the larger collective bodies—such as Politburo or Central Committee
itself—for institutionalization and ceremonial confirmation (Werth 1999:
39; Khlevniuk 1996: 83; Ennker 2004: 178; Getty 2005: 86, 99; Khlevniuk
2005: 110).
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Hitler (2): Transformational leadership with some elements of
transactional leadership
The functional equivalent of Stalin’s paranoiawasHitler’smania grandiosa.
Supported by fuzzy logic of official propaganda (which referred to Nazi
leader as the ‘will’ of their ‘action’), and obedient legal theory (which
treated law as the simple codification of the Fuhrer’s Wille—Giaro 1999:
249), the Fuhrer came to believe that his volition was indeed a source
of national power (Vondung 1979: 398). The fact that this lunacy was
not stopped until it thoroughly destroyed the state foundations speaks
for the extreme weakness of the transactional mechanisms in the sys-
tem of political leadership. Some barriers that Hitler erected between
himself and his followers were reminiscent of Stalin’s measures (such
as complete disappearance from public sphere in 1942, explained away
by excessive workload (Kershaw 1987: 121; Volmert 1989: 139; Bohse
1988: 127)). But Hitler was much more consistent than Stalin in purging
spontaneous political bargaining from the public communication: in
the last ten years of his political career, the German leader not only
increasingly detached himself from everyday political business but also
steadfastly demolished all remaining areas of transactional politics such
as collective bodies or councils: in fact, governance was reduced to
Hitler’s personal orders given to 100 highest officers and four bureau-
cratic bodies, all vying for the Fuhrer’s attention (Nyomarkay 1967: 145;
Gruchmann 1973: 192; Neumann 1977; Mommsen 1981: 59; Kershaw
1985: 73, 84; Burrin 1999: 63-64; Overy 2004: 111-113). The inefficiency
and arbitrariness of such leadership was obvious, but, in all probability,
the economical and political failings of transformational leadership with
little transactional elements were seen by Hitler (and Stalin) as tolerable
side-effects of this system of power representation, compared to its
relatively stable performative advantages (Howell 1999: 683, 690).
Roosevelt (2): Transactional leadership with some elements
of transformational leadership
If totalitarian conventions of power performance inherited from Euro-
pean monarchies the clear division between the transcendental compe-
tence of the individual rulers and the purely instrumental function of
their followers, the founders of American nation saw the whole nation
the subject of messianic accomplishment. Accordingly, the strength
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of the country’s highest office was derived not from the leader’s vision-
ary intuition communicated to and approved by ordinary citizens, but
from his ability to successfully bargain for his objectives with as many
citizens as possible,. Indeed, the classical treatise of Richard Neustadt,
widely seen as an apology of strong executive power of Rooseveltian
kind, equates presidential strength with negotiating successes: using
communicative preferences of executive power, the president should
be able to persuade others that their social interests are best served by
fulfilling his political goals (Neustadt 1960). Unmistakable in Roosevelt’s
presidential addresses, this distinctive combination of transformational
messianism with transactional activity brings to light the crucial dif-
ference between his and Hitler’s self -performance of political power.
Neither American president nor Nazi leader shy away from portraying
themselves as prophets, although Hitler (‘I have often happened to be a
prophet in my life’) feels more comfortable in this role than Roosevelt
(‘[My] prophecy is in the process of being fulfilled’) (Hitler 1941: 103; Roo-
sevelt 1943: 329). At the same time, Hitler’s speeches were characterized
by a monological structure typical for orations (‘Here I am a speaker of
the whole German nation’), while Roosevelt frequently inserted into his
addresses the second-person references to his listeners (‘You and I know
now. . . ’), having earned from John Dos Passos the derisive title of “you-
and-me president” (Hitler 1938: 1; Roosevelt 1936b: 162; Schivelbusch
2005: 58-59). As much as the subject-predicate scheme employed by
Hitler embodied his unidirectional approach to political communica-
tion discussed above (higher wisdom communicated by leader to his
all-to-human subjects), Roosevelt’s inclusion of listeners into his master
narrative signaled the consensual nature of his message perfected in
numerous interactions with his followers.
It looks like the association of totalitarian leaders with activity and
omnipresence in its simple form cannot be confirmed or disproved by
empirical data: the very same reference to leaders (such as pronouns
‘We’ or ‘my’, or proper names ‘Stalin’) may have very different meanings
depending on communicative environments, ideological conventions
or organizational principles, and cannot serve as unambiguous corre-
lates of this or that performative strategy. The attempt to get rid of
one-dimensional characterization of political discourse prevalent in its
narratological interpretations, resulted in a more compound explana-
tion of data on ‘activity’ and ‘omnipresence’ of leaders in Soviet Union,
Nazi Germany and United States in 1936-1943.
For example, Stalin’s first-person reticence, juxtaposed with the bac-
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chanalia of third-person references to him in media, clearly attests to the
disparity of collectivist ideology and individualist power system in Soviet
Union. In any transparent public sphere such a blatant discrepancy
would damage the credibility of official doctrine or—inversely—put into
question the sincerity of “popular support”, but such external evalu-
ations (abundant in the West), were seen by Stalin as lesser evil than
moving the shaky foundations of his historical and popular legitima-
cies). But the very same scarcity of demonstrative pronouns ‘I’ and ‘we’
in Stalin’s public discourse, projected onto the relative abundance of
possessive pronouns (‘my’ and ‘our’) in the very same texts and similar
constructions in the media (‘Stalin’s words’), points at a different prop-
erty of Stalin’s discursive performance of power—the necessity of the
leader canonization, which stems not only from the general tendency
to routinization of charismatic leadership, but also from the question-
able legitimacy of his own power. The fact the leader is portrayed in
his own discourse and public media more as a depository of invaluable
knowledge (‘Stalin’s wise instructions’) than an agent of history seems
to be an important part of this canonizing effort which deserves to be
studied in more detail (for the relevant insights see: Tucker 1972: 157;
Brandenberger 2005: 251).
Another double juxtaposition could better explain the policemy of
the leaders’ first-person references as indicators of political and orga-
nizational conditions. The similar ratios ‘activity’/‘possession’ in first-
and other-references to Roosevelt and Stalin in public discourse (Tables
3-4) hints at the likeness of the two leaders’ discursive performance of
power but the comparative analysis of their state management reveals
profound difference between the monological ‘I ’ of the transformational
leader, used in orders and revelations (‘I’, and the dialogical ‘I’ of the
transactional leader, employed in a context of narrative equality (‘I and
you’). Furthermore, as the unflinching egocentricity of Hitler’s first-
person public discourse and its extension into the sphere of the personal
(see above) could be explained by progressive deinstitutionalization
of power in charismatic leadership, Roosevelt’s interactional stance is
surely linked to the role-taking nature of democratic politics which sees
first-person statements of a ruler as a mere tool of political bargaining
from the position of power. Again, the exact room taken in Roosevelt’s
speeches by this rhetorical figure of ‘conversation partner’ has yet to be
studied in depth. To sum up, Roosevelt’s discursive space of power could
be compared to a perennial construction site, whereas the fitting alle-
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gories for Hitler’s and Stalin’s power performance by means of language
would respectively be a stadium and a mausoleum.
Table 1: Third-person-references to specific power structures in the
leaders’ texts (100% = all references to power structures in a given text)
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1 Hitler 1) 13.7 21.6 7.9 0.0 3.9 52.9
2 Hitler 2) 16.7 0.0 8.3 0.0 0.0 75.0
3 Hitler Pre-War 1)+2) 14.4 17.5 7.9 0.0 3.3 57.1
4 Hitler 3) 33.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.7 50.0
5 Hitler 4) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0
6 Hitler Wartime 3)+4) 26.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 13.3 60.0
7 Hitler Total 1)+2)+3)+4) 11.7 19.5 6.5 0.0 5.2 57.1
8 Stalin 5) 0.0 27.0 0.0 0.0 71.4 1.6
9 Stalin 6) 0.0 21.7 0.0 0.0 73.6 4.7
10 Stalin Pre-War 5)+6) 0.0 23.7 0.0 0.0 72.8 3.6
11 Stalin 7) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0
12 Stalin 8) 0.0 55.6 0.0 0.0 44.4 0.0
13 Stalin 9) 0.0 4.5 0.0 0.0 31.9 63.6
14 Stalin Wartime 7)+8)+9) 0.0 16.2 0.0 0.0 29.7 54.1
15 Stalin Total 5)+6+7)+8)+9) 0.0 22.4 0.0 0.0 65.0 12.6
16 Roosevelt 10) 13.3 23.3 53.3 0.0 10.0
17 Roosevelt 11) 0.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
18 Roosevelt 12) 0.0 78.6 12.5 0.0 0.0
19 Roosevelt 13) 0.0 87.5 12.5 0.0 0.0
20 Roosevelt 14) 27.2 45.4 9.0 0.0 18.2
21 10)+11)+12)+13)+14) 9.0 56.4 24.3 1.3 9.0
22 Roosevelt 15) 28.6 28.6 42.8 0.0 0.0
23 Roosevelt 16) 0.0 50.0 30.0 0.0 20.0
24 Roosevelt 17) 0.0 20.0 20.0 0.0 60.0
25 Roosevelt 18) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0
26 15)+16)+17)+18) 7.7 30.8 26.9 0.0 34.6
27 10)+11)+12)+13)+14) 8.6 52.0 25.0 1.0 15.4
+15)+16)+17)+18)
109
Kirill Postoutenko
Table 2: Singular vs. plural self-references in leaders’ texts (in %)
Texts I-Me-My We-Us-Our
1 1) Hitler 1935 45.2 54.8
2 2) Hitler 1938 69.8 30.2
3 Hitler Pre-War 1)+2) 48.5 52.8
4 3) Hitler 1941 47.2 52.8
5 4) Hitler 1942 56.5 43.5
6 Hitler Wartime 3)+4) 48.3 51.7
7 5) Stalin 1937a 3.6 96.4
8 6) Stalin 1937b 11.8 88.2
9 Stalin Pre-War 5)+6) 6.1 93.1
10 7) Stalin 1941 2.1 97.9
11 8) Stalin 1942 7.8 92.2
12 9) Stalin 1943 1.6 98.4
13 Stalin Wartime 7)+8)+9) 3.8 96.2
14 10) Roosevelt 1936a 39.8 60.2
15 11) Roosevelt 1936b 37.7 62.3
16 12) Roosevelt 1936c 37.1 62.9
17 13) Roosevelt 1936d 23.4 76.6
18 14) Roosevelt 1936e 42.6 57.4
19 Roosevelt Pre-War 37.1 62.9
10)+11)+12)+13)+14)
20 15) Roosevelt 1941 18.5 81.5
21 16) Roosevelt 1942a 7.7 92.3
22 17) Roosevelt 1942b 15.9 84.1
23 18) Roosevelt 1943 26.8 73.2
24 Roosevelt Wartime17)+18)+19) 15.0 85.0
110
Performance and Management of Political Leadership
Table 3: Activity, presence and posession:
three forms of grammatical self-references in the leaders speeches
(100% = all reflexive statements in a given text)
Activity Presence Possession
Texts [I-We] [Me-Us] [My-Our]
(I think. . . ) (it was said to me) (our mission)
1 1) Hitler 1935 60.4 16.5 23.1
2 2) Hitler 1938 68.2 11.1 20.6
3 Hitler Pre-War 1)+2) 62.0 15.4 22.6
4 3) Hitler 1941 64.2 13.7 22.1
5 4) Hitler 1942 37.0 28.2 34.8
6 Hitler Wartime 3)+4) 61.4 15.0 23.6
7 5) Stalin 1937a 17.2 16.4 66.4
8 6) Stalin 1937b 26.9 16.1 57.0
9 Stalin Pre-War 5)+6) 21.0 16.3 62.7
10 7) Stalin 1941 14.4 10.3 75.3
11 8) Stalin 1942 22.1 13.0 64.9
12 9) Stalin 1943 16.1 9.7 74.2
13 Stalin Wartime 7)+8)+9) 17.4 11.0 71.6
14 10) Roosevelt 1936a 86.4 3.4 10.2
15 11) Roosevelt 1936b 83.0 1.9 15.1
16 12) Roosevelt 1936c 56.5 12.9 30.6
17 13) Roosevelt 1936d 57.9 18.7 23.4
18 14) Roosevelt 1936e 78.8 9.2 12.0
19 Roosevelt Pre-War 73.8 9.1 17.1
10)+11)+12)+13)+14)
20 15) Roosevelt 1941 55.6 12.9 31.5
21 16) Roosevelt 1942a 58.1 11.1 30.8
22 17) Roosevelt 1942b 63.0 7.3 29.7
23 18) Roosevelt 1943 68.3 7.3 24.4
24 Roosevelt Wartime17)+18)+19) 60.0 10.0 30.0
Table 4: Activity, presence and posession:
three syntactic forms of reference to the leaders
Texts Activity Presence Possession Total
Hitler gave a talk Greetings to Stalin Roosevelt’s speech (100%)
1 Roosevelt 556 (59.9%) 140 (15.0%) 234 (25.1%) 930
2 Stalin 237 (30.5%) 224 (28.8%) 317 (40.7%) 778
3 Hitler 308 (43.0%) 175 (24.4%) 233 (32.5%) 716
Source: Völkischer Beobachter 1936 January-March (Hitler);
Pravda 1936 January-March (Stalin);
New York Times 1936 January-March (Roosevelt).
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Codes

The Duce in the Street
Illumination in Fascism
NANNI BALTZER
Theatrical Lighting Effects
Various occurrences of everyday life, especially from the 1920s and 1930s,
attest to the attractiveness and fascination of light. Pervasive enthusiasm
for theatrical light effects—think of pavilions of electricity at world exhi-
bitions or the works of artists like Man Ray—was promoted by the rapid
progress of light technology. It was also this technical progress that was
at the roots of photography published in the Rivista Illustrata del ‘Popolo
d’Italia’ in May 1933: “Giuoco di riflettori”. Obviously the publishers
assumed that the image as such—without captions or any relation to the
rest of the journal—would fascinate the reader (see: Figure 1).
The title emphasizes the formal interplay of the light beams, but it
might be as well showing an anti aircraft floodlight. As a matter of fact,
though, “Giuoco di riflettori” by Hans Finsler was taken as a part of a
series of pictures at the “Zürcher Lichtwoche“ (Zurich light week). The
“Zürcher Lichtwoche” took place in October 1932—a few months before
the publication of the photography in the Rivista Illustrata del ‘Popolo
d’Italia’. Hans Finsler had just emigrated from Halle an der Saale in
Germany to Switzerland in order to teach photography at the “Zürcher
Kunstgewerbeschule” instead of “Burg Giebichenstein”. He thoroughly
documented the “Zürcher Lichtwoche”. The “Zürcher Lichtwoche” was
an elaborate and expensive exhibition. Its aim was to show the new
possibilities of electrical light for artistic effects in urban development
(see: Figure 2).
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Figure 1: Hans Finsler, “Giuoco di riflettori”
Source: Rivista Illustrata del ‘Popolo d’Italia’, Mai 1933: 88
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Figure 2: Zürcher Lichtwoche, October 1st-9th, 1932
Source: Photoglob
The motto of the “Zürcher Lichtwoche” was therefore: “Technology
and art shake hands”. Together with technicians and an electric power
company, influential contemporary artists like Max Bill or Augusto Gi-
acometti helped planning the exhibition. Besides the exhibition and
the contest, though, many other attractions—swimming fountain of
light, an amusement park, night excursions, spectacular neon signs and
temporarily illuminated streets, buildings and shop windows—drew the
public into town at night.
Shortly before the “Zürcher Lichtwoche” in 1931, the book Italia nuova
Architettura nuova was published. Virgilio Marchi, a futurist and friend
of Tommaso Marinetti, but also a writer, an architect and movie set
designer of about sixty films and numerous plays, was asking the book’s
readers why the festive illumination of church facades did not transfer
to profane architecture. Marchi advocated the illumination of urban
spaces as carried out in Zürich shortly after.
Marchi however had another goal than the city council of Zürich: by
using floodlights to send light beams to the sky and God, he hoped to
“elevate the soul into the realmofmysticism”.1 Not thatMarchi’s thoughts
1 | “Al fine di un articolo riguardante la scenotecnica delle rappresentazioni
sacre all’aperto mi domandavo: ‘Perché non si deve fare della luce moderna un
inno che dai riflettori salga in alto come da tanti turriboli d’argento?’ Io intendevo
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were new. The idea of linking the Divine (heavenly) with the earthly by
means of light is many thousand years old. It can be traced back to the
ancient Egypt where the apex of the obelisk was coated with gold, so that
the sunlight would reflect and make a connection to the sun god through
light. Interesting about Marchi’s thoughts is his idea of secularization
combined with the desire for mysticism. He puts sacred events on a level
with theater and profane architecture which require both drama and
mysticism. Surely, the illumination of St. Peter’s Basilica with floodlights
and hundreds of torches a few years before the publication of Marchi’s
article—during the Anno Santo 1925—must have been a good example
for both drama and mysticism (Marra 2000: 159).
Mysticism was an important reason for the success of all of the fol-
lowing examples of fascist illuminations, although its working was all
but explicit. Mussolini himself uttered his opinion regarding this crucial,
but elusive ingredient in 1932, when he said to Emil Ludwig, the noted
German biographer: “The mystical and the political side depend on each
other. The first is dry without the second; the second without the first
decays in the flags’ wind” (Ludwig 1932: 123-124; transl. by the author).
The Fascists knew how to use the mystical power of light and they did
so on several occasions, for example on the anniversary of the March on
Rome, October 28th, or during the “Anniversario della Vittoria”, November
4th(see the photo documentation in L’Illustrazione italiana, November
12th, 1933, on page 765). During my research I descovered another exam-
ple for the use of theatrical light effects which, at the first glance, had
nothing to do with politics or religion. For the opening of the exhibition
“Esposizione Aeronautica Italiana”, floodlights were installed on the Mi-
lano Dome square to illuminate the artificial wafts of mist (see: Figure 3
and 4).2
Even though these kind of illumination was a popular, eye-catching
dare alla luce elettrica un senso mistico [. . . ] come si fa con la luce medesima sul
teatro dramatico. S’intende che l’architettura religiosa e non religiosa é implicata nel
problema, come fonte di partenza o come schermo di arrivo. L’osservazione veniva
da certe illuminazioni di chiese per le grandi festività. [. . . ] il fine dell’illuminazione ha
un che il teatrale analogo a quella della luce nelle sacre rappresentazioni” (Marchi,
“Elevare l’anima trascinandola nel regno mistico.”, in Marchi 1997: 71; transl. by the
author.).
2 | The project not only reminds one of the present-day artificial stagings of
nature as Olafur Eliasson’s artifical evening sun in a veil of mist, in the Tate Modern,
to where the visitors could escape the London winter, but even more so of baroque
spectacles. In 1794, such a spectacle took place on the “Felseninsel” in the Wörlitz
Park of Count Leopold III, Friedrich Franz von Anhalt-Dessau, when the volcano,
created by Friedrich Wilhelm von Erdmannsdorff, smoked, glowed and spat. See:
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Figure 3: Atmospheric “mis en scène”, Dome square, Milan, on the occasion of the
opening of the Esposizione aeronautica italiana, June 16th, 1934
Source: AEM (Azienda Elettrica Municipale), Archivio Fotografico
and an important instrument of fascist propaganda, it was scarcely dis-
cussed in scientific literature; on the rare occasions it was, its analysis
was dissolved in a greater research field of attempted sacredness of Fas-
cism (Randone 1933: 41-45).3 This work is the first thorough research on
illumination in Fascism (see: Baltzer 2009). For the sake of explicitness, I
will specifically focus on just one example.
Vorstand der Kulturstiftung DessauWörlitz 2005; for the festivities of the re-opening
of the restored island Stein in September 2005, several eruptions were staged.
3 | In Gentile’s standard work concerning the sacralisation of Fascism, the light
effects on the Milan Dom Square are briefly mentioned (Gentile 2003: 153-155).
From 1926, according to Gentile, the celebrations always followed a similar pattern,
they were organised by the Fascist Party and executed under the control of the
Police.
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Figure 4: Atmospheric “mis en scène”, Dome square, Milan, on the occasion of the
opening of the Esposizione aeronautica italiana, June 16th, 1934
Source: AEM (Azienda Elettrica Municipale), Archivio Fotografico
Illuminations on October 28th
Since 1926, the anniversary of the march to Rome on October 28th, 1922
was giving the population a reason for an annual celebration. Fascist
organisations, likemilitia, unions, youth organisations, as well as widows
and orphans, the decorated an the wounded took their part in the rigidly
organised routine of the day. The celebration was given a military note in
order to cater to the population’s taste: the “Foglio d’ordini” of the fascist
party highlighted “the idea that at the base of the fascist revolution stood
the military, which guaranteed life and progress to every citizen”.4
A strict schedule shaped the festive occasion: the morning was meant
for the religiously inspired part with fascist rites, the commemoration
of the fallen, the parades and the speech of the Duce, which was trans-
mitted by Radio to every corner of Italy. The afternoon belonged to the
popular fête with dancing, music and excursions to the countryside. Fi-
4 | PNF, “Foglio d’ordini” (10, October 9th, 1926), here cit. after Gentile 2003:
152-153: “[. . . ] per dare a tutti ‘l’idea della formidabile compagine di forze che stanno
alla base della Rivoluzione Fascista e ne garantiscono contro chiunque la vita e lo
sviluppo”.
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nally, in the presence of Mussolini, a military parade including airplane
squadrons and deployment of the fascist formations would take place.
All over Italy, fascists assembled in the evening to commemorate their
fallen colleagues; as for the general public, son et lumière was another
important part of the program. In all the larger Italian cities there was a
screening of films in honour of Mussolini, complemented by projections
of fascist slogans (such as “W il Duce”) and symbols (“fascio”), lighting
of roads and public squares, illumination of public buildings (decorated
with flags), marches of torch-carriers through the streets and fires on the
hill (Gentile 2003: 152-155). As we will see, city centres were transformed
by illuminated ephemeral structures into a veritable “theatre of light”.
Milano, October 28th, 1933
In the following, I will concentrate on one of these “illuminazoni”,
namely the one that took place in the evening of October 28th, 1933,
in Milano. On the anniversary of the march to Rome, L’Illustrazione
italiana reported, “the crowds flocked to the Dome Square in order to
watch the illumination, unimpressed by the pouring rain”.5 Here, the
local electricity station (Azienda Elettrica Municipale) had transformed
the Dome Square with the help of colossal candelabras and flowers into
a giardino luminoso (see: Figure 5 and 6).
The illuminations in each year were similar to the ones a year before.
In 1932, the monumental writing DUX was projected onto Piazza del
Duomo. In 1934 fountains were transformed into illuminated cakes, and
in 1936 the the monumental light inscription “W IL DUCE” “FONDA-
TORE DEL’IMPERO” embellished the fronts of the surrounding palazzi
and the arch of the Gallerie Vittorio Emmanuele II (see: Figures 7, 8 and
9). (The reason for this slogan originated on May 5th, 1936 when Italian
army conquered Addis Abeba, and four days later Mussolini proclaimed
the Italian Emporium).
What makes the illuminazioni of the year 1933 especially interesting
is an approximately thirty meter high, square-edged black and white
portrait of Mussolini, which was attached to the resplendent façade
5 | “La folla [. . . ] è accorsa la sera del 28 ottobre, sfidando l’acqua torrenziale,
ad ammirare l’illuminazione della Piazza del Duomo.”, in: L’Illustrazione italiana,
(November 12th, 1933: 765; transl. by the author).
Giorgio Di Genova authenticates the portrait already in 1922 and 1923 in Numero,
respectively in 420. Somewhat later, the same portrait can be found as a decoration
on a ceramic plate, approx. 1926, anonymous (di Genova 1997: 15, 84).
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Figure 5: Installation of the illumination on the occasion of the anniversary of the
March on Rome, October 28th, 1933
Source: AEM (Azienda Elettrica Municipale), Archivio Fotografico
of the Milan Cathedral, and, as part of the evening illuminations, was
highlighted by floodlights (see: Figure 10).
With his usual piercing look, but strangely un-statesmanlike, the Duce
looked his people in the eyes. Even within the very wide stylistic range
of Duce portraits, this portrait is unusual (Bardi 1933: 5; see: Figure
11).6 It can be found in periodicals of the early twenties and even on a
ceramic plate (around 1926) which with its inscription points at the total
absence of sfumature-nuances, stating on the edge of the plate “l’uomo
che non ammette sfumature/o bianco nero/con noi o contro di noi”.
(“The man, who does not allow shades of grey/either black or white/with
us or against us”).
The portrait could have its origin in stencil printing normally used for
pavement graffiti (see: Figure 12). The remaining images of the portrait
on the façade of the cathedral invite the assumption that it is a painted
cardboard taken from a photographic copy, which was illuminated by
floodlighting at twilight (see: Figure 13).
Unfortunately we cannot learn much more from the contemporary
6 | Should one interpret Mussolini’s piercing look as “seeing-eye”? See the
interpretation of general Moshe Dayan’s look on the battlefield—in the direction of
the viewer of the photograph—by Otto Karl Werckmeister (2005: 26).
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reports because they mention only overall “illuminazioni” and do not
refer to any technical details. As far as I know, the whole scenery was
unique; never before or after a portrait of Mussolini was shown on a
church façade.7
The Cathedral Square as a lieu de spectacle was an inviting space for
mass gatherings, being the locus of unity and division since early days
of Milan not just as a geographical centre in a town, built in concentric
circles, but also in economic, social and cultural respects: even today the
medieval Broletto, the seat of worldly power and justice, and the Opera
(the Teatro alla Scala) stand immediately next to the Cathedral Square.
The Square is mainly bordered by the Palazzo Carminati, the Portici
Meridionali resp. Settentrionali with the archway of the gallerie Vittorio
Emanuele II. The manica lunga (long sleeve) of the Palazzo Reale stood
on the opposite side until 1933 and was later replaced by the Aregenario,
the portal-like fascist building.
With clear borders on all four sides the Cathedral Square fulfils a basic
requirement for hosting compact mass gatherings, as was formulated by
Franz Dröge and Michael Müller in their work Power of Beauty (1995):
7 | At least, I could not make out another case, neither in sources nor in secondary
literature. The portrait alone, without the church façade in the background, was
presented again: in November 1933 in Ascoli Piena (a piece of cardboard or some
kind of sheet). In baroque times, churches were, under certain circumstances,
certainly used as a background for non-ecclesiastical events, e.g. on the occasion of
a birth, a wedding or a death, and included in the organisation of festivities (parades).
But Elisabeth Kieven points out (e-mail to the author, November 23rd, 2008) that
on the occasion of canonisations, the façades were decorated with scenes from
the life of the saints, on the other hand, in honour of secular rulers, coats of arms
and emblems were part of festive decorations on façades. There are no portraits
of secular rulers known on church façades. The adornment on the occasion of
the birth of the french Dauphin by Gian Lorenzo Bernini (together with Jean Paul
Schor), an ephemeral construction which extend along the incline from the Piazza
di Spagna up to the façade of the Trinità dei Monti, with the central piece adorned
by a large dolphin as a symbol for the successor to the throne, is well known. But
the difference in the case described by me consists of the fact that, in Fascism, the
church façade was usurped for an event which was completely independent from the
Church, whereas in baroque times the Church was an integral part of the festivities.
Regarding ephemeral architecture of festivities, see: Kessel 1995. Regarding the
inclusion of the façade into the festivities see Boiteux, “Fêtes et traditions espagnoles
à Rome au XVIIe siècle” (Fagiolo and Madonna 1992: 117-134) and Montserrat Moli
Frigola, “Donne, candele, lacrime e morte: funerali di regine spagnole nell’Italia del
Seicento” (Fagiolo and Madonna 1992: 135-158). Further to festive architecture in
baroque times see also: Fagiolo and Spagnesi 1982; Maurizio e Marcello Fagiolo
dell’Arco 1967. Unfortunately, the new publication of Bonnemaison and Macy (2008),
in this context is unprofitable.
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“It [the architecture] encloses the mass, which may not dissolve” (Dröge
and Müller 1995: 321). The Piazza del Duomo is not only ideal for mass
meetings, it is also unique Virgilio Vercelloni (1989) says: “Due to the
failure of the Bonaparte Forum, the dome square remained the only
significant urban space where crowds could gather. From the union of
Italy until the development of new means of communication in the past
decades the dome square continued to be the only place, where political
and religious events could take place. During Fascism it was the place
for mass rites” (see: Figure 14).8
Space through Light
It is a common knowledge that light installations for the effective stag-
ing of mass marches became well known due to their prevalence in
Nazi Germany, but it was already in 1936 that Albert Speer’s “Lichtdom”
contributed to the dramatic techniques of the Reichsparteitage on the
Nurnberg Zeppelin field. In Italy, on the contrary, the light had already
been used for several years as an unalienable part of propaganda events.
True, the effect and power of the “Lichtdom”were incomparably stronger
than that of the Italians (see: Figure 15).9 But Speer built a new closed
space and had not illuminated an existing building with the floodlight
beams which shone for several kilometres in the night sky.
Speer himself wrote about the occurence: “The sharply defined 130
Rays, put around the field in distances of only 12 meters, were visible
up to an altitude of six to eight kilometres and melt up there into a shin-
ing expanse. This resulted in an impression of a huge space, in which
the single beams appeared to be gigantic pillars of endlessly high outer
walls” (Speer 1969: 71). Speer’s light domes tied people together and
thus prevented the masses from fraying and disintegration.10 What the
8 | “Il fallimento del progreto giacobino di crere il Foro Bonaparte [. . . ], fa si che la
piazza del Duomo conserviil significato di unico luogo urbano deputato ad accogliere
l riunione di massa. Dall’Unità d’Italie sino alla diffusione dei nuovi strumenti di
comunicazione degli ultimi decenni, la piazza del Duomo resta il solo contenitore
capace di ospitare le grande manifestazione politiche e religiose. Durante gli anni
del fascismo al potere è il luogo deputato per i suoi rit di massa” (Vercelloni 1989:
55; transl. by the author).
9 | Regarding the idea, the planning and the execution of the light dome, see:
Krauter 1997; the work includes a good overview of the reception of Speer’s light
architecture before, resp. after 1945.
10 | “[Die Begrenzung der Masse] ist neben der Erzeugung der mystischen Stim-
mung auch die Aufgabe des Lichtdoms” (Dröge and Müller 1995: 321).
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architecture of the dome square guaranteed in Milano, was constructed
on the Zeppelin field in the shape of a light dome: the light formed an im-
material wall. Such physical materials as stone and glass were replaced
by the architecture of light: this new building material replaced both
the church-room and the candlelight and produced a semi-religious
atmosphere. The sheer grandeur of the light-dome generated a “de-
personalisation of the human being” (Speer 1979: 42), as Albert Speer
stated. More than that: “[. . . ] the creation of the so-called ‘light-dome’
in Nurnberg was for him [Hitler]—and for me [Speer] a culmination of
making an impression on human beings, especially from a political view,
with the goal of categorization and subordination of man—in order to
eliminate his personality” (Speer 1979: 30-31; emphasis NB).11 The fials
of the cathedral of light pointed into the Divine night sky, and the mysti-
cal mood contributed, in its turn, to making the masses susceptible to
the National Socialist message.
The use of light for propagandistic means is thus common to both
dictatorships is. In both régimes, the light contributes, as a symbol of
the Divine, to the sacralization of profane events.12 Whereas on the
Zeppelin-field the sacral architecture was constructed by light, fascism
used the church façade—or so it seems—solely as a carrier for the gi-
gantic portrait of the Duce. But behind the temporary occupation of the
church façade by the fascist state stood more than a mere pragmatism,
as I will demonstrate shortly.
Sacralisation of Fascism
Just as equally important as the unification of the masses appeared to
be their ordering, given in the Italian case by the portrait of Mussolini.
The masses, as stated by Elias Canetti, exist as long as they move in uni-
formity into a determined direction. “The direction which is common to
all members fortifies the feeling of equality. [. . . ] For [. . . ] the existence
[of the masses], the direction is an absolute necessity. The fear of disin-
tegration, which always plays an active part, makes it possible to direct
11 | Speer’s light architecture did not find any direct following in Italy. One building,
however, appears to be a reminiscence of Speer’s light architecture. The italian
pavillion of the Roman architect Marcello Piacentini at the World exhibition in Paris
1937, situated directly on the Seine, was illuminated at night in such a way that the
almost cubic façade, structured by loggias, doubled in size and was turned into a
lighthouse by the reflection in the river.
12 | See also Marchi, “Architetture pirotecniche”, in: Marchi 1997: 71-79.
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them unto any kind of target. The masses exist, as long as they have an
unreachable target” (Canetti 1985: 26-27).13 In the discussed case, the
unreachable target dominated the façade of the dome: Mussolini, the
outstanding personification of Fascism, was worshipped like a God after
years of single-minded propaganda.
Gustave Le Bon, whose publication “Psychology of the masses” (1911)
can be regarded as a kind of working instruction for the domination
of the masses, opined that an individual in the crowd could only be
impressed if the religious basis is provided (Le Bon 1982: 36). And
further: “For the masses, either one has to be God or one is nothing” (Le
Bon 1982: 48). Mussolini seemed to carry out these instructions, when
in 1926 he prepared the apotheosis of Fascism and his own person with
the following motto: “Fascism is not only a party, but a regime, not only
a regime, but a faith, not just a faith, but a religion that captivates the
laborers”.14
Part of the fascist, quasi-religious rites were for instance Decalogues
and actual prayers for and/or to the leader.15 Mussolini counted, by the
supernatural abilities attested to him, as the person to be addressed with
problems of any kind. One of the authors of numerous fascist prayers,
Alessandro Melchiori, issued arecommendation: “If you, comrade, ex-
perience bitter moments due to miserable earthly circumstances, raise
your spirit and say your prayer”16—not to god, but to and for the Duce,
as Melchiori expounds in a “Prayer to the Duce”:
13 | Gustave Le Bon already formulated: “under certain circumstances and only
under these circumstances, the gathering of people possesses new, completely
different qualities from the qualities of the single people who form this gathering.
The conscious personality fades, the feelings and thoughts of all the individuals are
orientated towards the same direction” (Le Bon 1982: 10).
14 | “Il Fascismo non è soltanto un partito, è un regime, non è soltanto un regime
ma una fede, non è soltanto una fede ma una religione che sta conquistando le
masse lavoratrici del popolo italiano” (Mussolini’s speech in Pesaro, August 8th, 1926,
PNF 1939: 35).
15 | With regard to the appropriation of christian symbols by Fascism reference is
made at this point to the new Fascist chronology which begins, instead with the birth
of Christ, with the march on Rome on October 28th, 1922, and the “Befana”, i.e. the
feast of the Epiphany on which occasion presents are given to the children, which
was renamed in 1928 into “Befana fascista”: 1931 the “Befana fascista” was moved
from January 6thto Christmas Day, whereupon the celebration was named “Natale
del Duce”. See: Gentile 2003: 156.
16 | “E allora, o camerata, quando tu hai [. . . ] degli istanti di amarezza per piccole
e miserevoli cose terrene, esalta il tuo spirito ed elèva la tua preghiera” (Melchiori
1935: 182; here after Galeotti 2000: 30).
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“Prayer to the Duce
For you, oh Duce, who is the life, the hope, the assurance for a new Italy,
For you, oh Duce, who makes hardship easy and the lowliest service an honour,
For you, oh Duce who sees and hears everything as a leader due to your mind, as
a father due to your heart,
You, whom I love more than anything else in the world
You, who has given me a strong, formidable and great fatherland,
You, to whom, for the joy of a moment, for a smile from the distance, for the
certainty that you will hear me, I offer, in all humility, my life, oh Duce.”17
In these prayers Mussolini not only equated with God, but was put in His
place, as also in the sculpture “The empire arises from the duce’s mind”
by Ferruccio Vecchi, “L’Impero balza dalla mente del Duce”, (1939-40)
which was shown at the Biennale in Venice in 1940. A gigantic head
(Mussolini) rising from a naked muscular-martial figure aremed with
sword and fascio. The reference to the features of Mussolini is unmis-
takable: the creator is the Maker of himself, combining fascism and the
Emporium (see: Figure 16).18
Lutz Klinkhammer, in his study of the relationship between the fascist
liturgy and the Catholic religion, denies the existence of a “feda fascista”
(fascist faith) (Klinkhammer 2003: 73-90)19 comparable to the catholic
faith. Klinkhammer’s further thesis—that Mussolini has never been
attributed extraterrestrial qualities—must be rejected: his statement
is at variance not only with the afore-mentioned “Prayer to the Duce”,
but also with numerous statements putting Mussolini on God’s level, as
in the “Creed of Belief” of Massimo Bontempelli (Galeotti 2000: 19-26).
Bontempelli (1878-1960), awriter, dramatist, critic and founder (together
with Curzio Malaparte) of the literary journal 900, was in the 1930’s a
highly influential personality in the Italian culture. Under the title of
“literary politics” Bontempelli published personal dogma-statements,
reminiscent of the mechanistic belief in progress espoused by futurists:
17 | “Preghiera al Duce/Per Te, o Duce, che sei la vita, la speranza, la certezza
dell’Italia nuova; per Te, o Duce, che rendi lieve la fatica, e nobile ogni più umile
servizio; per Te, o Duce, che tutto vedi e tutto senti col Tuo genio di Capo e col Tuo
cuore di Padre; a Te che io amo più di ogni altra cosa al mondo; a Te che m’hai
dato una Patria forte, temuta e grande; a Te, per la gioia di un istante, per un sorriso
intravisto di lontano, per la certezza che Tu m’odi, io offro in umiltà la mia vita, o
Duce” (Melchiori 1935: 182; here after Galeotti 2000: 30).
18 | Not to be confused with the sculpture “The Fascism” by Aroldo Bellini, a
gigantic figure on a pedestal resembling Mussolini. This, appr. 100 meters high, was
to have been errected behind the Foro Mussolini on Monte Mario. See: Benton 1996:
126-127.
19 | Although I think that a Fascist faith existed, one can hardly speak of Fascism
as a religion.
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“1° I believe in fascism as a daily revolution, 2° I believe in Rome-Italy as motor
and balance for Europe, 3° I believe in the passion, the unforeseen and the war,
4° I believe in Mussolini, the God without prophets.”20
Mussolini thus required neither herald nor mediator, because, as it is
clear from Bontempelli’s creed of belief, the Duce was himself the God
on earth, reminding of Le Bon’s statement “For the masses one must
[. . . ] be God”.21
Religion as the Foundation for Totalitarian Regimes
Mussolini puts himself, his regime and the City of Rome on the same
level as the Impero of the ancient emperors and the Roma restaurata
of the popes. In order to anchor the image of a seamless, continual
tradition in the collective memory of the population, the propaganda
machinery of Fascism had explicitly and extensively drawn upon the
repertoire of its mighty predecessors. The recourse was taken either
to the antiquity or to the forms, rituals and symbols of Catholicism.22
Suffice to mention “Befana”—the Feast of Epiphany on which presents
are handed over to the children - which was renamed in 1928 to “Befana
fascista”. In 1931, the “Befana fascista” was shifted from January 6th to
the Christmas Day, whereupon the Feast was baptized “Natale del Duce”.
By integrating religious elements into its propaganda, fascism could
lean upon positively charged acts and pictures which for had been an-
chored for centuries in the collective memory of the people. In that
20 | “La mia fede fascista io per mio conto me la sono tradotta così: 1°Credo
nel Fascismo come rivoluzione quotidiana; 2° Credo in Roma-Italia motrice ed
equilibratrice d’Europa; 3° Credo nella passione, nella improvvisazione e nella
guerra; 4°Credo in Mussolini Dio senza profeti” (Massimo Bontempelli, “Politica
letteraria”, in: Quaderni di segnalazione 1933 III (Aug.-Sept.): 28, here cit. after:
Galeotti 2000: 28).
21 | In Biondi (1973: 217), God still exists next to Mussolini, but then it states
regarding the Duce: “Discese a Roma: il terzo giorno ristabilì lo Stato, [. . . ]”—the
image of the creator could not be more obvious.
22 | “E un equivoco fu il ’mussolinismo’, con gli anni. Capo e popolo s’intesero di
prim’acchìto, ma rimasero a questo. Il regìme, che non volle essere ‘rappresentativo’,
si fermò alla ‘rappresentazione’. Cessò di essere un regìme, per divenire una regìa.
La mimica spontanea dell’uomo si fissò nei gesti, che la folla amava. Si sono viste
folle chiederglieli, questi gesti; e estasiarsene. Il ‘mussolinismo’ era divenuto un rito,
una liturgìa” (Giuseppe Bottai, entry in diary on March 3rd, 1946, in: Bottai 1988:
317). Literature regarding the sacralisation of Fascism (selection): Gentile 2003; Le
Bon 1982; Klinkhammer 2003: 73-90. Primarily regarding Germany, marginally also
regarding Italy, see: Mosse 1993.
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way totalitarian regimes, like Fascism, develop, in the words of Matthias
Behrens, “[. . . ] a myth and a cultist life (rites, liturgy, sacral language,
music); both are to help with the realization of the ideological, moral,
summoning action and cause an intensity of the experience correspond-
ing with the totalitarian demands” (Behrens 1997: 260).
Excursus
Moscow
With regard to this phenomenon of taking over images and rituals an-
chored in the people as a basis of new innovations, I should like to make
a short side trip to Moscow. In the early 1930s, on the May 1stof ev-
ery year, the monumental portraits of Lenin and Stalin (sometimes of
Marx and Engels as well), as large as 25 meters high, were displayed and
illuminated with floodlights in the evening (see: Figure 17).23
Here on this picture, we see Gustav Klutsis’s monumental photogra-
phies of Lenin and Stalin, made for May 1st, 1932, in nocturnal illumina-
tion in front of the Hotel Metropol on the Sverdlov Square in Moscow.
Between the figures, a model of the Dnjepr barrage can be recognised.
On the reproduction of the dam Lenin’s slogan can be read: “Commu-
nism is Soviet Power plus the electrification of thewhole country” (Taylor
1996: 249).
Brandon Taylor describes the figures in his essay “Concentrated pho-
tographic effects, painting and iconic elevation” (Taylor 1996: 249-252)
as the contemporary forms of the traditional Russian icons. One has to
imagine this graphically: the figures about 25 meters high depicted on
the photo boards, are traced back to the small icons (see: Figure 18).
In fact, both the Soviet leaders and, occasionally, saints are depicted
as complete figures facing each other. Position and status of the tablets
held in the hand of the saints are compared by Taylor to the writings
on the coffer-dam wall. Taylor sees major affinities between the giant
communist photos and icons in the “great potential for public effect” and
the “auratic elevation of the two leaders” (Taylor 1996: 251). To that end,
he writes: “The modern variation shows both Soviet leaders elevated to
saints and, insinuated by the unfurling liturgy of electrification in their
23 | The full body portraits of Lenin and Stalin measured appr. 25m x 10m; they
are put together from innumerable single foto tiles, each measuring 50 x 60cm. The
whole installation was put up by 200 workers, photo technicians, retouche specialists,
statics specialists, etc. see: Taylor 1996: 249.
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midst, in a figurative as well as a literal sense to be in possession of power
through the word” (Taylor 1996).
The reason for seeing parallelisms in icons and fascist visuality lies ob-
viously in the potential of these representations to serve as a foundation
for a regime in construction. The paraphrasing of the well-known form
leads at the same time to the communication of the rituals associated
therewith. If one considers, consequently, the icons as a connecting
link between the viewer and the portrayed divinities, that endows the
gigantic photo figures with the meanings from the divine domain.
It can hardly be doubted that the object of the monumental photogra-
phies lies in the admiration, veneration and stylization of the superhu-
manness (or superhuman greatness) of the persons depicted. Hence,
communismmakes use of the discourse of theOrthodox Church to trans-
fer the religious practices and effects—such as veneration and belief—
onto politics.
The Portrait of the Duce on the Church Façade
Fascism and Catholicism
It is clear that the phenomenon of the sacralisation of politics does not
confine itself to Mussolini’s Italy, but the direct competition between
Mussolini and the pope has some highly specific outcomes. “The Duce is
always right”24 was a standard saying, and his absolute domination, not
unusual in dictatorships—had never been contested publicly. The only
nationwide counterpart that Mussolini had to cope with was the Pope
who resided in the immediate neighbourhood of Mussolini. In catholic
Italy, especially in papal Rome, the rivalry was omnipresent and acute;
Mussolinis’ claim to power did not stop at the borders of the secular
power.
Nevertheless, (and notwithstanding the dictum “Fascism is a reli-
gion”), the Mussolini regime can hardly be spoken of as a religion,
as Emilio Gentile proposed (Ufficio Propaganda del Partito Nazionale
Fascista 1923: 7). Rather, on is tempted to agree with Alexander Nützen-
adel that the adoption of religious rituals and symbols had been a “su-
perficial adaptation” and not “the formation of independent religious
faith contents” (Nützenadel 2000: 128).
24 | The sentence can originally be found in “Endecalogo” by Leo Longanesi from
1926 and became, in the following years, the most widely circulated catch phrase
(decalogue) of Fascism.
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Without discussing the thesis of Nützenadel, formulated retrospec-
tively, I would like to show that the Portrait of the Duce on the façade of
the Dome of Milan was first of all a contemporary attempt to produce
the new faith content by means of a “superficial adaptation” in the literal
sense of the word (see: Figure 19).
From the forecourt over the entrance area up to the altar at the church
crossing the room continually gains in sacral importance. This prome-
nade architecturale, normally perambulated by church-goers (from the
square through the door into the church interior, then through the nave
to the crossing) is reduced in our example to the relationship between
the dome square and the portrait applied to the façade.
In this way, both the sacral message of the church-interior and the one
of the façade become irrelevant; the spatial apogee of the sacral hierarchy
is shifted from the altar to the forecourt: here resides Mussolini, here are
the people who capture from the necessary distance the monumental
portrait of the leader at his height. Here, on the parvis—the word used
both for the paradise and for the forecourt of the dome, the mass faces
the leader and, as one could say with Dröge and Müller, recognises itself
in him: “Architecture is the counterpart of the mass, in which it reflets
itself and recognises itself”.25
The sacral iconographic program of the dome-façade was superim-
posed by the portrait of the Duce. Therewith, the secular iconography
steps into the immediate neighbourhood of the religious one. The im-
portance of this fascist act lays in transferring religious images onto
profane context, using them as a foundation, but also as a legitimation
for the relatively young regime.
It is clear that Fascism could never displace Catholic faith. Likewise,
for Mussolini it must have been clear that a frontal attack on the church
would be fruitless if not outright counter-productive. At least some profit
should have been made from pictures of the catholic religion, though, so
that the faith in Fascism, incapable of replacing catholic faith, would at
least stand on a par with it. In our case this equality was embodied with
the help of an icon of the Catholic church on it—the Milanese Dome: for
a moment, the two powers were literally on the same level (Taylor 1996:
249-252).
The light-photo-montage in Milan shows clearly that Mussolini, de-
spite the Lateran treaties of 1929 which declared Catholicism the state
25 | “Die Architektur ist das Gegenüber der Masse, in dem sie sich spiegelt und
erkennt” (Dröge and Müller 1995: 321).
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religion of Italy, was not prepared to leave to the Catholic Church its
terrain without benefiting from it.
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Figure 6: Installation of the illumination on the occasion of the anniversary of the
March on Rome, October 28th, 1933
Source: AEM (Azienda Elettrica Municipale), Archivio Fotografico
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Figure 7: Illumination on the occasion of the anniversary of the March on Rome,
October 28th, 1932
Source: AEM (Azienda Elettrica Municipale), Archivio Fotografico
Figure 8: Illumination on the occasion of the anniversary of the March on Rome,
October 28th, 1934
Source: AEM (Azienda Elettrica Municipale), Archivio Fotografico
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Figure 9: Illumination on the occasion of the anniversary of the March on Rome,
October 28th, 1936
Source: AEM (Azienda Elettrica Municipale), Archivio Fotografico
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Figure 10: Vincenzo Carrese, “Milano saluta il Duce”, photography, October 28th,
1933
Source: Rivista Illustrata del “Popolo d’Italia”, November, 1933: 13
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Figure 11: Ceramic plate, ca. 1926
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Figure 12: Pier Maria Bardi, “Origini”
Source: Quadrante, October, 1933: 5
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Figure 13: Illumination on the occasion of the anniversary of the March on Rome,
October 28th, 1933
Source: AEM (Azienda Elettrica Municipale), Archivio Fotografico
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Figure 14: Mario Stroppa, “La piazza del Duomo allestita per la visita del Duce”,
pencil on paper, 36 x 78 cm, 1932
Source: Virgilio Vercelloni, La storia del paesaggio urbano di Milano, Mailand:
Edizioni L’Archivolto 1989: 55
Figure 15: Anti-aircraft beams on the Zeppelin field, 1937
Source: Centrum Industriekultur Nürnberg 1992: 66.
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Figure 16: Ferruccio Vecchi, “L’Impero balza dalla mente del Duce”, 1939-40
Source: Genova 1997: 25.
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Figure 17: Gustav Klutsis, monumental photographies of Lenin and Stalin for
May 1st, 1932
Source: Taylor, B. 1996: 249.
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Figure 18: Russian Icons, School of Dionissij, The Saints John Chrysostom and
Basili the Great, 16th century
Source: Taylor 1996: 249.
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Figure 19: Illumination on the occasion of the anniversary of the March on Rome,
October 28th, 1933.
Source: AEM (Azienda Elettrica Municipale), Archivio Fotografico
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DMITRI ZAKHARINE
State Totalitarianism or Media Totalitarianism?
The question concerning the logical relationship between the structures
and media of totalitarianism has been treated controversially in contem-
porary scholarship. A large part of the relevant publications (represented
by Hannah Arendt and Leonard Schapiro)1 defines totalitarian power
primarily as the power of a charismatic leader over the unwilling major-
ity and, following Aristotle’s concept of tyranny, sees the latter as rooted
in structures of political order.2 A second corpus of research increas-
ingly interprets totalitarianism as technological power and associates
1 | See: Hannah Arendt (1951: 465): “[. . . ] totalitarian government in its initial
stages must behave like a tyranny and raze the boundaries of man-made law”. See:
Leonard Schapiro (1972: 118): “Totalitarianism is a new form of dictatorship which
grew up in the conditions of mass democracy after the First World war. It was
characterized by the predominance of the leader of the victorious movement, who
with the aid of his subordinate elite and a manipulated ideology aimed at total control
over state, society and the individual”. Peter Burke indicated certain similarities
between leaders of totalitarian regimes (in the twentieth century) and absolutist
regimes (in the seventeenth century) in The Fabrication of Louis XIV (Burke 1992:
203): “The contrast between 17th-century leaders and 20th-century ones is not a
contrast between rhetoric and truth. It is a contrast between two styles of rhetoric”.
See: Gleason (1995: 7): “Although the term totalitarianism has been widely used
outside the academic community and has wide currency today, one seldom sees it
any longer used analytically in the pages of a scholarly monograph or journal”.
2 | “Any monarchy must necessarily be a tyranny of this sort if it is rules in
unchallenged fashion over persons who are similar or better and with a view to its
own advantage and not that of the ruled. Hence [it is rule over persons who are]
unwilling; for no free person would willingly tolerate this sort of rule” (Aristotle 1984:
4-10-1295ff).
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it with scientific inventions in the field of telecommunications. In this
second corpus, the radio, the loudspeaker and sound film, i.e. media
forms that realize the principle of optical sound recording, are assigned
a structuralizing function with regard to the reproduction and continuity
of totalitarian power.
Established trends in philosophical anthropology and the philosophy
of media seem convinced that acoustic and audiovisual media have a
particular affinity for exercising political power. One of their main argu-
ments holds that humans have two eyelids, but no “earlids”. Since man
cannot evade auditory impact, the source of totalitarian power is said
to inhere in the involuntary acoustic guidance of attention. As early as
in the nineteenth-century discourses of Zivilisationskritik, hearing was
treated as a sense of extreme passibility and at the same time as a guaran-
tor of authentic perception. For indigenous peoples, auditory sensations
are supposed to have been action-guiding to a greater degree than visual
sensations. Based on this theory, Nietzsche attempted to derive the
meaning of Greek tragedy from the spirit of music in 1872. At around
the same time, the sociologist Georg Simmel (1882) noted “that in all
primitive peoples [. . . ] music [. . . ] plays a key role”. Cultural historian
Egon Friedell (1949) later maintained that “the receptivity and sensitiv-
ity of the Greeks to the power of sound [was] downright pathological”.
While it is no longer desired to reflect on the finer differences between
the universals of acoustic perception and socially constructed listening
contexts, contemporary cultural studies has by and large subscribed to
the above-mentioned theories of philosophy and philosophical anthro-
pology.3
In the 1960s, media studies pioneerMarshallMcLuhan established the
“monopolistic effect” of the radio by bringing concepts such as “auditory
space” and Lebensraum into a close relationship with one another.4 In
McLuhan’s work, the famous analogy between the radio and the tribal
drum applies first and foremost to the public listening cultures of devel-
oping nations. While England and America were supposedly “immune”
to the radio “due to the influence of alphabetic writing and industrializa-
tion”, the radio embodied “an archaic force [. . . ] for the peoples of Africa,
India, China and Russia”. In these places, the radio “evoked archaic tribal
ghosts of the most vigorous sort” and returned the fragmented individ-
3 | See: Welsch (1993: 99): “It follows that we are especially in need of protection
acoustically”.
4 | See: McLuhan (1964: 298): “It is the top item on radio, showering us with
fountains of auditory space or lebensraum“.
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ual to the cradle of the collective environment of voices (McLuhan 1968:
340-345).
The tradition of the concept of media totalitarianism elaborated in
McLuhan’s writings has produced a number of recent studies on acous-
tic communication. These treat the “new media” (but above all electro-
acoustic media) as “hot” in terms of their high potential for effecting inte-
gration. Thus Cornelia Epping-Jäger, for instance, views the loudspeaker
as the source of “a medially configured vocal power”. Using the term
“Loud/Speaker dispositif ”, she analyzes the consolidation process of the
technical parameters of acoustic media and the power claims of politi-
cal elites. Through her analysis of Hitler’s self-portrayals, Epping-Jäger
arrives at the conclusion that the Loud/Speaker dispositif generated
the “phonocentrism of National Socialist political communication” and
promoted the internalization of power as an acoustic form of experience
of the Volksgemeinschaft.5
Unlike Epping-Jäger, Inge Marszolek shows that the communal recep-
tion of both radio and loudspeaker voices would have been destined to
fail without the cooperation of both listeners and producers of sound.
Implanted in private rooms, the radio eluded total control: it could be
switched on and off. One could avoid the infiltration of totalitarian vocal
power into private spaces through the self-guided adjustment of volume.
As numerous memoirs from the time of National Socialism document,
this option was often exercised. The Volksempfänger was instantly si-
lenced “as soon as a loud voice resounded from it” (Marszolek 2005: 67).
For this reason, political speeches were reduced in favor of entertain-
ment programs by 1935. According to Marszolek, mass presentations
with a powerful acoustic component increasingly lost their prominence
after 1935 and were reserved for only a few major National Socialist
events (Marszolek 2005: 63).
It is always popular and, with certain reservations, even sensible to
express alarm about the power produced by innovative technological
solutions. However, scholarship has thus far failed to provide an empir-
ical basis for equating concepts such as acoustics and totalitarianism.
But the argument for the totality of the radio or the loudspeaker is valid
only if it can be proven that both listeners and those who let listen use
5 | The public spaces in which the parades of the Nazis took place were organized
so that none of the audience members were more than 75 meters away from a
loudspeaker. Hitler’s voice was amplified 50,000 volt, so that it could dominate the
space of 500,000 square meters on Berlin’s Tempelhof Field (Epping-Jäger 2003:
100; Epping-Jäger 2006, 166).
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and interpret these media in a certain culturally coded manner. This
requires greater insight into the nature of social agreements about the
use of acoustic media in the context of repressive power regimes.
The present article attempts to show that the relationship between
the audio media and the listening contexts of totalitarianism should be
treated as contingent. Based on an analysis of early film sound projects
in the Soviet Union, it intends to demonstrate how, on the one hand,
electro-acoustic media were used to reconfigure traditional soundscapes
and how, on the other hand, local (social, mytho-religious) semantics
of sound entered into the constitution of such electro-acoustic sound-
scapes.
The Totality of Voice in the Eastern Christian Interpretation
of Sound
The human voice constitutes a basic two-channeled identification sys-
tem, which allows the establishing of a correlation between the produc-
tion and the reception of sounds: I hear myself, therefore I produce
sounds; I produce sounds, therefore I hear them. The projection of this
production-reception schema onto the environment accounts for the
“channel purism” [Kanalpurismus] of many religious systems. To this
day, the differentiation between sounds whose source is human and all
other sounds remains essential to such religions as Islam and Eastern
Christianity. Thus, for instance, in Russian churches the use of musical
instruments is not allowed for the reason that instruments are unable to
pray. Protestantism knows of a similar dilemma, though it observes this
difference less rigorously.
Since the Early Middle Ages, Catholic priests (similarly to Russian
clergymen and Muslim muezzins, or callers to prayer), were expected
to have special capabilities in the interpretation of sound.6 But only in
Western regions did musicians of the sixteenth and seventeenth cen-
tury supersede religious interpreters who conveyed sacred messages
using their voice. In the cultural contexts of both Western and Eastern
Christianity, collective acoustic signal-calls stood in a relationship of
6 | See: Murray R. Schafer (1999: 215): “Throughout history the range of the
human voice has provided an important module in determining the grouping of human
settlements. For instance, it conditioned the ‘long’ farm of early North American
settlers, where the houses were placed within shouting distance of one another in
case of surprise attack, and the fields ran back from them in a narrow strip”.
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reference to the human voice for many centuries.7 As late as in 1737, a
church intendant in the Bourbonnais (according to the account of Lu-
cien Febvre) had the bells of his city lowered and flogged by the hangman
in medieval fashion, because they had dared to ring out against the royal
guard (Febvre 1942: 322). In Russia, church bells were ensouled and
treated as living beings much longer and more consistently than in the
West. As a result, they were punished for conveying heretical messages
by being thrown to the ground, flogged and carried off to Siberia after
having their loop (ear in Russian) beaten off and their clapper (tongue in
Russian) torn out.8 In places where complex social ties emerged more
slowly, and where the writing-based learning process in the realm of
acoustics did not occur linearly, the animistic interpretation of sound
survived longer than in Western Europe. Even in the twenty-first century,
the Russian church still practices customs in which un-enlivened church
bells receive names and are mourned in memorial services. In 2002,
for instance, the name of incumbent Russian president Vladimir Putin
was engraved on the bells of the Holy Trinity-St. Sergius Monastery in
Zagorsk, one of Russia’s most important churches.
When the acoustic community acknowledges the arbitrary nature
of sound symbols, it is reflected in national policy regarding both un-
enlivened and enlivened sound objects. Political power relies on the
collective conviction that sound symbols lose their magical power when
the sacred source of sound is exchanged or replaced by another source.
7 | Claude-Levi-Strauss reconstructed the prototypical, symmetrically arranged
model of sound perception by analyzing the sender-recipient schemata found in
mythology: “In the myths mentioned so far, the protagonists are receivers of noise; in
other contexts, they turn into producers of noise” (Levi-Strauss 1976: 211).
8 | Russian history tells of numerous bells that were “corporally” executed in this
manner. The first of these is the bell of the Novgorod veche (people’s assembly),
which was dismounted, “arrested” and carried off to Moscow in 1478 by order of Ivan
III. Another famous story concerns a bell from Uglich that was flogged with the knout
in 1593 and taken to Tobolsk. The bell was said to have heralded bad news about the
murder of Tsarevich Dmitrii. As punishment, the people threw the bell to the ground
from the belfry, tore out its clapper, beat loose the loop of the bell and publically
struck it twelve times with the knout on the town’s main square. Afterwards, the bell
was locked into the Tobolsk prison. In the second half of the eighteenth century, the
bell of the Moscow Kremlin was punished for similar reasons and in similar fashion.
During the Moscow Plague Riot of 1771, a large number of people had gathered
under the bells. When Empress Catharine II was unable to find the conspirators (i.e.
those who had rung the bell), she ordered that the bell itself be punished. First the
“tongue” (clapper) of the bell was removed. The bell then hung at the Kremlin without
a clapper until 1803. Today it is located at the armory in Moscow (Raushenbakh
1985: 304ff; Bondarenko 1998: 499ff).
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This collectively shared belief can explain the particular status of original
sound recordings in the Soviet Union of the 1930s. The struggle of the
first Soviet sound engineers to depict the industrial sound environment
in the format of original sound was based primarily on ideological rather
than technical reasons. These, if not determined directly by it, had much
in common with the religious beliefs of the Russian Orthodox Church.
In the 1930s, film theorists outside the Soviet Union were of very differ-
ent opinions regarding the extent to which original sound recording was
not only feasible, but also necessary for generating an authentic sound-
film effect. The pioneer of sound-film theory Béla Bálazs expressed
skepticism about the viewer’s ability to distinguish between original
versus studio sound (1926).9 Christian Metz later took a similar position:
“In principle, nothing distinguishes a shot heard in a film from a shot
heard on the street”.10 In complete opposition to this, Williams argued
that, unlike studio sound, original sound transmitted the traces of the
acoustic context of a recording: “‘identical’ sounds (voices, instruments)
seem different in different acoustic environments” (Williams 1980: 53).
Modern sound recording techniques (Dolby) allow the capturing of
the subtlest nuances of a soundscape. In this process, the volume of
low sounds is raised while noise is strongly reduced. The nuances of the
soundscape could therefore be imitated in the studio as well, by blending
recordings and special sound effects created with a synthesizer.11 To this
day, sound film can and must dispense with original sound recordings
for two reasons. First, the ambient noise contained in every original
sound recording is often perceived as distracting by viewers. Second,
ambient noise is superfluous during playback because the eye’s correc-
tive function neutralizes its effect. While looking at a screen that shows
a running horse, one will easily identify the rattling of nutshells with
the sound of hooves. One of the paradoxes of sound recording consists
of the fact that studio sound often seems more effective than original
sound. In the United States, England and Germany, early sound film
often managed without recordings of original sound. In fact, studio
9 | See: Bálazs 1926-1931: 161: “Sound is cannot be depicted [. . . ]. Not the
image of [actor’s] voice but the voice itself is shown”.
10 | See: Metz 1975: 158: “Rien ne distingue en principe un coup de feu entendu
dans un film d’un coup de feu entendu dans la rue”.
11 | See: Flückiger 2002: 73: “One could imagine techniques that would eliminate
this difference [between original and recorded sound]. It is also conceivable that the
physical properties of original sound and recorded sound could coincide completely”.
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sound recordings were utilized much more consistently at the time than
in today’s film shootings.12
Soon after the first experimental sound films were introduced into So-
viet culture, inventors of the first sound-film camera and formalistically-
minded film interpreters claimed that the nature and function of Soviet
sound film were essentially different from its German and American
prototypes. While the talkie and the musical were of primary signifi-
cance in the West, the proletarian cinema of the Soviet Union instead
specialized in reproducing the sound picture of the heroic industrial
workday (Sokolov 1930: 59; Shorin 1941: 90ff; Andrievskii 1931: 21).
When pioneer of Soviet sound film Dziga Vertov (Denis Kaufman)
composed the “Sound March” for his film The Donbass Symphony in
1929, he provided the recordings of his sound sources with attributes
that revealed an animistic understanding of the sound environment.13
The director rarely invented such attributes himself, however, drawing
them from current newspaper articles instead:14 “The furious sound
of the church bell rings out with new force;” “Suddenly one hears the
strange whimper of a flying cross;” “A cry of pure delight escapes the
orchestra”; or “The knocking sounds of the billet being forged” (Vertov
1929-1930: 1-6).15
12 | In his journal from the early 1930s, the American film director Rouben Mamou-
lian admits that, due to high production costs, original sound was used only rarely
in American cinema: “In Applause unfortunately the traffic noises had to be made
on the set. It was pathetic, and it still is pathetic when I hear it. But for the subway
scenes we got permission to shoot in the subway. Those sounds were authentically
recorded. We also shot in Pennsylvania Station, and I did a scene on the top of a
skyscraper by breaking the law” (Cameron 1980: 90).
13 | The acoustic connotations of the artistic name invented by Dennis Kaufman,
the descendant of a Jewish family from Bialystok (Poland), speak for themselves.
The first name “Dziga” was meant to suggest the noise of the film editing machine
(dz. . . dz. . . dz. . . ), while the name “Vertov” is derived from the Russian root “vert” (to
turn).
14 | Vertov 1929-1931, 5. See the following excerpt from an article in the Red
Army newspaper from April 12th, 1923: “Suddenly the booming sounds of the bells
ring out in the club-house. [. . . ] One can hear the hoarse bass voices of the priests,
accompanied by a pitiful crowd of old religious women. ‘Long live the Internationale,
brothers’—one hears inside the clubhouse. [. . . ] To the astonishment of the priests
and the believers, this passionate and powerful song resounded from the bell tower:
‘Not God, nor Tsar, nor hero.’ Thus the komsomoltsy sing from the bell tower of the
monastery. A few old women make the sign of the cross.—Are those perhaps angels
singing?” (Anonymous 1923: 1).
15 | Vertov countered reproaches by his opponents that characterized the indus-
trial noises in The Donbass Symphony as monotonous and boring with the argument
that the sounds in his film are “not at all monotonous; they are unusual [. . . ] the
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The attempt of totalitarian propaganda to exaggerate the collective be-
lief in an animistic sound environment, and to replace Christian sound
media with those of the Bolsheviks, implied an understanding of Bol-
shevism as a doctrine of enlightenment that filled an inanimate environ-
ment with spirit. Thus, the enervating sound of the factory siren came
to replace the metallic ringing of the church bell. In 1923, professional
musician Mikhail Gnesin, a 1914 graduate in composition from the St.
Petersburg Conservatory, was the first to speak of “communist bells”. He
was later to become the founder of Soviet music criticism in the USSR.
In the same year, another representative of the musical avant-garde,
Arsenii Avraamov, composed an entire symphony using factory sirens.
Two immense open-air events, in Baku (Azerbaijan) and Moscow, made
use of the pipes of every factory, the foghorns of the entire Caspian navy,
as well as two artillery divisions.
In light of the demystification of Christian sound media, optical
sound recording increasingly acquired a significant function and quasi-
religious impact. Not surprisingly, the passing of a decree on church
congregations in 1929, the drafting of the secret resolution “On the
Regulation of the Church Bells” on December 6th, 1929, the subsequent
dismantling of church bells, as well as the first Soviet attempts in the
sphere of sound film (1929) all coincided.16 Workers’ decisions about the
prohibition of bell ringing were frequently made in movie theaters fol-
lowing screenings of antireligious propaganda films.17 In the course of
implementing party decisions, church bells were thrown to the ground
by the Soviet Militia (similarly to medieval times), after their clappers
industrial workers read these sounds as meaningful signs [smyslovye znaki ]” (Vertov
1930-1931: 83). See also Vertov’s answer to the criticism of the Kiev film factory
administration: “A worker that has been employed in manufacturing for years will
recognize the sound of any factory. When he hears the sounds produced by the
power plant, he will know that it sounds like the plant in Donbass” (Vertov 1930-1931,
59).
16 | See the following excerpt from this resolution: “The bell ringing practiced
by the priests throughout the district contradicts the principle of the separation of
church and state insofar as it infringes on the rights of the broad non-religious
masses, prevents work and disturbs the workers in their free time. Under these
circumstances, and based on requests stemming from the broad working masses
(whose intellectual needs have increased in recent times), our administration must
take highly restrictive and prohibitive measures regarding the ringing of church bells”
(NKVD: Ob uregulirovanii kolokol’nogo zvonka).
17 | For instance, a gathering of audience members took place at the movie
theater “Vostok” in Yoshkar-Ola (Mari El) on April 19th, 1932. The viewers in the
assembly are said to have demanded the legal prohibition of bell ringing.
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(tongues in Russian) had been removed.18 The devout reacted to the
desecration of bells with ritual lament.19
The implementation of animistic standards of perception in original
sound recording techniques presupposed an aesthetic principle that
determined the nature of early Soviet documentary newsreels [doku-
mental’nye khroniki]. The camera crew in which the inventor of the first
Soviet sound-film camera, Shorin, collaborated with Vertov, often used
the single portable camera available at the time to record the voices of
both birds and Soviet party functionaries in a same session. In his mem-
oirs, Shorin liked to compare sound recording to a pre-modern form of
hunting, using the ambiguous verb “to capture” to describe two distinct
practices (“capturing with a trap” and “capturing with the microphone”).
The second of the two accessible cameras that enabled original sound
recording in nature was placed at the disposal of the Department of Doc-
umentary Film by the Shorin-Vertov team. Immediately thereafter, the
state commissioned the Moscow film director Erofeev to produce orig-
inal sound recordings in the Pamir Mountains. From a practical point
of view, the goal of the laborious expedition into a region with “no elec-
tricity and no technical assistance” was difficult to comprehend (Shorin
1941: 91). It was clear that the entire range of supposedmountain sounds
18 | See the report of a clergyman who witnessed the dismounting of bells: “On the
evening of April 19 [1935], a brigade of workers appeared. This time the watchman
had the keys to the temple. He handed them over and the workers began to dismount
the bells. But because it soon got dark the workers merely managed to take down
the clapper of the large bell and to throw it to the ground. At night, the community
spokesman convinced the men to return the clapper to the belfry, which they did.
[. . . ] Early in the morning came a group of four workers who had thrown down the
clapper the night before. When they discovered that the large bell’s clapper had
been returned to its initial place, they began removing all of the bells, beginning
with the smaller ones. At around this time, about fifty women gathered next to the
belfry, protesting and crying very loudly, which did not help at first. But eventually
the workers stopped and simply dropped their tools. They descended from the belfry
and at the exit encountered a group of women that were crying loudly and reviling
the workers as vampires. After that, the workers marched off to the village soviet,
where they phoned to request Militia troops. Later, two armed militiamen arrived on
horse and threatened the women with violence and the use of weapons” (Damaskin
2002: 167-183).
19 | See the following eyewitness report (Voronezh district): “The toppled bells
were mourned by the peasant women like the deceased. Led by members of State
security and a delegate of the Communist Party, a group of peasants arrived from
Voronezh and went up the bell tower. When the women from the village noticed that
the drunk peasants were preparing something on the tower, and were trying to lower
and throw down the church bells, they began to wail even more loudly, as during an
attack of the Tatars” (Annenkov 1990: 160).
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could be recorded in a studio or, at most, in a Moscow suburb. The Soviet
state nevertheless insisted on original sound recordings. This approach
had the ideological objective of opening the ears of the masses and of
completely sensitizing societal perception to the infiltration of latent
messages from the natural landscape.
Dissolving the Boundary Between the Sonic Weapon and
Sound Aesthetics
Soviet experiments with audio media reveal a scientific culture whose
ideological platform was based on an enlightenment faith of Eastern
Christian provenance that had been equipped with technological at-
tributes and symbols. Such a scientific culture exhibits, on the one
hand, a continued tendency toward its dedifferentiation from religion,
art and politics. On the other hand, it demonstrates a certain degree
of reflexive scientification (see: Kozulin 1984; Weiner 1999; Berstejn
2001; Busky 2002; Andrews 2003). This scientification creates conditions
under which societal introspection begins to regard science not as a
source of solutions, but as a source of scientific problems. According to
Beck (1986), this leads to the de-monopolization of scientific knowledge
claims: science becomes more and more necessary, but at the same time
less and less sufficient for the socially binding definition of truth.
With some reservations, one can argue that the concept of a psy-
chotronic weapon, which was already coined by the scientistic utopias
of the 1920s, influenced later Soviet experiments in the field of radio-
hypnosis. The 1920s through 1930s witnessed the large-scale Soviet
experiments of Lazarev, Bekhterev and Kazhinskii, who studied brain
waves that were assumed to be capable of transmitting both thoughts
and transcendental messages over long distances. For proletarian the-
atre performances, devices such as “Fonofot” were constructed (1924).
These can be considered the prototypes of later technologies of behavior
control whose objective was to manipulate the aesthetic impressions of
the audience by psycho-physiological means.20
As in the case of many technological innovations, the motivation for
research in the sphere of sound-wave radiation in the 1930s through
the 1940s was based on military interests. Accordingly, public scientific
20 | See: Zapiska izobretatelia instrumenta Fonofot (1924). See about psy-
chotronic [non lethal] weapons: Defense News 1993, Defense Electronics 1995;
Alexander 1995; Smirnov/Beznosiuk/Zhuravlev 1995.
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disputes had first to determine which electro-technical inventions fell
into the category of entertainment and which were to be classified as
weapons. The scientific experiments of the late 1920s in the sphere of
entertainment focused primarily on analyzing sonic waves 1) whose
frequency fell below the threshold of sensitivity (infrasound) or above
this threshold (ultrasound) and 2) whose intensity remained below the
threshold of audibility (10 dB—breathing) or ranged above the acoustic
threshold of pain (130 dB—an aircraft engine).
Even before the invention of optical sound recording, Soviet physicists
and artists alike anticipated the emergence of amedium thatwould erase
the boundary between aesthetics and physiology. At the time, sonic
weapons were the focus of scientific studies in both the realm of theater
arts and the military sector. In 1928, the same year in which sound
film appeared, the Red Army General Headquarters distributed a secret
informational brochure about German and French military experiments
with sound waves for the purpose of destroying the enemy both mentally
and physically.21
While early experiments in the field of optical sound recording were
21 | The original text of the manual reads as follows: “Lately we are receiving
information about experiments aiming at the solution of new tactical goals. These
concern the effect of invisible waves over a long distance. The concrete question
is not the impact of electricity but the impact of sound waves, or more precisely—
the development of a device that generates certain sound waves, which are barely
audible to the human ear. The data at our disposal allow us to conclude that such
a device has already been developed in France. It produces ultrasound waves that
are transmitted in the form of a beam of rays. The effect of these waves on the
nervous system is very strong. In large crowds [. . . ] such waves trigger the urge
to flee. According to the information we have received, the operating principle of
this device is based on a commonly known nervous reaction that can be produced
in anyone. This reaction is caused when piercing sounds, such the scraping of a
piece of metal on a smooth surface, are heard at close distance. Whoever hears
such a sound has goosebumps and is forced to grind his teeth. These are barely
audible sounds. But based on their extremely sharp effect they are almost equal to
ultrasound. If the oscillation frequency exceeds 50000 per second, one can no longer
hear the whistling sounds. However, a far-reaching effect on the nervous system is
immediately noticeable. We have no technical specifications about the structure of
the device. But we are receiving information (from Germany as well) on how the idea
of such a device is to be realized. The Germans are likewise conducting experiments
that aim to employ ultrasound waves in signaling systems. The descriptions of these
experiments indicate that [. . . ] ultrasound waves of low intensity do not cause any
damage. But if the intensity of the waves increases, their effect on the skin can cause
agonizing pain. Sonic generators of higher capacity could also be used as a military
weapon” (“Voennoe ispol’zovanie noveishikh dostizhenii tekhniki” [“The Military Use
of the Newest Achievements of Technology” 1928]).
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still being conducted in the Soviet Union, the effect of high-frequency
sound waves was openly discussed as a boundary problem of warfare
and musical aesthetics. The Soviet musical avant-garde made a signif-
icant contribution to experiments on the military use of sound waves,
for instance. The name of the engineer Lev Termen (Leo Theremin) is
associated not only with the invention of the Termenvox (an electronic
musical instrument that can be played without physical contact). More
importantly, Termen was famous in his time as a developer of signaling
and eavesdropping systems. For many years, the KGB used his Buran
device to intercept the conversations of foreign embassy workers.22
As the sound engineer for the first Soviet sound film, The Five Year Plan
(Plan for Great Works, 1929), the composer Arsenii Avraamov worked
with the “oscillation formula of the membrana basilaris, the acoustic
organ responsible for the perception of music”. Avraamov was of the
opinion that “the composer who applied such a formula could literally
deafen the listener”.23 He believed that the impact of Dziga Vertov’s Don-
bass Symphony could have been much more striking if the sound of the
film had been produced by means of electro-acoustic synthesis, instead
of using original sound recordings (Avraamov 1939: 316). Similar to the
military studies cited above, the composer was primarily concerned with
the piercing gliding sounds of the upper frequency range (beginning at
circa 3,000 Hz). Beyond the acoustic effect, such a “differential music”
was supposed to cause the body to tremble and the facial muscles to
contract.24
Whereas the first American sound film studio originated in the con-
22 | Over many years, Leo Theremin worked for the KGB and Soviet intelligence.
In 1926, he developed an experimental device with a wireless connection that served
as a project for the first television set. See the following excerpt from an interrogation
of Termen, who was later arrested as a “spy”: “I worked on developing a new
apparatus that was intended to be used for eavesdropping on the personnel of
foreign embassies inside their rooms. The device was aimed at the windowpanes.
Based on the recorded oscillations, one could determine what was being discussed
in the room” (Anfilov 1962: 192ff; Kaplunova 1988: 2).
23 | See: Avraamov 1916: 85: “Only few people realize that the physiological
structure of the ear requires careful handling of the notes of the fourth octave [. . . ].
This is of enormous practical significance, because [. . . ] having switched to the
register of e4-c4, the composer [can] literally deafen his listener [. . . ]”.
24 | See: Avraamov 1939: 319: “This ‘differential music’ (we have called it thus
by analogy with differential analysis in mathematics, since differential analysis has
introduced the concept of infinitely small numbers) could solve the problems science
is currently facing [. . . ] It possesses such resources as we used to merely ‘suspect.’
[. . . ] We know that ‘glissando’ [gliding sound, D. Z.] is a highly effective tool [. . . ].
Nature itself has invented it: the howl of the jackals, the whistling of wind and storm,
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text of silent film production in Hollywood and the first German sound
film studio in the context of silent film production in Babelsberg, So-
viet sound film was subordinated to the Radio Institute from the very
beginning; as a result, its production studios were located at the Cen-
tral Telegraph Building. Even though pre-revolutionary Russian silent
film studios such as the Mosfilm studio established around 1924 were
also available for the development of sound film in the USSR, the Soviet
administration chose a different option.25 Their decision was based on
the theory of so-called electro-acoustic telepathy, in which recently dis-
covered cerebral radiations were over-generalized as a type of universal
energy. Around 1920, Petr Lazarev had first observed brain-generated
electromagnetic waves with a frequency range of 10 to 50 Hz. From
these, the scientist deduced the human ability to transmit thoughts
across distances in the form of electromagnetic waves (Lazarev 1920:
6). In 1924, Bernard Kazhinskii conducted an experiment in the applied
laboratory for zoological psychology that studied the transmission of
telepathic commands from humans to dogs (Kazhinskii 1928). A hypno-
tized dogwas supposed to jumponto a chair in response to the unspoken
command of the scientist. Although the results of the study remained
inconclusive, the idea of cerebral radiation inspired broad layers of the
intelligentsia to a new conceptualization of the Soviet public.
It is highly indicative that themajority of sound engineers who actively
developed early Soviet sound film were university-educated neuropsy-
chologists. Dziga Vertov and Abram Room studied this subject at the
Institute of Neuropsychology in St. Petersburg.26 The terms “Radio-
Eye”27 and “Radio-Ear”28, which Vertov used to define the functions of
and the sighing, groaning and squealing of man are all examples of glissando in
nature”.
25 | In all, three silent film factories existed in Moscow. The main film studio of
Khanzhonkov was renamed the “First Factory of State Cinema” after the Revolution.
Already in 1924, the film studio “Mosfilm” was opened by combining the First and
Third Film Factories.
26 | In the years 1914 to 1917, Abram Room studied at the St. Petersburg Institute
of Neuropsychology. From 1917 to 1922, he continued his scientific career at the
medical faculty of Saratov State University, while simultaneously working as an
instructor at the Theatre Workshop.
27 | See: Vertov 1924: 118: “Several years ago we posed the question of the
radioukho (‘Radio-Ear’, D.Z.) and radioglaz (‘Radio-Eye’, D. Z.) and the invention of
sound film has preempted this question”. See: Zakharine 2009a; Zakharine 2009b.
28 | See: Vertov 1966: 55: “We will state it once more: the eye and the ear.
The ear cannot see; the eye cannot listen. The division of functions”. Vertov most
likely adopted the concept of the division of functions of eye and ear from Helmholtz.
Helmholtz developed the “concept of non-overlapping qualitative spheres” [sich nicht
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Soviet sound media, alluded to Beliaev’s novel The Radio-Brain, pub-
lished in excerpts in the Red Newspaper from 1926 to 1929 (see: Beliaev
1928: Chapter 17). The novel told of a self-controlled psychotronic appa-
ratus (a “small screen [. . . ] for reading minds”) that learned to program
the behavior of Soviet citizens. Through the use of direct and indirect
citations, the novel popularized the ideas of Lazarev and Kazhinskii,
who interpreted the effect of cerebral radiation in terms of electronic
telepathy.29
Influenced by new publications in the sphere of electro-acoustic
telepathy, film theorists such as Sergei Eizenshtein, who had initially
been critical about the future of the talkie, revised their montage theories
(1929). According to Eizenshtein’s confession, this revision took place
“in unison with what was taking place in acoustics”. Montage technique
would henceforth contain “a physiological component [. . . ] just like mu-
sic whose effects are caused by the overtones”. In thework of Eizenshtein,
the new concept of overtone montage [obertonnyi montazh] implied
the broadening of sensory stimuli beyond the limits of the screen. Film
became a medium that was meant to put the viewer into uncontrollable
states. Thus, according to Eizenshtein’s account, the film The General
Line (1929) was created based on “the collision and combination of indi-
vidual stimuli [. . . ]”. When the director was shooting scenes of mowing
peasants, he moved the camera slightly from side to side. Afterwards
he laughed “with all his soul” as he “secretly observed the audience in
the movie theater”. Sitting in their seats, they were rocking from side to
side, at first slowly, then “faster and faster, as the images on the screen
became shorter and shorter” (Eizenshtein 1929: 504).30
Not long before the appearance of the first Soviet sound film in 1929,
the Association ofWorkers of Revolutionary Cinema (ARRK)was engaged
in discussing of Stalin’s directive on the state of Soviet film. This directive
intended to “replace” the traditional vodka business as a source of na-
überschneidende Qualitätskreise] which enclose the processing of stimuli: “The
same ethereal vibrations that appear as light to the eye are felt as warmth by the skin.
The same aerial vibrations that the skin perceives as a light touch are perceived as
sound by the ear” (Helmholtz 1959: 16).
29 | See the following excerpt from the novel: “‘Yes’, Takh replied quietly. ‘I’ve
already said that I found a material that would help receive these waves. I have
defined these waves as ‘C-waves’ or ‘C-rays’ (from the word cerebrum, Latin for
‘brain’). [. . . ] C-waves of infinitely short length are reminiscent of the x-rays that
serve to illuminate the screen”’ (Beliaev 1928: Chapter 17).
30 | The question to what extent Eizenshtein’s concept of overtone montage could
also be understood as a parody of mainstream discourse can not be discussed in
any detail in this article.
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tional tax revenues “with radio and film” (CPSU 1928: 60).31 The Soviet
film industry was faced with the task of eliminating, in short order, the
disparity between tax revenues stemming from the sale of alcohol and
from film distribution. In accordance with Lemberg’s plan, which was
supported by the workers’ assembly, “film was to replace vodka”. Among
the most significant arguments in favor of this replacement strategy
were the results of surveys conducted in the Kharkov region. These polls
documented a “large interest among the population” in film screenings,
which the people referred to as “misty pictures” [tumannye kartiny].
In the debates led by the ARRK in 1929 and 1930, the physio-aesthetic
effect of sound film was understood in connection with Ivan Pavlov’s the-
ory of reflexes.32 The film director Abram Room advanced the argument
that sound film would be ideally suited to the implementation of reflex-
ology in cinematic practice. In his view, film directors had to capture
the nerve reflexes of the actors in order to meet the new demands of the
sound camera as a cognitive medium. Room based his ideas on the par-
allel depiction of animal and human reflexes in a film by Pudovkin that
reconstructed and demonstrated the procedure of Pavlov’s experiments
with dogs.33
The comparison between animal and human reflexes became the
topic of scientific news from various fields of research shortly before the
emergence of sound film. For instance, the first part of the documentary
film The Achievements of Soviet Science (1929), entitled Experience with
the Acclimatization of Monkeys at the Sukhumi Zoo, showed a Sacred
Baboon that had been born at the zoo. The second part of the film (The
Great Mute Begins to Talk) then introduced Tager and Shorin, the in-
31 | Stalin’s directive took up an idea posited by Trotsky: “The state can integrate
[film] into the spheres of leisure and national education more and more by opposing
cinema to alcohol and turning film into its own source of income” (Trotskii 1927: 23).
In a lecture from March 7th, 1929 entitled “Vodka and Cinema”, Lemberg (a member
of the ARRK) expressed the problem of the disproportionate distribution of income as
follows: “Whereas the national income from film production comes to no more than
20 million rubles, tax revenues from Tsentrospirt in the years 1925-1926 amounted
to 370 million” (Lemberg 1929: 3).
32 | In the years 1924-1925, Room designed the Course of Lectures on Reflexol-
ogy for the audience of the Meyerhold Theatre.
33 | See: Room 1929: 16: “Just as in the case of the dog that salivates after
seeing a picture of food, light is considered a stimulus in the case of the actor [. . . ].
Such great men as Bekhterev and Pavlov relied on Darwin in their research. They did
not work with actors; they worked with animals. [Therefore] we need a psychological
laboratory for the purely cinematographic study of man; we should study the reflexes
of film actors”.
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ventors of the first Soviet sound film cameras.34 Many of the audience
members knew the goal of breeding apes at the Georgian zoo from overt
newspaper publications. Based on a theory advanced by the veterinar-
ian Dr. Ivanov, scientists planned to transplant the male reproductive
glands of apes into the bodies of the old Bolsheviks in order to retard
the aging process.35 The images of sound film cameras alluded to an-
other scientific miracle, which consisted of the “ensouling” of the silent
film camera. Consequently, it remained for the audience to conceive of
sound film as a medium that could infinitely extend the human capacity
for cognition.36 By analogy, apes were presented as the source of the
animalistic sexual virility of the future man.
In conclusion, it can be argued that the consolidation of the concepts
of totalitarian power and of the total medium in the Soviet Union of the
1930s occurred in two ways. The first was the hermeneutic approach,
which concerned the interpretation of the sound environment. The
latter allowed archaic animistic interpretations of sound, which had
been partially predetermined by Eastern Christian church doctrine, to
resurface in the sound symbols, used by radio and sound film com-
positions. Consequently, the idea of church bells as living beings was
projected onto the factory siren. The second approach was a scientism
that promoted the dedifferentiation of physics and religion. Inspired
by inventions in the realms of ultrasound, cerebral radiation and the
study of reflexes, scientifically trained sound engineers theorized acous-
tic sound media as an alternative to psychoactive substances. Such
theories implied the dissolution of the boundary between aesthetics and
physiology on the one hand and between the public and the individual
on the other hand. The two approaches indicated here allow for the
conclusion that the electro-acoustic types of media that are viewed as
playing a decisive role in Soviet totalitarianism are, in fact, in continuity
with the interpretive schemata established by local cultural contexts. So-
34 | The film is located at the Russian State Documentary Film and Photo Archive
(Code 1-2087).
35 | See: Shishkin 2003: 17ff. The book gives a detailed account of Soviet
biologists’ experiments with transplanting ape glands. Following a series of failed
experiments, both Stalin and Zinov’ev lost confidence in the veterinarian Ivanov, who
had planned the rejuvenation of the Bolshevik elites. The doctor was arrested.
36 | In the discussion that occurred following Room’s lecture at the Association of
Revolutionary Film-Workers in 1929, one worker (Kirshon) suggested combining the
innovative theory of reflexes with the initial experiences in the field of scoring silent
films: “The formation of reflexes must be taken into consideration, and here we see
that German filmmakers do just that, by using music to evoke specific moods and
states” (Room 1929: 30).
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viet audio media stood in the service of totalitarian power only insofar as
they invoked the traditional sound symbols of Old Russia and relied on
the customary cooperation between expert networks in both the natural
sciences and the humanities.
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The Birth of Socialist Realism
out of the Spirit of Radiophonia
Maxim Gorky’s Project “Literaturnaja ucheba”
JURIJ MURAŠOV
This article is an attempt to combine a general media theory with a
microanalysis of textual strategies. Firstly, I will offer some broad theo-
retical considerations on the role of media in Soviet culture. Secondly, I
will try to show how the birth of Socialist Realism in Russia is linked to
the radio and how its understanding can be based on a specific poetics
of radiophonia. Finally, the third part will present a short microanalysis
of Gorky’s editing work on a manuscript sent to him by a young writer.
This analysis will show how radiophonic poetics work in the concrete
literary praxis.
Outline of a General Media Theory of Soviet Culture
The connection between the October Revolution in Russia and Soviet
culture on the one hand, and the media revolution of the twentieth
century on the other hand, is evident. Normally this connection is
analyzed from a political and institutional perspective. Modern mass
media, especially radio and film, but also mass printing, are considered
to be instruments used by political leaders to influence and manipulate
the masses in terms of Soviet socialist (totalitarian) ideology (Murašov
and Witte 2003: 17-38).
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Here I would like to propose a different point of view that focuses
above all on structural components of communication—especially radio
and film—reshaped in the Soviet culture of the 1930s under the impres-
sion of the new mass media. My argument holds that the new Soviet
communication utopia is rooted in the well-known Platonic attempt to
overcome those semantic and pragmatic unreliabilities of communica-
tion which result from the process of technologizing the word through
writing and (in analogy to Plato’s view) typography.
This paradoxical and therefore never realizable project is both the
foundation and the moving force of the strange and complicated pro-
cess called “sovietization”, which was pervasive during the 1930s in the
Russian cultural system, having absorbed art and literature, science,
philosophy, economy, law and justice, ethics, political power and, finally,
love. Remarkably, it was not the plots, topics and contents that were
most affected by socialist and Marxist ideology, but rather the modi and
logics of representation and communication.
The media- and communication-based reconstruction of Soviet cul-
ture is helpful in explaining the late and very slow development and
expansion of writing and typography in Russia. For a long time, print
culture in Russia remained under the control of either the Orthodox
Christian institutions or the Tsarist administration. Only beginning in
the 1830s, the so-called “epoch of Smirdin” (named after a famous pub-
lishing magnate), publishing became a form of independent economic
activity. The delayed process of social extension, institutionalization
and mental internalization of the effects of writing and typography is
the reason for the late functional differentiation of cultural spheres and
subsystems such as law, economics, political power and love in Russia.
The sceptical and sometimes downright obstructionist attitude towards
the technologically processed word, complemented by the artificial imi-
tation of orality in discourse, can be found in the specific poetological
strategies of nineteenth-century Russian literature, such as Gogol’s skaz,
Dostoevsky’s “polyphony” and even Tolstoy’s rhetorical device of es-
trangement (ostranenie), which culminated in the writer’s late rejection
of his own oeuvre and his corresponding moralistic anti-aestheticism.
This delayed institutional and mental recognition of writing and ty-
pography, together with the notorious skepticism towards both of them,
explain the unprecedented popularity that new electronic media, espe-
cially radio, gained in Russia during the media revolution. Those media
produced the so-called “secondary orality” which promised to overcome
semantic and pragmatic treacherousness of writing and print by eradi-
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cating such menaces of Russian culture as formalisation and abstraction,
semantic ambiguity and individualization.
At the same time, the political and social concepts andutopian ideas of
the nineteenth century were adjusted to the potential of the new media
at the beginning of the twentieth century. It suffices to mention Lenin’s
famous definition of communism as socialism plus electrification, or
the characterization of radio as a “megaphone of the Revolution”.
While during the utopian avant-garde period of Russian culture (from
the late 1910s through the early 1920s) the connection between the new
media and Soviet society remained more or less a declaration of intent,
the situation changed considerably in the following decade: new elec-
tronic media, especially radio and film, but also traditional print media,
became relevant in a technological, institutional and social sense. Two
simultaneous processes are particularly visible: the traditional Russian
scepticism towards writing and print culture increased, while at the
same time the new Soviet attitude towards orality within the framework
of literacy led to the paradoxically-schizoid mode of communication
that began to permeate all spheres and discourses of Soviet culture. Most
importantly, from that point on every self-definition and self-description
of the Russian cultural system had to be based on this new Soviet oral
mode of communication.1
A Media Theory of the Socialist Realism
When we look at literature from the point of view of functional anal-
ysis, we may define it as a subsystem within modern culture which
regulates and elaborates its strategies of dealing with the semantic and
pragmatic complexities of the speech production, such as interrelation
of language and writing, or the intricate eye-ear asymmetry of the pro-
duction of meaning. From this point of view, it becomes apparent why
the sphere of literature is so structurally relevant for all discourses and
functional subsystems of modern culture. Furthermore, we are able
to understand why even in comparison to the nineteenth century the
relevance of literature in the Soviet era increased and acquired a key role
in all self-definitions of the Soviet cultural system. Soviet literature had
the paradoxical task of popularizing and practicing the new “secondary
1 | For several years now there has been an increasing interest in the acoustic,
electroacoustic and acousmatic dimensions of Soviet culture, see especially: Gorham
2003; Gorjaeva 2007.
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orality” by utilizing writing and print media. This refers to the social
and mental adoption of an attitude towards writing that suppresses the
specific hermeneutic effects of the written and visualized word, produc-
ing abstraction, formalization, semantic ambiguity, individualization,
self-reflection and introspection.
This anxious rejection of the hermeneutic efficacy of the written word
is common in Russian culture of the first (and perhaps even second)
half of the twentieth century. It is noticeable in the texts of writers and
intellectuals of all ideological stripes, from Mikhail Bakhtin to Nikolai
Ostrovskii and from Vladimir Nabokov to Andrei Platonov. But the most
impressive illustration is provided by the linguistic theory ofNikolaiMarr,
elevated by Stalin to the status of official doctrine. In one particular case,
Marr identifies writing with the bourgeois class enemy against whom
Soviet linguistics must guard itself:
[. . . ] To this day, writing is the old enemy [. . . ] and evil adversary in the science
about language. [. . . ] There was a time when writing, and written language as
such, obscured language. Living speech escaped of attention of scholars, which
was entirely preoccupied with written language.
“[. . . ] pismo—stary vrag [. . . ] i zlo sopernik do naxih dne v
nauke o zyke. [. . . ] Bylo vrem, kogda pismo i voobwe pismenno-
st zaslonlo zyk. iva req vyhodila iz orbity issledovatel-
skogo vnimani, zahaqennogo elikom interesom k pismennomu
zyku” (Marr 1936: 353).2
At the same time, in Soviet culture of the late 1920s to early 1930s lit-
erature appears to be the foundation on which the new Soviet mode
of communication as such, paradoxically oriented towards orality, was
built. This construction connected literary production and its reception
with the mass medium of the radio. One should note that this connec-
tion still remains largely unexplored, despite an abundance of research
on the emergence of Socialist Realism and the first Congress of Soviet
Writers.
Two examples may illustrate this close connection between the institu-
tionalization of radio as a mass medium and the emergence of Socialist
Realism in the beginning of the 1930s. The first is a quote taken from the
editorial article “Pisatel’ i radio” in the radio journal Govorit SSSR:
For millions of people, the Congress of Soviet Writers has raised in all its depth
and breadth the question of creativity, of the production of high mastery, of great
ideas, great art and great simplicity.
2 | See for a more detailled analysis Morašov 2000a: 599-609.
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By presenting their works on the radio, the writers put into practice the basic
principle of Socialist Realism—creative work for the masses.
“S’ezd sovetskih pisatele vo vs glubinu i xir postavil vopros
o tvorqestve dl millionov, o produkii vysokogo masterstva,
bolxih ide, bolxogo iskusstva, bolyxo prostoty.
Vystupa so svoimi proizvedenimi na radio, pisateli osuw-
estvlt osnovno prinip sonalistiqeskogo realizma—tvorqe-
stvo dl mass” (Anonymous 1934: 3).
The second example is an enthusiastic statement by the writer Marietta
Šaginjan:
We writers must learn to communicate by means not only of the written, but also
of the spoken word. When I speak before the microphone, I have a keen sense of
being connected with millions of people, and I direct the word into space with a
feeling of real, responsible aim. That is the enormous significance of the writer’s
work for the radio.
“Nam, pisatelm, nuno nauqits obweni ne tolko qerez na-
pisannoe, no i qerez proiznesennoe slovo. Kogda  govor pered
mikrofonom, u min ostroe owuwenie svzi s millionami lde,
i  napravl slovo v prostpanstvo s quvstvom realnogo, otvet-
stvennogo priela. V 	tom ogromnoe znaqenie raboty pisatel dl
radio” (Anonymous 1934: 7).
In contrast to the various avant-garde poetics which all focus—even
in writing and visual culture—on the oral and otherwise sound word,
Socialist Realism means a writing project par excellence which simulates
an oral narration thus deletes all traces of its own discursive genesis in
the process of text production. From this point of view, Social Realism
with its keywords like ‘massovost’, ‘narodnost’, ‘ponjatnost’, ‘partijnost’,
‘tipizacia’, ‘položitel’nyj geroj’ can be characterizied as the poetics of
radiophonia.
Maxim Gorky’s Project “Literaturnaja ucheba”
A highly significant effort to institutionalize the structural relevance
of literature in Soviet culture is Maxim Gorky’s project “Literaturnaja
ucheba”, which attempts to engage the masses of uneducated workers in
the active production of literature. The genesis of the project (including
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its institutional and political aspects) is well described in Evgenij Do-
brenko’st book Formovka sovetskogo pisatelja (Dobrenko 1999), which
gives a lively impression of the megalomaniac scope of the project.
Yet what has not been analyzed so far is Gorky’s concrete pedagogical
involvement in his own project—for example, his corrections and editing
of manuscripts sent to him by young and aspiring writers.3
Gorky’s editorial practice is highly interesting because it shows his
own work on language and specific effects of writing. The writer’s editing
of his admirers’ manuscripts shows how the radiophonic poetics of
Socialist Realism regulates textual and editorial practice.
To illustrate this point, I would like to refer to Gorky’s editorial work on
the manuscript of a novel “Vor” (“The Thief”) send to him by the young
writer Michail V. Luzgin (1899-1942). “The Thief” describes a moral and
political development of the protagonist Pogodin, who manages to get
out of a criminal milieu, develops mature political consciousness and
finally joins the Bolshevik party. This case is remarkable, because it is
one of the rare cases, when a manuscript received in this way managed
to sustain Gorky’s severe criticism. In 1936 the novel was published
in two parts under the titles Medvezhatnik (The Apartment Robber)
and Oshibka (The Mistake) in the collection The Bolshevtsy. Essays
on the History of the Iagoda Labor Commune of the NKVD (Bolshevtsy.
Ocherki po istorii bolshevskoi imeni G. G. Iagoda trudokommuny NKVD)
in the series History of Plants and Factories (Istoriia fabrik i zavodov).
Luzgin’s 86 page-long typoscript retains Gorky’s pencil corrections made
in different colors (red, blue, black) which makes it likely that Gorky
went over Luzgin’s text three times (Luzgin 1936).4
Looking at Gorky’s corrections, one has to acknowledge his high pro-
fessionalism as editor and proofreader able to work thoroughly and with
a remarkable consistency. It is also remarkable that Gorky’s corrections
are not explicitly ideological but rather stylistic ones, concerning textual
and narrative structure. In his essays published in the journal Literatur-
naja uchebaGorky repeatedly pointed out how important the “technique
of writing”, orthography and the basics of rhetorics and stilitics were.5
When we look at Gorky’s corrections we see that he consistently elimi-
3 | Hereafter I rely upon the results of the research project on Social Realism
carried out at the University of Constance together with Natalia Borisova and Tomaš
Liptak and supported by the German Scientific Foundation (DFG).
4 | This material was found by Tomaš Liptak.
5 | See Gorky’s characterization in Makar’ev (1932: 5): “[. . . ] dl nego
[Gorkogo] vopros o mirovozzrenqesko uqebe avtora neotdelim ot
voprosa o ego tehniqesko uqebe” ([. . . ] for him [Gorky] the question of the
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nates all elements of narration and textual structure that may function
as recursive loops of self-reflection and self-observation in the narrative
process. He also lets down all elements of the text hinting at the inner
ambivalence of the protagonist which may stake his inner feelings and
self-reflection against the plot and narrative logic:
Note the following example of Gorky’s corrections:
Luzgin’s original:
His meeting with Muromtsev, despite the impudent words about his parents, left
Pogodin with a feeling that resembled sympathy.
“Ot vstreqi s Muromevym, nesmotr na nahalnye ego slova
nasqet roditele, u Pogodina ostalos quvstvo shoee s sim-
patie k nemu.” (Luzgin 1936: 4).
Gorky’s corrected version:
The conversation with Muromtsev left Pogodin with a feeling resembling sympa-
thy for the old man.
“Ot besedy s Muromevym, u Pogodina ostalos quvstvo pohoee
na simpati k stariku.”
Here we find an interesting detail: Gorky replaces the “meeting with
Muromtsev” (“vstreqi s Muromevym”) with a “conversation” (“be-
seda s Muromeym”) reducing the complex encounter, which may
have included both verbal and visual elements, to a simple verbal ex-
change. For him, it is the verbal impression that is relevant for the
protagonist’s judgement. Unacceptable for Gorky is the personal, self-
reflecting perspective of the protagonist which may run counter the logic
of the plot and the intentions of the objective narrator:
Luzgin’s original:
He evenwondered if he should not join the Bolsheviks and offer themhis services.
A wariness acquired through the years, the knowledge that everything would not
end today or tomorrow, and an intuitive, sharp sense of protest unclear even to
himself, stopped him.
ideological training of the author is inseparable from the question about his technical
training).
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“On dae podumal ne poti li k bolyxevikam, ne predloit li
im svoi uslugi. Godami vyrabotanna ostoronost, soznanie, qto
vse 	to konqits ne segodn, zavtra i stihinoe nesnoe samomu
ostroe quvstvo protesta ostanavlivali ego.” (Luzgin 1936: 25)
Gorky’s corrected version:
A wariness acquired through the years, the knowledge that everything would not
end today or tomorrow, and an intuitive, sharp sense of protest unclear even to
himself, stopped him from joining the Bolsheviks.
“Godami vyrabotanna ostoronost, soznanie, qto vse 	to konqit-
s ne segodn, zavtra i stihinoe nesnoe samomu ostroe quvstvo
protesta ostanavlivali ego idti s bolxevikami.”
This example shows how Gorky changes the entire perspective of the
narration by eliminating the following sentence: “He even wondered
if he should not join the Bolsheviks and offer them his services” (“On
dae podumal ne poti il k bolxevikam, ne predloit
li im svoi uslugi”). Instead of immediate acquaintance with the
protagonist’s self-reflection (“He even wondered” (“On dae podu-
mal”)) the reader is confronted with his behavior through the eyes of an
“objective narrator” in the course of his teleological movement towards
membership in the Bolshevik party. Gorky pays attention even to short
sentences which may weaken the plot by referring to the protagonist’s
self-reflection; he crosses out, for instance, the following short sentence:
He realized that he would spend his last hours in Voronezh (On ponl,
qto v Voronee provodit poslednie qasy). In other cases, Gorky
tries to define the plot structure of the novelmore sharply and to increase
the speed of narration by deleting the protagonist’s introspections and
loops of self-reflection (see: Figure 1):
It was so obvious to Pogodin, and so clearly did he see the future toward which
the communists were striving, when each would have that which he needed and
perhaps the very word “carouse” might fall out of use. But how unbelievably
difficult it was to explain this to others!
“Tak oqevidno 	to bylo Pogodinu, tak otqetlivo risovalos emu to
buduwee, k kotoromu stremts kommunisty, kogda kady budet
imet vse emu nunoe, i moet byt samoe slovo ‘kutit’ per-
estanut ponimat. No kak neverotno trudno bylo 	to obsnit
drugim.” (Luzgin 1936: 33)
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The following is another example in which a self-reflective passage is
deleted in its entirety (see: Figure 2):
And in the end, who could say to whom it is known? Mistakes occur even in the
shrewdest calculations of the wisest of men. Perhaps everything Pogodin had
believed to be immutable, an inevitability, or a law, contained a blunder lesser
men would someday laugh about. Is life not richer, more inventive and more sly
than all of one’s intentions?
“I kto nakone moet znat, komu 	to izvestno? I v samih tonkih
rasqetah samih umnyh mudreov sluqats oxibki. Moet byt
vo vsem, vo qto poveril Pogodin kak v neprelonoe, kak v neizbe-
nost, kak v zakon imeets promah, nad kotorym kogda nibud budu
smets rebtixki. Razve izn ne bogaqe, ne izobretatelnee,
ne hitree lbyh predpoloeni?” (Luzgin 1936: 42)
The first of these deleted passages characteristically discloses the diffi-
culties of externalizing and communicating mental pictures and utopian
ideas that point at certain structural problems of communication.. A
similar attempt by Gorky to strengthen the plot can be found in his
fine-tuning of the following sentence:
Pogodin waited as though he had asked someone—not himself, but someone
who loves to think everything over, who does not hurry with his answer.
“Pogodin dal, toqno sprosil kogo to, ne seb, qeloveka, kotory
lbit obdumat vse, kotory ne toropits s otvetom.” (Luzgin 1936:
47)
Here is Gorky’s revised version:
Pogodin asked not himself, but someone who loves to think everything over and
who does not hurry with his answer.
“Pogodin spraxival, ne seb, a—qeloveka, kotory lbit obdu-
mat vse kotory ne toropits s otvetom.”
In the place of confrontation between the empirically observable be-
haviour “waited” (“dal”) and the possibility of the protagonist’s in-
ner self-questioning, there remains a single fact of life—he “asked”
(“spraxival”). Now the act of self-questioning seems to be exter-
nalized and orientated towards a moral authority.
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Besides eliminating and shortening text pieces potentially leading to
the breakup of the plot into two (inner mental sphere and an external
sphere of action and behaviour) Gorky does not shy away from adding
passages linking the inner mental disposition to the active, externally
observable emotional reactions.
Luzgin’s original:
Well, that won’t happen, Pogodin will manage to deal with it, he hardly restrained
himself.
“Nu, 	togo to ne sluqits, s 	tim Pogodin sumeet spravits, on s
trudom sderival seb.” (Luzgin 1936: 50)
Gorky’s corrected version:
Well, that won’t happen, Pogodin will manage to deal with it. He wanted to sing,
dance, laugh. He could hardly restrain himself.
“Nu, 	togo to ne sluqits, s 	tim Pogodin sumeet spravits emu.
Hotolos pet, plsat, smets. On s trudom sderival seb.”
In another case, Gorky introduces aesthetic judgments into the plot by
adding to the narrative structure the interplay of cause and effect:
Luzgin’s original:
Pogodin read her poems by Bal’mont and Blok. Dusia listened obediently, her
little child-like brow furrowed intently.
“Pogodin qital e stihotvoreni Balmonta i Bloka. Dus
sluxala naprenno smorwiv detski lobik.” (Luzgin 1936: 21)
Gorky’s corrected version:
Pogodin read her poems by Bal’mont and Blok. The gloomy lines evoked melan-
choly and sadness. Dusia listened obediently, her little child-like brow furrowed
intently.
“Pogodin qital e stihotvoreni Balmonta i Bloka. Sumereqnye
stihi budili peqal i grust. Dus pokorno sluxala Naprenno
smorwiv decki lobik.”
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Systematically purging self-reflection from the edited texts, Gorky is
equally harsh in his treatment of references to literature, language, writ-
ing and the problems of representation. The following passage is an
example in which the self-reflection of the protagonist acquires an evi-
dently metapoetic dimension that signifies the problems of representing
mental dispositions through the written word. It is entirely deleted by
Gorky (see: Figure 3):
Well, you envied the Muromtsevs because you didn’t wish to work for them,
because you considered it happiness to be able to live without working, while
someone else works. Isn’t it so? Am I not right? So admit it, dear Aleksei Niko-
laevich, admit it. Now you no longer need to pretend—were you happy? In all
honesty—were you happy? Were you or not? If Pogodin had been able to write
stories instead of letters he would have covered many pages and would have told
the story of a paltry, difficult, humiliating and meaningless life.
“Da potomu, qto vy ne ela rabotat na Muromevyh zavidovali
im, potomu qto vy sqitali sqastem kogda mono it ne rab-
ota, kogda rabotaet kto-to drugo. Tak? Pravda? Nu tak priz-
navates dorogo Alekse Hikolaeviq, priznavates, teper ue
ne prihodits otvertyvats: oyli vy sqastlivy? Po sovesti—
byli sqastlivy? Byli ili net? I esli by umel Pogodin pisat ne
pisma, a povesti, ispisal by on mnogo strani, rasskazal by is-
tori izni niqtono, telo, obidno, bessmyslenno.” (Luz-
gin 1936: 47)
A highly interesting deletion of a text passage is shown by the following
example (see: Figure 4): Here Gorky furiously excises all traces of the
evil resulting from the protagonist’s confrontation of the process of in-
trospection and self-reflection. This example is interesting because it
echoes an old Russian Orthodox tradition of writing and representation,
in which the depiction of evil becomes taboo—in contrast to the West-
ern view exemplified by Saint Augustine or Rousseau, which sees the
representation of evil in writing as an agent of change or the promise of
cathartic redemption. We can find the remnants of this apophatic stance
in Nikolai Karamzin’s famous essay “Cˇto nužno avtoru” (1794/1795) as
well as in Lev Tolstoy’s anti-aesthetics discussed above, but the tradition
surely remains in force in Russia at the end of the 19th century, and even
later, as we see in the example above.
187
Jurij Murašov
Conclusion
Summing up our observations on Maxim Gorky’s editing and correct-
ing of Mikhail Luzgin’s manuscript of The Thief, we may state that the
renowned editor reacts very sensitively to all textual elements that indi-
cate alternating structures and include some recursive or self-reflecting
plot movements. This is remarkable insofar as we know that the written
word, as a visual medium, works as a generator of differences, which
become observable in the process of writing and reading. In writing,
the production of meaning is essentially accompanied by the experi-
ence of differences, of broken, unstable and hybrid identities. While
in oral performance the differential structure of sense-making seems
to be eliminated by the volatility of the word being pronounced and
sounding in time (or sometimes even under the extra time pressure),
in the process of writing the production of meaning is not an external
and technical procedure, but rather an event and a corporeal as well as
mental experience.
In his editing work on Luzgin’s text, Gorky achieves the simulation of
an oral narration by deleting all traces of the text’s written genesis. In this
way, Gorky’s project of “literaturnaja ucheba” finally implements the po-
etics of radiophonia in Luzgin’s novel and creates a text of Socialist Real-
ism which tries to deny its own origin from writing and wants the reader
to believe in immaterial processes of sense-making and communica-
tion. At this point, the poetics of radiophonia and Gorky’s “Literaturnaja
ucheba” join the general production of a totalitarian ideology.
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Totalitarian Propaganda as Discourse
A Comparative Look at Austria and France in the Fascist Era
ALEXANDER HANISCH-WOLFRAM
Introduction
Throughout the 20th century, propaganda has been a key term and a
key concept of political communications studies;1 in certain respects,
propaganda research actually stood at the cradle of this field of social
science (Bussemer: 2005: 379-385). At the same time, propaganda as
a specific mode of communication was at the centre of totalitarianism
as a political phenomenon, which attained its peak in the first half of
the same century. Totalitarian propaganda—best explored in the cases
of National Socialism and Soviet Communism—had the function of
creating consensus between political leadership and the masses.
In this paper, totalitarian propaganda will first be identified as a spe-
cific type of political communication which can be described and ana-
lyzed as a discourse. However, the theoretical position will be presented
in such a way as to make it clear that the discourse-analytical approach
represents only one possible way of operationalizing the underlying the-
oretical concept of propaganda. In what follows, the proposed definition
will be further described in theoretical terms and operationalised along
the so-called “dimensions of propaganda”. Concerning the empirical
part, the focus will be placed on a restricted choice of these dimensions,
in order to be able to go into more detail and depth in presenting the
examples. The two texts chosen for a comparative illustration of the
1 | For an overview over the traditions of propaganda theory and research: Busse-
mer: 2005.
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approach are two speeches pronounced under comparable historical
circumstances (in Austria in the 1930s and in France in the early 1940s).
In conclusion, the perspectives of the approach described will be elabo-
rated.
Defining (Totalitarian) Propaganda
There have been various “waves” or phases in propaganda research
throughout the 20th century, each of them having its own definitions
of “propaganda”—or even explicitly refusing to define the term or the
phenomenon.2 This, in combination with the ubiquitousness of the
term in political debate, has led to a certain degree of confusion about
what “propaganda” can mean, should mean or must not mean. The
model of propaganda research proposed here has the basic aim of laying
out an interdisciplinary theory of propaganda as a basis for empirical so-
cial research.3 The central theoretical concept on which this theoretical
approach to propaganda is based is “collective identity” (Giesen 1999;
Straub 1998; Wodak, Cillia and Reisigl 1998: 47-71). Thus, propaganda
shall be defined here as the strategically planned attempt to construct,
spread and implement a certain collective identity, combined with the
use of various forms of pressure or even violence.
The degree of detail and complexity in the elaboration of this identity
can vary, as can the use of pressure or force to implement it. This, in
consequence, leads to a broad variety of types of propaganda, one of
them being totalitarian propaganda.
Within this broad variety of types, totalitarian propaganda is the
most elaborated and most complex one. Totalitarian propaganda conse-
quently is to be understood as a complex and elaborated communica-
tion strategy aimed at promoting and implementing a collective identity
encompassing (nearly) all aspects of life—from political opinions and
attitudes to values and ways of life in the private sphere.4
For theoretical description as well as for empirical analysis, different
2 | For a short overview over the main paradigmes: Bussemer 2005: 43-60.
3 | For a more detailed elaboration of this propaganda model: Hanisch-Wolfram:
2006a: 3-73; Hanisch-Wolfram 2007: 55-98.
4 | As the phenomenon of totalitarianism in general, totalitarian propaganda
also touches upon the question of the relationship between the public and the
private spheres. As a detailed discussion of this issue would lead beyond the
objective of this paper, it shall just be noted that in general this relationship itself
has to be understood as a discursive construction; totalitarianism basically aims
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dimensions of propaganda can be specified. These dimensions belong
to different levels of communicating propaganda, some of them referring
to modes of communication and other pointing at its content. These
dimensions are:
1. Myths and rituals (Hanisch-Wolfram 2006a: 45-53; Hanisch-Wolf-
ram 2007: 65-77). Myths5 play a central role in (totalitarian) propa-
ganda as they provide a basis of belonging together which is notin
danger of being questioned. What is communicated as a myth lies
beyond verification and also beyond the need for legitimization.
Myths provide answers to the questions of the collective’s roots,
origins, common characteristics and goals, they may even give
reasons for the “choice” of the enemies. Propagandistic myths
can take various forms, from simple key words hinting at whole
narratives or stereotypes, to the historical key dates and events or
symbolic places. Ritual serves as an actualization of the contents
narrated in mythic communication. In rituals, myths are arranged
in order to visualize their meaning and importance for the contem-
porary social life. Examples of such rituals include manifestations
of memorial culture or the organization of (political) events in
symbolic historical areas.
2. Signs and symbols (Hanisch-Wolfram 2006a: 55-57; Hanisch-
Wolfram 2007: 77-81; Frutiger 2006). As with personalization,
this dimension of propaganda is essentially reduction of complex-
ity. In this case, the visualization is not realized by presenting a
certain person or group of persons, but by establishing and then
propagating certain graphic designs or symbols. These symbols
have a twofold function: firstly, they represent an element of the
ideology being propagated (or even this ideology as a whole, as e.g.
the swastika); secondly, they enable the propagandist (especially if
this is a regime already in power) to be omnipresent on a symbolic
level.
3. The construction of the “Other” (Hanisch-Wolfram 2006a: 42-45;
at abolishing the differentiation between the public and the private, and so does
totalitarian propaganda.
5 | It would lead too far here to discuss in depth the various concepts and
definitions of the “myth”; basically, “myth” shall be defined here as a concept of a
(great) narrative that is use in social discourse in an axiomatic way. Myths in this
sense need not be legitimized or proven, they are themselves the basis of legitimation
and proof.
199
Alexander Hanisch-Wolfram
Hanisch-Wolfram 2007: 81-86). For a given (or “planned”) group
to define itself, it is first of all necessary to define what it is not—or
what it must not be or become. This central operation of group
identification (Karall 2001; Luhmann 1994) is intensified within
propaganda communication by the construction of an enemy—
something or someone not only different but hostile (Wendt 2006;
Schlee 2006). This “other” has to be combatted in order to stabilize
the group. The intensity of this combat varies from discrimination
to planned annihilation.
4. Construction of the common history (Hanisch-Wolfram 2006a:
49-51; Hanisch-Wolfram 2007: 71-73). This dimension of propa-
ganda is closely linked to mythic communication. Narrating the
past always implies a choice of events, in some cases even the
definition of what is to be seen as a historical event and what is
not (Chris 1997: 17-64, 367-436; a constructivist perspective is
elaborated e.g. in: Assmann 1999). In case of propaganda, this
choice is made with the aim of supporting the collective identity
to be implemented. As a positive choice, this means the com-
memoration of certain events, processes and dates linked to this
identity; as a negative choice, it implies the radical eliminationof
all events, persons or dates conflicting with this identity, from
collective memory. This may mean re-writing history books and
destroying or building monuments (Menkovic 1999; for the au-
thoritarian regime in Austria, discussed as one of the examples
below see: Grassegger 1998), but also re-interpreting historical
events in order to make them fit into the intended definition of
social cohesion.
5. Personalization of propaganda elements (Hanisch-Wolfram 2006a:
53-55; Hanisch-Wolfram 2007: 86-89). This dimension of propa-
ganda is basically a strategy of reduction in complexity. Ideologi-
cal dogmas, historical references or myths are reduced to a given
person, name or image. This person or image, after being effec-
tively established by propaganda, then stands for its recipients for
the entire cluster of conscious or unconscious references, values,
stereotypes and connotations. Aswith historical dates, theremight
be established a pantheon of canonized persons which express
the core of the collective identity to be implemented in a human
form (Behrenbeck 1996; For one of the examples discussed below
see: Cointet 2002). The most prominent example of this type of
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propaganda communication is the cult of “great leaders”—from
Lenin and Stalin to Hitler or Mao.
It seems quite obvious that these dimensions of propaganda are in-
tended to be ideal types which are rarely realized as such; usually, they
are are combined, with large overlapping areas. For example, a given
personalization can at the same time be a personalized myth—as was
the case with Hitler oder Mao. Another example might be the use of
symbols or personalizations which take their roots from collective his-
torical traditions. Finally, the definitions and presentations of enemies
are often personalized and legitimized through historical references.
Totalitarian Propaganda as Discourse
Basically, the theoretical approach to the phenomenon of propaganda
delineated above is meant to be an interdisciplinary approach to the
foundations of various (social) scientific disciplines working on propa-
ganda. A common definition can make it possible to reach a higher level
of comparability regarding the results of specific studies, which then in
turn can be a basis for further development of the theoretical approach
as such.
In this paper, the specific methodological approach chosen is a
discourse-analytical study of propaganda (Hanisch-Wolfram 2006b;
Hanisch-Wolfram 2007:184-205). In this vein, propaganda can be under-
stood as a socio-political discourse, with a focus on its verbal form(s).
It has to be underlined again that this is the only possible way of im-
plementing the proposed theoretical concept in the concrete empirical
research.
Although discourse analysis—especially the Critical Discourse Anal-
ysis,6 focuses primarily on questions of social power (political power
being understood as one of its forms), it has until now quite rarely taken
up the issue of propaganda (Hanisch-Wolfram 2006b: 86-87). At first
sight, this is quite surprising, as propaganda is one of the most promi-
nent and (in other disciplines) most researched political phenomena,
at least as far as 20th century is concerned. One of the reasons reason
for this lack of interest might be the fixation of CDA on various forms of
6 | It is im impossible to give a selected bibliography for (Critical) Discourse
Analysis here. For a general overview, which is related to the approache(s) used in
this study, see among others: Fairclough 1995; Fairclough 2001; Jäger 1993; Wodak
and Meyer 2001.
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hidden social power making, aimed at disclosing the invisible forces of
social control. Having this specific task in mind, it seems more natural
that propaganda as a form of social control or a way of exerting social
power is a too “overt" phenomenon to come into the focus of critical
discourse analysis.
However, at the same time, CDA provides a set of methods which
can be made very fruitful for propaganda analysis and make it possible
to deliver innovative research results. Its basic interest fits in with the
outlined concept of propaganda: “CDA may be defined as fundamen-
tally concerned with analysing opaque as well as transparent structural
relationships of dominance, discrimination, power and control as man-
ifested in language” (Wodak 2001: 2). The concept of “text” used by
CDA expresses the same social-constructivist approach that governs a
concept of propaganda as the construction of collective identity. It is not
only the text as such that is to be analyzed, but the relationship between
producers, recepients and channels of communication, as well as the
process of constructing common definitions of reality emerging from
interaction between these three (Hanisch-Wolfram 2007: 110). Basically,
it can be stated that “propaganda discourse” refers to the production, dis-
semination and reception of specific propaganda texts that are intended
to spread and implement a certain definition of collective identity (and,
henceforth, of social reality), accompanied by various forms of control
in and over discourse as well as other, non-discoursive forms of social
control.
The question of power in and over discourse relates to the control a
propagandist strives to exert over political communication (Fairclough
and Wodak 1997: 272-273). Power over discourse refers to the 1) ways
of controlling its accesssibility, 2) eligible participants and 3) extent of
participation. In order to control political discourse and freely spread
propaganda, the propagandist will seek to exert a rather drastic power
over discourse, whichmeans a lot of discrimination and exclusion. In the
case of totalitarian propaganda, the access to discourse will be restricted
to those recognized as loyal to the regime in power and thereby officially
sanctioned to take part in this discourse (in the Third Reich, for instance,
this was regulated mainly by the so-called “Schriftleitergesetz”7). Power
in discourse, on the other hand, implies controlling the content of dis-
course, including the breakdown of vocabulary into words to be used
7 | For the implementation of tis law in Austria after March 1938, see: Hausjell
1993: 40-53.
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and words to be avoided. In totalitarian propaganda, there might even
be a precise catalogue of allowed and forbidden notions (as was the
case, again, with the Third Reich). Through this control over ways of
communication, definitions of reality can be manipulated as certain
terms are no longer parts of discourse, whereas other terms, due to their
connotations, are the references to the description of social reality. On
the other hand, the terms excluded from propaganda discourse can—as
such—become symbols of resistance and opposition.
The basic discoursive strategy of propaganda discourse is a construc-
tive strategy which first of all aims at constructing and implementing
a certain collective identity (Wodak, Cillia and Reisigl 1998: 82-86). Be-
yond this constructive strategy, other strategies of discourse can also
come into play, especially if the propagandist already holds power—as
is the case with totalitarian propaganda. In this case, there can also be
strategies of conservation aimed at stabilizing and strengthening the
regime in power (Wodak, Cillia and Reisigl 1998: 87-88).
The realization of a propaganda discourse cannot, however, simply
aim at putting pressure on the recipients in order to reach its goal. For a
common definition of reality and, in particular, of planned identity, the
recipients have to be convinced that they voluntarily take part in this
identity—even though power and coercion are, in fact, the key elements
in its implementation. This can be realized through a strictly controlled
social discourse, a major part of it being the propaganda discourse. In
its turn, the most controlled form of discourse is reached in the form of
totalitarian discourse.
The dimensions of propaganda described above can be understood
as strata of discourse. Generally, the strata of discourse—a concept
elaborated by the Duisburg school of discourse analysis (Jäger 1993:
181-187, 208-209)—are to be seen as different components and facets
of one discourse which are inextrucably tied together and can only be
fully understood in this perspective. This matches the dimensions of
propaganda outlined above, which also have to be understood as ideal
types which in practice exist only overlapping with one another and
therefore must be interpreted in the context of the other facets of the
intervowen whole realized in a given text.
This short outline of a discourse-analytical approach to propaganda
research should have shown in what ways different concepts of critical
discourse analysis can lend theoretical aswell asmethodological support
for propaganda analysis; its aim was also to demonstrate that the study
of propaganda can open up a new field of research for discourse analysis.
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Illustration
Austria and France in the Fascist Era
Focus of the Illustration
As already mentioned, the elaboration of the empirical examples illus-
trating the concept described above will be focused on a limited choice
of the “dimensions” of propaganda. This will make it possible to elab-
orate the comparison in more depth and detail. Besides, as there is
always an interplay between the different dimensions of propaganda,
the other ones which are not focused on explicitly will not be neglected
completely.
The dimension chosen for a more detailed interpretation is the pro-
pagandistic myth. The main reason for this choice can be seen in the
fact that quite often the myths realized in a given propaganda text rep-
resent a kind of nucleus or core of the propagandistic topoi realized
in this text. Another reason is that propagandistic myths are particu-
larly close to other dimensions of propaganda. One will rarely find a
myth in a given piece of propaganda which is not linked to at least one
of its other dimensions. Thus, the interwovenness of the different di-
mensions of propaganda can be best illustrated through an analysis of
propaganda myths.This analysis would lead to elaboration of the basic
typology of propaganda myths, which, in their elaborated form, should
be understood as no more than ideal types which in reality are closely
knit together, with large overlapping areas.
As the focus in the following empirical analysis will be put on propa-
ganda myths, the other dimensions will only be discussed in a rather
general way. Despite this generality, though, it could be discerned to
what extent the interconnectedness between the different dimensions
represents a central characteristic of propaganda discourse and what
forms the other dimensions can take.
A Comparative look at Austria and France
The two texts chosen for a comparative empirical analysis are taken
from the propaganda discourses of the two state systems which are not
the classical full-blown totalitarian regimes and have therefore largely
eluded the grasp of propaganda research. These systems are the authori-
tarian quasi-fascist regime in Austria (1933-1938) (Talos and Neugebauer
2005; concerning the Propaganda of the regime, see: Kriechbaumer 2002;
Hanisch-Wolfram 2006a: 252-266) and the Vichy regime in France, led
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by Marshall Pétain (1940-1944) (Cointet 2003; Paxton 1997; Azéma and
Bédarida 1992; concerning the Propaganda of the Vichy regime see:
Rossignol 1991). Regarding the respective historical contexts, there is a
considerable degree of comparability between the two as both regimes
existed in the context of the rising fascism (or quasi-fascism) in Central
and Western Europe, which, in its turn, was overshadowed by the rise
and peak of National Socialism in Germany. They were also both influ-
enced by the Nazi Regime, albeit in very different ways and situations.
The Austrian text chosen is a speech held by chancellor Engelbert
Dollfuß in Vienna on September 11th, 1933 in which he sets out the
ideological foundation of the new regime.8 The French example is an
address given by Philippe Pétain on August 12th, 1941 (known as the
address about “le vent mauvais”), in which he legitimized the political
project of his regime and severely criticised an oppositional mood of the
general population.9
The comparative analysis undertaken in the following will be struc-
tured in such a way that those types of myths elaborated in both texts
will be described first, followed by those types of myths which are only
elaborated in one of the texts. Possible reasons for the differences will be
discussed, and finally the already mentioned typology of myths will be
outlined. This typology will go beyond the myths analyzed on the basis
of the two chosen texts, because several types of propaganda myths are
not present in these examples.
A first type of propaganda myth develope in both texts is the legitimiz-
ing myth (pertaining to the regime in power), combined with a sacrifice
topos. In the case of the Pétain text, this myth is extremely personalized:
Pétain describes his taking power as a sacrifice (“don de ma personne”),
which he has to make in order to fulfill a duty.10 His career and image
as a war hero (he was known to the French public as the general who
defeated Germans at Verdun in 1915) surely affected the use of these
topoi of sacrifice and duty. In sum, Pétain presents himself as the saviour
of his country—a role he had already played in 1915. In the speech of
Dollfuß, on the other hand, a similar myth is elaborated more in relation
to a collective leadership: compared to the large number of “I”s in the
Pétain text, Dolfuß generally prefers to use “we” as self-reference. There
8 | The text is published in: Berchtold 1967: 427-433.
9 | For a detailed discourse analytical study of the text: Hanisch-Wolfram 2007:
289-317.
10 | For the role of Pétain in Vichy Propaganda see: Rossignol 1991: 77-112; for
a more general discussion see: Cointet 2002.
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are two myths legitimizing the regime construed by Dollfuß. First, the
new leadership is described as the result of God’s will, which makes the
whole enterprise mythological and sacred due to its mere existence. Sec-
ond, the group of leaders now in power is characterized as being ready
to sacrifice themselves (“opferbereit”).
In sum, although the same myth is unwrapped in both texts, there
are also significant differences. In the Austrian text, the new regime is
referred to as a collective and is described (and legitimized) in religious,
sacralizing terms. In the French text, on the other hand, Pétain as an
individual leader is the focus of the myth, and the aspect of sacrifice is
set more in military than in religious terms (although there certainly was
a great deal of sacralizing Pétain the leader in Vichy propaganda).
A second type of myth which can be identified in both texts is the
historical myth, which, however, has significant variations. In the Aus-
trian text, the feudal structure of the early Modern Ages is presented as
a harmonious, calm and just social order which ceased to exist in the
course of the French Revolution (presented as the symbolic end of the
Golden Age) (Kriechbaumer 2002: 49-53). This positive description of a
distant historic era has a legitimizing function: the Golden Age is to be
restored by the regime in power. This connection between the past and
the future is one major function of the propaganda myth: the regime
strengthening or stabilizing its power places itself in the flow of time
linking its future projects to the past legitimating foundations. Another
dimension of propaganda which is more or less explicitly linked to this
myth is the rejection of various ideologies arising in the 19th century.
In the Pétain text, in contrast, the historical myth is much less pro-
nounced, being referred to only implicitly. Within the elaboration of the
myth of the National Revolution and the myth of the war as a challenge
(which will both be discussed below), the immediate past of the Third
Republic (which ended in 1940) is described as the “ancien régime”, i.e.
the regime which had to be overcome in order to restore the glory of the
nation. Thus, the motive for elaborating this historical myth is the same
as in the Dollfuß text, but it is only mentioned implicitly and, even more
importantly, within a framework of a negative historical myth.
Two other myths, or types of myths, in both texts include the dimen-
sion of a projected future. First, there is the creation of a new order—a
goal which is rendered non-debatable by being presented as a myth. In
the case of Vichy propaganda, the key term is the project of the “Na-
tional Revolution” (“la Révolution Nationale” (Rossignol 1991: 113-166) ),
which is, from that standpoint, is a “National Renovation” for it strives to
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restore the Golden Age of France by abolishing the disastrous effects of
the French Revolution. The equivalent of this ideological project in con-
crete, “real” politics is the “new order” (“’l’ordre nouveau”) which as such
is also presented as a myth. These two myths legitimize and support
each other, in a way, they are interdependent in describing the future
realization of the National Revolution (which, as Pétain states, remains
uncompleted): the necessary to establish the new order is legitimized by
the need to bring about the National Revolution. This Revolution stands
as a kind of transcendent aim which is to be reached by creating a new
social structure. This myth also shows the connection between different
dimensions of propaganda. Pétain enumerates two main reasons why
the National Revolution has not yet been fully realised: firstly, it is the
absence of the prisoners of war (which is by itself a strongly personalized
myth), and, secondly, the loalty of some to the “ancien régime”.
In the Austrian text, this mythologized creation of a new order is ex-
plicitly linked to the mythologized past: the new order to be created is
the restoration of the old feudal social order, which was already men-
tioned as an idealized past which had been lost. Unlike Pétain, Dollfuß
overtly formulates the claim to restore a past situation. The difference
can be illustrated on the level of the terms used in the texts: whereas
Dollfuß refers to the notions connoting the social structure of the early
Modern Age (“ständisch”), Pétain uses the term “révolution” which at
least suggests a radical, progressive change—even if, in fact, both po-
litical projects are of a conservative nature aimed at restoring the old
political structures.
The second kind of future-oriented myths developed in both texts
is the description of a mythologized challenge or task. In the Dollfuß
text this, on the one hand, is the already mentioned restoration of the
old feudal social order and, on the other hand, the topos of a religious
mission which Austria has to fulfill. Since these political (or ideological)
plans and projects are not presented as the political will or projects of a
certain social group, but rather as duties which the entire society has to
fulfill, they become sacred tasks or challenges. This, in turn, places them
beyond any debate or criticism, underscoring their totalitarian nature:
opposition is no longer seen as the expression of a different political
opinion, but rather as a violation of the sacred, a sin.
In the case of Pétain’s text, this sacralization of the regime’s political
project, is even more elaborated. The first part of it is the already men-
tioned project of the National Revolution and the “ordre nouveau” as
its political equivalent. This project is described by the Chef de l’Etat
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not merely in terms of political plans or concepts, but as a historic duty
of all Frenchmen to restore the former glory of France and to arrest
the political, cultural and social decline in the country triggered by the
French Revolution and its consequences; National Revolution, so to
speak, is the last chance of the French to save their nation. The topos of
a mythologized task is overtly inscribed by Pétain in the actual political
context—the war is presented as a challenge. Here again, we see a strong
military undercurrent of Vichy propaganda, which paints the war and
occupaiton resulting from not primarily as a disaster or a catastrophy
but rather as a challenge which the French nation has to withstand, if the
nation at all is worthy of restoring of its Golden Age. In this respect, the
elaboration of this sacralized challenge has the function of exhortation.
Finally, there is a fourth propagandamyth of this category: throughout
the text, the vision of a new, emerging Europe is mentioned (Rossignol
1991: 177-185). The leading role of Germany within this new Europe is
taken for granted—and in any case, the challenge for the French nation
is to prove itself again worthy of taking part in this “new Europe”—a
construction to be finished after the end of the war. The role of the
French nation within this new Europe outlined by Pétain contradicts
in many aspects the restoration of French grandeur in the course of
the National Revolution. The contradiction, however, can be seen as
typical for propaganda discourse, known to gloss over conflicting claims
and facts by sacralizing diffuse ideas, terms and projects. Because the
latter are parts of a transcendent political sphere, there is no need for
a reflection on their compatibility with reality—as long as propaganda
works.
In addition, there are three types ofmythswhich can only be identified
in the Austrian text. The first is the ontological propaganda myth—a dis-
coursive element claiming that certain characteristics belong “naturally”
to individuals or collectives. These characteristic traits are presented not
as the results of processes, but rather as the natural or god-given traits.
The first such myth in the Dollfuß text is the myth of Austria’s German
character. That Austria is part of the German nation, and that it is a Ger-
man state, is, according to Dollfuß, so self-evident that it goes without
saying (which he does nonetheless). This stressing of the German char-
acter of Austria is at least partly rooted in the fact that the authoritarian
regime had constituted itself after the Nazi seizure of power in Germany
and that it should have been seen, from its beginnings, as a rival to the
German model. The Dollfuß regime intended to present Austria as the
“better Germany”, as the guardian of the “true” German character. In this
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context a sub-myth had to be identified—that of the Christian-German
character of Austria (Kriechbaumer 2002: 49-53). Austria as a state and
part of the German people is described and defined as the better Ger-
many precisely because it defines itself not only as a German state but
also as a Christian (i. e. Catholic) state. The definition of what is German
is thus transferred into the sphere of religion, for the “true” German
character is represented as being Christian as well. Whether everyone in
Germany or Austria perceived “German” to be defined in this way is of
no interest to propaganda discourse: it is not claimed that Austria should
be a German and Christian state, but that it is—by nature—a German
and a Christian state. This, in the logic of this propagandistic discourse,
is not a question of consent or dissent, but of natural characteristics.
The second ontological myth to be found in the text is closely linked
to the first one: it is the myth of the religious and Christian nature
of man. This myth is clearly to be interpreted in close relation to the
one mentioned above: as the human being is said to be religious by
nature and the Austrian regime claims to be a Christian/Catholic regime
(unlike Nazism in Germany), the Austrian regime, unlike the Nazi regime,
corresponds to the nature of the human being. The conclusion “our
regime fits the human condition” need not be stated—its confirmation
can be left to recipients. In any case, this ontological myth strengthens
the ideological orientation of the regime and its propaganda myth of
being the “better Germany”.
Another type of myth, quite similar to the ontological myth, is the
myth of positive or negative characteristic traits—which are not ascribed
to an individual or a collective, but are given a great amount of impor-
tance and an incotestable value in propaganda discourse. In the case of
the Dollfuß text, this is realized in two cases: the myth of calm and order
and the myth of honesty. Both characteristics are presented as being
extremely positive and—of course—as being characteristic traits of the
social situation established by the regime. What is typical about this
type of propaganda myth is that there is no explanation of what is meant
by this term or what its points of reference are; it is just a term that is
presented as positive or negative and that can be attached to a person, a
regime, a situation etc. It is this vagueness that hinders discourse and
makes this value statement a propaganda myth.
Finally, a third type of propaganda myth, found only in the Austrian
example, is the mythologization of abstract concepts—in this case the
concept of “Heimat” (a German word simultaneously referring to home,
home country, nation, region, descent etc.). At the same time, this is
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a semantic myth, a term or word transformed into a myth; in the case
of such a propaganda myth, the connotations which are evoked in the
minds of the recipients are of utmost importance: for every recipient,
there is a whole cluster of connotations, so that with the use of one single
term or concept, a broad variety of feelings, ideas and value judgements
can be triggered. In propaganda discourse, the propagandist will seek to
manipulate and control discourse in such a way that those connotations
will be strengthened—ideally, to the point of exclusiveness which would
fit into his definition of social reality and collective identity.
Finally, there is one type of myth present only in the text from the
Vichy propaganda: the personalized myth. There are three different
myths of this category in this text; first and most prominent, there is
the myth of Philippe Pétain as the saviour of France (which was already
mentioned above). Thismyth is a typical example of themythologization
of a political leader in (totalitarian) propaganda—one might even claim
that propaganda is totalitarian to the degree the respective leader is
sacralized. In the case of Pétain’s person there is also a strong military
aspect, but nonetheless the aspect of sacrifice (“don de la personne”)
is of great importance. That there is no equivalent myth elaborated in
the Dollfuß text is not typical for the propaganda of the authoritarian
Austrian regime, which also puts its leading figure at the forefront, with
the intensity greatly increased after Dollfuß’s death in 1934 (“the dead
man leads us”) (Kriechbaumer 2002: 57-59, 64-66).
A second personalized myth in the Pétain text is the myth of the
prisoners of war (“prisonniers de guerre”). They are presented as a signif-
icant element of social cohesion and a role model for the ideal character,
sacrificial and patriotic at once. This personalized myth has also a tran-
scendent character, as those on whom the myth is built are not present
in France, they are away from home—and this further strengthens their
character of being role models (especially regarding the topos of sac-
rifice). The third personalized myth which is only briefly mentioned
in the text is that of the farmers, the “paysans”. This has to be seen in
connection with Pétain’s personal roots in a rural area and the ideology
of the National Revolution which stressed the importance of the French
soil and farmers as guardians of this soil.
A Typology of Propaganda Myths
On the basis of the comparative analysis undertaken above, and of other
results of discourse-analytical propaganda research, it is possible to
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formulate a typology of propaganda myths—which is intended to be
open for further development on the basis of further research. At this
stage, the following propaganda myths may be differentiated:
• The mythologized term, notion or concept. One key word or notion
can be transformed into a myth in order to “freeze” its connota-
tions and constrain variety of meanings. In this respect, the aspect
of power in and over discourse is of great importance, since the
propaganda apparatus will seek to minimize the range of different
connotations to a reduced spectrum which is compatible with the
intended social identity. In the case of an imaginary complete
success of totalitarian propaganda, all words uses and meanings
are dictated by the propagandist. The mythologization of abstract
concepts can be seen as a sub-category of this myth; it is a type of
myth which also serves as a support of and legitimation for other
myths or other dimensions of propaganda.
• The personalized myth. This myth is closely linked to the pro-
paganda dimension of personalisation. In certain cases, such a
personalization can be heightened into a myth—with the person
in question then being beyond any debate or criticism. This quite
often goes hand in hand with the sacralization of a leading figure,
which is very typical for totalitarian regimes.
• Historical myths. In conjunction with the construction of a com-
mon past as one dimension of propaganda, certain events, pe-
riods or processes of this past can be transformed into a myth.
This generally concerns those parts of the common past which are
defined as having a key role—which can also be a negative one,
as is the case with the French Revolution in both texts discussed
above. Besides, a canon of historical events and processes forming
a historical myth is established by propaganda: certain facts or
events are assigned fixed definitions and non-debatable (within
propaganda discourse) interpretations.
• The myth of the origins or descent. A common descent or origin is
an important aspect of strengthening social cohesion and to giving
more weight to the collective identity constructed by propaganda.
In most cases, this common descent is more or less a fiction, as it
is either far from reality or beyond the possibility of being proven,
or both. In the case of a propaganda myth, a certain theory of
common origins is propagated and excluded from debate.
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• The legitimatory myth. This type of myth is generally used to
support other dimensions of propaganda and form the basis for
concrete political action. Without the necessity of being proven,
these myths provide a set of reasons why the regime in question
is in power, why it must stay in power and why it is legitimate for
this regime to realise its political projects. The legitimatory myth
is often combined with other myths, especially historical myths.
• The ontological myth. This myth ascribes to individuals, collec-
tives, places etc. certain characteristics which—as was outlined
above—are not presented as the result of processes or influences
which are seen as natural or God-given. When applied to specific
persons and things, these characteristic traits cannot be debated
or altered. Other dimensions of propaganda and political action
can then be build upon these characteristics: for instance, the
enemy can be constructed in such a way that the differences be-
tween the group and the “others” would seem insurmountable,
and so these “others” represent a danger which must be fought
because communication and compromise are impossible. One
type of myth very closely linked to this one is the aforementioned
myth of certain characteristics which are then linked in a more or
less absolute way to the specific value judgements.
• The myth of the collective future. These myths refer to “historical
missions”, the destiny of a collective and other similar concepts.
They can take the form of challenges, unavoidable destinies or
duties which have to be fulfilled. In combination with myths
of origin, historical myths and ontological myths, propaganda
discourse can chart on on the basis of propaganda myths alone
an axis of temporal continuity of the collective.
• Local myths. Just as persons can be the objects of mythologization,
certain places or regions can also provide the starting point for
the creation of propaganda myths. In the elaborated propaganda
myth, this geographical point of reference then is connoted to the
specific events, persons, values etc. In consequence, the mention
of this geographical term in propaganda discourse triggers an
entire set of connotations for the recipients of this discourse. The
places, being the point of reference for local myths, generally also
play an important role in propaganda rituals.
• Object myths. The mythical objects regularly play a role within
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propaganda rituals. In such cases, artefacts serve as the points of
reference for propaganda myths, the underlying semiotic process
being equivalant to the case of the local myth or the personalized
myth.
Conclusion
This paper had two intentions—to present a theoretical approach to the
phenomenon of (totalitarian) propaganda on an interdisciplinary basis
and to outline the specific approach of discourse-analytical propaganda
research. The second is seen as an illustration of one possibility of
operationalizing the outlined concept.
Due to the limited space, one of the described dimensions of pro-
paganda was chosen as a focus. The choice fell on the propaganda
myth as one central dimension of propaganda which was frequently is
closely linked and interwoven with other dimensions of propaganda.
This interdependence between the different dimensions of propaganda
is to be seen as a significant element of this theoretical approach. The
distinction between these dimensions has its reason primarily in prac-
tical analytical needs and the need to operationalize the theoretical
concept. After the analysis of a given piece of propaganda, the different
dimensions of propaganda have to be put together again with the aim of
envisioning the whole palette of the propaganda in question. Each piece
of propaganda analysed subsequently can then deliver further pieces
for this mosaic and add details to the whole picture of the propaganda
discourse. This concerns empirical data as well as theoretical questions.
What is also of importance for the concept proposed in this paper
is that propaganda is not simply to be interpreted as one form of po-
litical communication, but as a complex process of social engineering
and an attempt to create and implement a more or less artificial col-
lective identity. It is evident that propaganda will hardly be successful
in implementing a collective identity constructed out of void; it has to
be anchored in pre-existing social structures, value and belief systems,
social hierarchies and so forth. The more complex such a propagated
collective identity is, the more aspects of the individual’s life it touches
upon, and the more this propaganda can be labelled ‘totalitarian’. “True”
totalitarian propaganda will not stop at manipulating social lives and
political attitudes of the individuals concerned, but will also seek to
influence their private lives. Perhaps the most tragic empirical example
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here is the antisemitic propaganda of the Nazi regime, which was aimed
at positioning Jews as pariahs even in the most intimate spheres.
Just as totalitarianismhas to be understood as a phenomenon of social
engineering, of profound manipulation of people’s attitudes, values and
self-definitions, propaganda—and especially totalitarian propaganda—
is a phenomenon of social communicationwith the potential of influenc-
ing to a high degree the definition of individual and especially collective
identities. Discourse-analytical propaganda research is one way of un-
covering this process, especially due to the critical impetus of discourse
analysis. Further pursuing this approach can be fruitful for both sides
(propaganda research and discourse analysis)—and subsequently for
the social study of propaganda in general.
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Violence, Communication and Imagination
Pre-Modern, Totalitarian and Liberal-Democratic Torture
WERNER BINDER
This contribution examines the practice of torture from a comparative
perspective and with regard to its communicative realization in public
and related social imaginaries. Nowadays, at the beginning of the 21st
century, a state will rarely call its own practices “torture”, but that was not
always the case. In European history torture has often been considered
to be an integral part of judicial processes. It was only in the last 200 years
that “torture” became a primarily negative concept, a label habitually
applied to the actions of political opponents. While specific torture
techniques traveled unseen between Liberal democracies as well as
totalitarian states, their representatives accused each other publicly
of using torture. The rising stigmatization of torture combined with
its monitoring by politicians and NGOs forced the torture specialists,
especially in democracies, to invent new stealth techniques. These penal
practices, leaving literally no traces on human bodies, were quickly
adapted by some totalitarian states and retain their significance in our
time (see: Rejali 2007).
How do we account for the communicative stigmatization of torture
and its consequences? I will argue that we can only explain this transfor-
mation by referring to the changes in semantic structures and providing
cultural explanations. The practice and prohibition of torture is regu-
lated by the moral and cultural order of a society. This societal order is
not only a complex of communicative actions, social norms or legal texts,
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but also a social imaginary. The notion of the imaginary foundations
of society goes back to Cornelius Castoriadis’ Imaginary Institution of
Society (1987), though I will be drawing primarily upon the concept of
the social imaginary as outlined by Charles Taylor, who defines it as
“the way ordinary people imagine their ‘social’ surroundings” (Taylor
2005: 23). Taylor conceives social imaginaries as a non-theoretical phe-
nomena “carried in images, stories and legends” that are—in contrast to
theories—“shared by large groups of people” or even “whole societies”.
Social imaginaries form the cultural background of a society as they
enable “common practices and a widely shared sense of legitimacy”. Not
only physical practices like torture, but also communication is embed-
ded in and legitimized by social imaginaries. The following study seeks
to answer the following question: in what way is the historical change
and the empirical variety of torture connected to the particular social
imaginaries?
I will start with a brief historical and sociological account on some
variations of torture from the Greek Antiquity to the early modernity in
France. I will show that the different meanings and functions of torture
can only be understood through their embedding in particular imagina-
tions of truth, pain and social status. Not only the rise, but also the fall
of torture (including its empirical decline and legal abolishment in the
course of modernity) is connected to certain social imaginaries. Still, as
we all know, torture didn’t vanish with the rise of modernity, but merely
changed its form. The rest of this study focuses on the similarities and
differences of torture practices, communication on torture and related
social imaginaries in totalitarian regimes and liberal democracies.
The second part will discuss the role of torture in the Stalinist show
trials and purges as an example of totalitarian torture, whereas the third
part focuses on the role of torture in the War on Terror as an example
of liberal democratic torture. I will show that both cases differ signifi-
cantly not only in regard to their imagining of torture, truth and state,
but also in terms of communication strategies. The Soviet authorities
used torture primarily against their own people, whereas the United
States tortured almost exclusively non-Americans. The Soviet Union
tried to produce false confessions, whereas the Americans wanted reli-
able information for intelligence purposes. Still, there are also striking
similarities. Torture appears in both cases to be an appropriate reac-
tion to a national crisis—in a double sense. The Stalinist excesses of
violence are not only responses to the early failures of the Soviet Union,
but have to be understood as social mechanisms that reproduce the
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liminal structure of a revolutionary belief community (Riegel 1987). In a
similar way should the use of torture in the War on Terror be regarded
as a symbolic transgression in response to 9/11 (Holmes 2006), and
not only as a rational instrument of counterterrorism. Far from being
purely instrumental or even rational, the practice of torture allows the
production and reproduction of certain social imaginaries.
Legal Torture in Pre- and Early Modern Times
Torture was widespread in many pre-modern societies, especially those
with comparatively rationalized and elaborated legal systems. In respect
to the legal use of torture, we have to distinguish between the judicial
torture as a means of truth-seeking and the penal torture as corporeal
punishment for the crimes committed. This chapter will focus primarily
on the judicial torture, starting with its use among the old Greeks.
Basanos—Judicial Torture in Ancient Greece
In Greek, torture was called basanos which means “touchstone”. This
word originally referred to a dark-colored stone that was used to test
the purity of gold. Later, the use of torture as a legal technique of truth-
seeking was named after the stone. The possible subjects of torture
in a Greek polis were defined by their social status; only slaves and in
exceptional cases foreigners were tortured. Full citizens, for example,
could demand the torture of a slave—of their own or of someone else—
in order to proof their innocence before the court. The testimony of a
tortured slave not only became equal to the evidence provided by free
citizens (Peters 1985: 13), but even surpassed it (DuBois 1991: 65). The
virtue of a citizen as someone who possesses reason becomes a vice
before the court as it enables him to give false testimony—even under
torture. Instead, a slave “recognizes reasonwithout possessing it himself”
and therefore his body “must be forced to utter the truth”(DuBois 1991:
66). Thus the body of a slave granted an immediate access to the truth
without the reflection and possible distortion that accompanies the
possession of reason. This truth extracted from the body could then be
used as a piece of evidence in a judicial procedure.
Two aspects and corresponding functions of Greek torture can be
distinguished. On the one hand, the use of torture was regulated by
the hierarchical differentiation of society, on the other hand torture was
219
Werner Binder
informed by a specific imagination of truth. Page DuBois argues that ju-
dicial torture became particularly important in the 5th century BC. At that
time, the boundaries between free citizens and slaves became blurred
and narratives of enslavement started to haunt the social imaginaries
of the Greek city states (DuBois 1991: 63-64). Torture therefore served
as a classificatory ritual reproducing the hierarchies between men and
women, citizens and foreigners, Greeks and barbarians, free men and
slaves. But that is only a half of the truth. The practice of basanos was
also connected to the Greek concept of truth, aletheia that was linked to
“hiddenness, secrecy, female potentiality, the tempting, enclosed interi-
ority of the human body”(DuBois 1991: 91). Truth was a hidden secret
that had to be wrested from the mere appearance of things.1 In the case
of torture, the truth was hidden in the body of the slave and had to be
extracted by physical coercion.
In contrast to the Greek mainstream, Plato proposed a dialogical the-
ory of truth that remained for a long time an elitist fantasy with little
impact on the wider social imaginary. Some critics of torture also ques-
tioned the specific link between torture and truth. Aristotle remarked in
his Rhetoric that people under torture’s compulsion lie “as often as they
tell the truth, sometimes persistently refusing to tell the truth, sometimes
recklessly making a false charge in order to be let off sooner” (quoted
in: DuBois 1991: 67). Later, the Romans incorporated tortura into their
law built on similar premises. Again, torture against slaves was predomi-
nant, though later it was also applied to the full citizens of a lower social
standing. The only difference to the Greek case is that the use of torture
was restricted to criminal proceedings (Peters 1985: 20).
Catholicism and the Rise of Torture in Late Medieval Times
The systematic use of torture vanished with the fall of the Roman Empire.
During the Dark Ages up to the 12th century, “irrational” legal practices
such as ordeals (especially duels among conflicting parties) dominated
Europe. But during the 12th century a “legal revolution” accompanied by
a religious change took place (Peters 1985: 40-44). In 1215, the fourth
Consilium Lateranum declared religious confession as mandatory for
each Catholic once a year. A breach of this duty was in principle enough
1 | Martin Heidegger adopts this Greek concept of truth in his Being and Time
(§44). He translates aletheia as uncoveredness (“Unverborgenheit”) and the pursuit of
truth as a violent act of appropriation (“Raub”): “Das Seiende wird der Verborgenheit
entrissen. Die jeweilige faktische Entdecktheit ist gleichsam immer ein Raub” (
Heidegger 1986: 222).
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to pass as a heretic. In the same period, the idea of the purgatory was
penetrating the ordinary peoples’ beliefs (Le Goff 1984). The purgatory
moved later from the realm of popular imaginaries to the sphere of elite
theology and was canonized in 1336 by the bull Benedictus Deus.
Also martyrdom as a testimony of religious truth and as a cultural
pattern to follow played an important role for the rise of torture. Here,
the late medieval reception of early Christian legends of martyrdom is
of great interest (Schirrmeister 2000). The Legenda Aurea, a collection
of Saints’ lives published by the Dominican monk Jacobus de Voragine
(1239-1298), became the most popular religious book—probably more
widespread than the Bible. In medieval passion plays, the suffering
of the Saints was reenacted for the purpose of remembrance and also
as an encouragement to follow their example (Hammer 2009). This
deep connection between torture, pain and religious truth was not only
carried and reproduced by folk narratives and performances; it was
also elaborated in contemporary systems of theology. According to
the religious doctrine of the already mentioned Jacobus de Voragine
(who was also a professor of theology), it was not the body itself, but its
suffering that could bear witness to the truth (Schirrmeister 2000: 141).
Legends about Saints and the institutionalization of the shrift provided a
painful paradigm for confessions. The tales of suffering in the purgatory
and lives of martyrs reveal the spiritual and moral value attributed to
pain. Taking this cultural background into account, it is hardly surprising
that torture was reintroduced in the 12th century.
In late medieval thinking, there was an analogy between shrift and tor-
ture, confessor and torturer. There is also a strong connection between
torture and truth, though it differs from the Greek conception. In the
medieval case, truth should not have been extracted but had to be rather
spelled out by the victim. The tortured subject was not a neutral vehicle
of truth (like a slave), but had to participate actively in the process of
its revelation. And it has always been the body of the accused person
that has been tortured—not the body of an innocent bystander. Also,
the immortal soul of the perpetrator was at stake. His obdurate body
had to be forced to speak truth for the sake of his own soul. We see
that in contrast to the Greek and Roman antiquity where torture was
used to attain evidence from a body as objective source beyond doubt,
in Medieval Europe it enabled obtaining a confession from the alleged
perpetrator. Unlike the Ancient Greek basanos—“the testing of gold”—
medieval torture was not so much a technique of extracting truth as, in
Foucault’s words, “the ritual of producing truth” (Foucault 1979: 38).
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Torture in Early Modernity and its Abolishment
The late medieval concept of torture outlasted the beginnings of moder-
nity. From a procedural point of view, coerced confessions were simply
indispensable (Langbein 2006). As long as it was impossible to convict
people with indirect evidence, there were no functional equivalents to
confessions. Only after a change in the imagination of truth rendered
indirect evidence permissible, torture lost its medieval status as the
“Queen of Proofs”. Once the indirect proof was possible, torture was
no longer needed and could—in principle—be abandoned. In order to
account for this institutional change, we need to investigate the modern
concept and imagination of truth. I will mention only two influential
theories of truth that had profound impacts on the modern social imagi-
nary: the deductive reasoning of Descartes and the empiricism of Bacon.
Descartes founded modern philosophy on the principle of radical doubt
and thus coined a new conception of truth that was incompatible with
the confession as the queen of proofs. He also advocated a strict dualism
of body and soul that cut the medieval bond between torture and truth.
Bacon’s idea of reading the world like a book was similarly influential.
His understanding of truth not only paved the way to modern sciences,
but also enabled changes in the legal system. Bacon’s empiricism al-
lowed the use of indirect evidence, thus fostering modern criminology
and the success of the detective novel.
Michel Foucault’s Discipline and Punish, as well as Lisa Silverman’s
study on torture in early modern France show that judicial (and penal)
torture persisted for a long time in early modernity. Silverman analyzed
the use of torture in the Parlement of Toulouse from 1600 to 1788, a
time where torture was neither mandatory nor arbitrarily used in court.
She explains the rise and decline of torture during that period by taking
historical circumstances and shifting cultural patterns into account. Her
book can partly be read as a refutation of Elain Scarry’s unhistorical
approach to torture in the Body in Pain (1985). Whereas Scarry starts
from the anthropological assumption that pain is a pure negativity and
the unmaking of the world, Silverman shows that the practice of tor-
ture was embedded in a social imaginary that was characterized by a
“valorization of pain” (Silverman 2001: 111-130). During the period she
researched, the religious life in Toulouse was dominated by lay confra-
ternities that practiced flagellations. Silverman shows that there was a
spiritual value attributed to pain that also affected the practice of torture.
Though it is very likely that many judges were also part of confraterni-
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ties that practiced the “self-torture” of flagellation, it is more important
that the valorization of pain was shared by a wider audience. Silver-
man takes into account not only the imagination of pain but also the
understanding of truth as existential knowledge inside the body. Pain
and suffering were conceived as ways to gain access to an embodied
truth—and to the sacred. The judicial discourse in early modern France
was modeled upon the hegemonic religious discourse which remained
quite similar up to late medieval times. Later, a reevaluation of pain led
to the abandonment of torture. In the 18th century, the shared cultural
framework that attributed positive meanings to the experience of pain
ceased to exist; instead, suffering became an unnecessary and ultimate
evil to be banished from the world.2 Silverman emphasizes the influ-
ence of the medical discourse on the social imagination of pain, but
also the impact of the scientific discourse on the understanding of truth
(Silverman 2001: 133-152). Truth was no longer conceived as something
buried in the body, but as something to be constructed. Cartesianism in
philosophy and medicine conceptualized the body as a pure machine
with no connection to the sacred.
Besides judicial torture employed to obtain legal truth, there was
also penal torture as corporeal punishment and public spectacle. In
Foucault’s description of the death of Damien, we see torture as an in-
strument to inflict pain and cause death, but also as a political ritual of
sovereignty (Foucault 1979). In late medieval as well as in early mod-
ern times, the body was the location of punishment. The body of the
tortured was conceived as a reversed image of the political body of the
king. Torture as a public ceremony and ritualized spectacle gives us a
taste of the political function contemporary forms of torture assume:
exercising torture means manifestation and inscription of the sovereign’s
power. According to Foucault, there was a penal revolution in the 18th
century that not only led to the abandonment of ceremonial torture and
public executions, but also to the birth of the prison. Foucault explains
this revolution as a shift from the power of the sovereign to the more
efficient disciplinary power. An alternative explanation is suggested
by Philip Smith who argues that the unruly behavior of the crowd dis-
2 | This change can be described as a shift from the positive to the negative
transcendence (Giesen 2005). In this approach, pain is no longer a way to the
positive transcendence of God but a secularized negative experience to be avoided
at all costs. Not only was the purgatory banished by the Reformation, but also the
Catholic Church recently reinterpreted this concept as a voluntary act of cleansing.
The change in the imagination of the purgatory followed cultural changes in the
evaluation of pain.
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turbed the public performance of sovereignty and justice (Smith 2008:
34-56). Foucault describes the abandonment of torture and corporeal
punishment as a disciplinary process that enhances the efficiency of
the penal system.1 The body stops being a prison of the soul it was in
medieval theology; instead, the soul becomes the prison of the body.
Smith shows that this disciplinary process is connected to the broader
modern narrative of rationalization (Smith 2008). We have to conceive
rationalization and disenchantment as cultural patterns that inspired
the charismatic movements of modernity. In the following chapter, we
will turn to Soviet Union as a totalitarian state to discuss the outcomes
of such a charismatic movement.
Soviet Totalitarian Torture in the Stalin Era
In the following chapter, I will focus on the role of torture in totalitarian
regimes. However, a general discussion of totalitarian torture seems to
be an impossible task given the diversity of totalitarianisms in terms of
ideology and social imaginary. Therefore, I will restrict myself to the use
of torture in the early days of the Soviet Union, in the Moscow show trials
and the Great Terror, though these findings might not apply to other
cases. Nevertheless, I will try to introduce a comparative dimension by
discussing some crucial differences between Soviet communism and
German fascism—as far as they concern both the imagination and the
practice of torture.
Totalitarianisms and Torture
The huge differences among totalitarian regimes in terms of their dom-
inant social imaginaries become obvious if we compare fascism and
communism. Fascism is a counter-modern movement though its his-
torical form was only possible in modernity. Communism, in contrast,
has always presented itself as a genuine modern movement grounded in
the “science” of political economy. Nevertheless, this self-description
is rather deceiving. On the one hand, an important intellectual roots of
modern communism was indeed Marxism, which Parsons described as
“the extreme of rationalistic radicalism” (Parsons 1967: 119). On the other
hand, every communist regime was also shaped by traditions, which
in the case of the Soviet Union was the Orthodox religious background.
It’s also important to note that fascism stood on the side of pre-modern
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particularism, whereas communism conceived itself as the champion
of modern universalism. This ideological difference is reflected by the
fact that fascist torture was less systematic and not so much in need
of justification compared with Soviet torture. Philip Smith has shown
that the codes of fascist discourses openly favored hierarchy over equal-
ity, emotional attachment over rational reasoning, exclusiveness over
inclusiveness, power over law (Smith 1998: 127). The communist civil
discourse had insteadmany codeswith liberal democracies in common—
for example, the public commitment to equality, reason, inclusiveness
and legality. The code of law was particularly important in the commu-
nication of totalitarian systems, though it was often used as a disguise
for political conflicts and the raw use of power. However, as far torture is
concerned, communism and liberal democracy differ strongly in the way
the relations of political community and individual person are imagined.
The liberal democratic imaginary is characterized by the belief in
the sacredness of the individual, most notably in terms of his civil and
human rights. Like National Socialism, early Marxism opposed the
notion of universal human rights but did so for very different reasons. In
National Socialism, not only racial differences overshadowed the idea of
a shared humanity but also the very notion of universalism was rejected.
Marxism, on the contrary, was from the very beginning concerned with
the well-being of all human beings, though its priority was not the liberal
pursuit of happiness but the liberation of mankind from alienation and
poverty caused by the capitalist mode of production. Marx noted in The
Jewish Question that civil and human rights are bourgeois since they
reproduce the imagination of society consisting of atomized individuals,
along with capitalism (Marx 1981: 347-370). In a true communism,
according to Marx, the political and the societal community become
one and the conception of human rights superfluous. Therefore, in
communist regimes the individual person had to be subjected to the
political community. The Marxists roots of the Soviet Union led to an
official condemnation of human rights which persisted until after the
Second World War when the Soviet authorities ratified the Declaration
of Universal Human Rights. If we take this ideological background into
account, we get an ambiguous picture of Soviet torture. On the one
hand, the rule of law was official policy, so one should not have expected
the judicial practice of torture. On the other hand, individual persons
were clearly subjected to the political community, which might have
facilitated the political uses of torture.
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Coerced Confessions in the Moscow Show Trials (1936-38)
As already noted, the legal role of confessions, coerced or not, decreased
with the rise of modernity. The Soviet Union was no exception: the use
of torture was prohibited as an unlawful practice, and its usefulness
was deemed questionable (probably due to the scientific imagination of
truth that has pervaded modern criminology). Still, the Soviet imaginary
of objectivity was a very special variation on the theme of scientific truth.
Andrej Vyshinsky, Stalin’s legal expert and later Soviet foreign minister,
claimed in his Theory of Legal Proofs that the application of the dialectic
method enables the judge to grasp not only the abstract and formal truth
of bourgeois law but also the concrete and material truth (Vyshinsky
1955: 231-232). Vyshinsky, who was also the mastermind behind the
show trials of Moscow, criticized explicitly the idea of the confession as
the ultimate evidence (Vyshinsky 1955: 276). He agreed with the much
maligned bourgeois law that confessions had to be voluntary and that
coerced testimonies possessed no legal value. He further argued that
the Soviet system had no need for confession as evidence as long as
other forms of evidence prooved the objective guilt of the accused. He
stresses that other forms of evidence are a must and grants confession
only a marginal significance. Still, according to Vyshinsky, confessions
retained moral value and might have influenced judges’ verdicts, even
if the individual confession was irreparably subjective—in contrast to
the objective truth established by the hard facts, which had some legal
value as a witness account (Vyshinsky 1955: 276). How does this legal
theory fit with the well-known practice of torture in the Soviet Union?
Particularly during Stalin’s purges, many party members became victims
of imprisonment, torture and execution. I will try to give an answer to
this question by addressing the role of torture in the Moscow show trials,
the Great Terror and the trials against the Rightist-bloc.
The Moscow show trials usually refer to the legal proceedings against
the Trotskyite-Zinovievite-bloc, charged by the chief prosecutor Vyshin-
sky for the murder of Sergei Kirov and the planned extermination of
Soviet elites (see 1936). These charges blend the alleged traitors inside
the party with other national and international enemies. The public
confessions of the accused were used not only as subjective admissions
of guilt but also as witness accounts necessary for incriminating others.
Still, these witness accounts had to be backed by hard evidence proving
involvement of the accused in counterrevolutionary activities. On Febru-
ary 24th, 1956, Nikita Khrushchev, the first secretary of Communist Party
of Soviet Union, revealed in his famous speech at the XXth Party Congress
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On Overcoming Personality Cult and Its Consequences that Kirov was
murdered on behalf of Stalin, having stated further that the evidence in
respective trials was faked and that the confessions were obtained by
torture:
“Now, when the cases of some of these so-called “spies” and “saboteurs” were
examined, it was found that all their cases were fabricated. The confessions of
guilt of many of those arrested and charged with enemy activity were gained
with the help of cruel and inhuman tortures” (Khrushchev 1956: 27).
These confessionswere not used as proofs in a legal sense: the “objective”
guilt of the accused was already established on the basis of fabricated
evidence. However, their confessions had not only subjective or moral
significance, but also public and political meanings for national and in-
ternational audiences. Overall, these coerced confessions from the Stalin
era bear only a superficial resemblance to the confessions in medieval
times. The latter had been an integral part of the legal system, whereas
the former were primarily used for propaganda reasons. The fact that
most of these confessions were obtained by coercion had to be hidden
from the public. First of all, the show trials contributed to the imagina-
tion of the Soviet state as threatened by internal and external enemies,
the so called counterrevolutionary and bourgeois forces. In this context,
the concept of the “enemy of the people” attributed by Khrushchev to
Stalin (Khrushchev 1956: 14) plays an important role. Second, the public
confessions demonstrated the Soviet rule of law and criminalistic exper-
tise. Though the confessions were of legal value, they proved in the eye
of the public, with the exception of some keen observers, that the Soviet
prosecutors had access to the truth and an objective knowledge about
these cases.3
Important for the broader social context of the show trials was the
extraordinary role of self-criticism and confession of guilt in the public
sphere of the Soviet Union (for the following see: Erren 2008). In the
1920s the victorious revolutionary party of the Bolsheviks faced a serious
crisis splitting it into right and left factions. After an initial period of
debates, dissent and crucial votes, political factions inside the party were
forbidden and dissenters were turned into heretics. Under these condi-
tions, public self-criticism and confessions evolved as mechanisms that
3 | Large parts of international press were convinced of the lawfulness of the
Moscow trials. Even NGO’s like the ligue des droits de l’homme had the general
impression that the trial was an “expression of justice itself”. A counter-perception
emerged only later (see: Schrader 1995: 36-38).
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allowed dissenters to re-integrate themselves into the new party line.
These public rituals strengthened the legitimacy of the party leadership
and fostered the imagination of the party as a monolithic and unified
bloc. By confessing one could show his unquestioned loyalty to the
party which became the criteria of being a “true Bolshevik”. Those who
refused to capitulate, were declared to be counterrevolutionaries. Erren
argues further that the Soviet culture of confessions was influenced by
religious patterns of canonic truth, heresy and guilt (Erren 2008: 19,
85-86 ).4 Self-criticism or samokritika emerged only in 1928 as a central
concept in the Soviet public sphere, though it was retrospectively de-
clared that it had always been a part of the Bolshevik tradition. This new
culture of self-criticism spread to the factories, on wall newspapers, in
academia and also played an important role in the purges of the thirties.
Even Khrushchev himself adapted this model of self-criticism to debunk
Stalin’s personality, as well as to legitimize his own rule.
Torture in Gulags and during the Great Terror (1937-1938)
The use of torture in the Soviet Union was not restricted to the prepara-
tion for the show trials, but played an important role in the Soviet prison
camps. In Gulag Archipelago, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn remarked that tor-
ture had always been a common practice in Soviet Russia (Solzhenitsyn
2002). He argued further that torture had been rarely used to discover
truth, obtain a confession or gain information. Instead, it served the
psychological purpose of breaking individual’s will. But the destruction
of subjectivities, in its turn, played crucial role in formulating the “objec-
tive truth” of the regime. The case of the Katyn massacre and its cover-up
shows that torture was also used to intimidate eyewitnesses whose ac-
counts contradicted the official version of the Soviet government. This
Polish case also shows that the Soviet Union practiced torture not only
against their own citizens. They used torture against the populations
of occupied territories too, for example in the prison camps of the SBZ,
which later became the German Democratic Republic (Erler 1998: 178-
179). The use of torture by the Soviet authorities remained for quite a
4 | Other cultural sources from the Russian tradition are also important for the
understanding of self-criticism as a part of a broader social imaginary—for exam-
ple, the dialectics of guilt and confession in Dostoevsky’s Crime and Punishment.
Nevertheless, this moral stand was very alien to of Marxism. For this reason, some
Bolsheviks condemned the rituals of confession as expressions of the “disdained
Russian soul” and even feared the return of “Dostoevskian moods (dostoevšcˇina)”
(Erren 2008: 379).
228
Violence, Communication and Imagination
long time a well-kept secret and a taboo topic in public communication.
Thus communication on torture was confined to private stories, gossip
and rumors.
Between 1928 and 1936, the so called convoyeur techniques—an array
of clean torture methods hugely different from the whipping practices
of the Czarist police—became part of the torture repertoire of the secret
police in the Soviet Union, NKVD (Rejali 2007: 88). Key elements of the
convoyeur techniques were sleep deprivation, relay interrogations and
stress-inducing positions such as forced standing (vystoika) or forced
sitting (vysadka):
“Living in an overcrowded, unsanitary prisons on meager rations was a torture
in itself that broke many people. But often it was not enough to obtain con-
fessions, so the NKVD turned to physical torture. There are many documents
and published testimonies about this, Memoirs and archival documents show
a gruesome picture of crimes committed in NKVD prisons. One of the most
frequent forms of interrogation was the “conveyor” method, where several in-
vestigators took turns in the nonstop interrogation of a prisoner for several days
without sleep, forcing the prisoner to stand or sit in uncomfortable positions.
Often such conveyor interrogations involved beatings and other forms of torture”
(Khlevniuk 2004: 151).
According to Darius Rejali, the Soviet torturers have not developed these
techniques on their own but most likely learned them from the police
systems of Western democracies. It is quite probable that some of the
later NKVD torturers had been themselves subject to these tortures as
socialist detainees in Western police stations and prisons. After World
War II, these techniques spread further to the secret polices in the other
countries of the Warsaw Pact.
During the so called Great Terror, from July 1937 to November 1938,
hundreds of thousands of people were arrested, tortured and executed.
The crucial document for the Great Terror was the order no. 00447 con-
cerned with the persecution of “former kulaks, criminals, and other
anti-Soviet elements” that also quantitatively defined the “contingents
to be repressed” (see: Khlevniuk 2004: 145). The arrests and murders
were based on quotas differing according to region and from group to
group. These limits were consecutively raised—sometimes on request
of the local governments, sometimes by the center in Moscow when
they had the impression that the local government showed not enough
engagement in the fulfillment of the plan. Initially, the execution of
75,950 and the imprisonment of 193,000 people was planned (Binner
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et al. 2009: 45). At the end, more than 800,000 people died as a conse-
quence of the Great Terror. There were two categories of people, on the
one hand former “kulaks and other hostile elements” to be killed, on
the other hand “criminals and less hostile elements” for imprisonment.
These lists was extended on request to include diverse “hostile elements”
such as priests and former members of anti-Bolshevik organizations.
Many people from these categories were already registered as not al-
lowed to vote (lišency), in particular the kulaks that were imprisoned
and later released in the wake of the de-kulakization in the early thirties.
This allowed the NKVD to arrest them easily and systematically; others
were arrested because of denunciations or as the result of forced witness
accounts. The most important legal institution in the Great Terror were
the troijki, the committees consisting of three people, created during
the de-kulakization in the early thirties, that were empowered to convict
people outside of the court.
The coerced confessions obtained by torture were necessary to pro-
duce evidence against the arrested people in order to fulfill the quotas
of killings and imprisonments. The prisoners were tortured until they
signed fake documents (in some cases even blank sheets of paper) that
suggested or proved their membership in a counterrevolutionary organi-
zation, thus creating the pretext for further interrogations (for examples
see: Khlevniuk 2004: 156). The introduction of the “mass conveyor” sped
up immensely the production of confessions. This particularities of the
torture technique are disclosed in a report on the “illegal methods of
investigation” in Turkmenia:
“For the mass conveyor, dozens of arrested people were lined up facing the wall
in a special room. A designated person on duty for the conveyor prevented them
from falling asleep or lying down until they agreed to give the testimony required
by the investigator. The stubborn individuals under arrest were also subject to
beating handcuffing or bonding. A large number of cases have been uncovered
where the arrested were kept on the conveyor for thirty-forty days without sleep”
(quoted from: Khlevniuk 2004: 158-159).
During the interrogations, beatings were quite common; many of them
resulted in deaths. The existence of these murders has usually been
concealed by faked death reports. Among the arrested and tortured were
also women with babies, as well as foreign diplomats. The report claims
that some interrogators boasted to be particularly cruel and therefore
efficient:
“In the NKVD department of the Kerbinsk district, its chief, Lopukhov, and officer
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Ovcharov systematically beat inmates on the conveyor. According to his own tes-
timony, Ovcharov, while drunk, broke two stools over the heads of the prisoners,
and within one hour made all fifteen people confess to espionage” (quoted from:
Khlevniuk 2004: 159).
The conveyor technique was very effective in the mass production of
confessions, but not particularly useful in intelligence gathering. In the
first place, the extorted confessions were used to justify further arrests
and interrogations. Their second use was providing witness reports and
evidence against the other inmates, since the coerced confessions of the
latter were not enough to convict the confessors. Along with deliberate
denunciations, the non-voluntary witness reports played an important
role in the trials against the so-called “hostile elements”.
Whereas the manifest goal of the Great Terror was the repression of
non-conformists, a rather latent function was the specification of an en-
emy image that was in danger of being unmasked as pure ideology (see:
Binner et al. 2009: 377). One may also understand the Great Terror as a
reaction towards the economic and political failures of Stalinism (Žižek
1999). Because the authority and truth of the party was beyond ques-
tion, these failures had to be explained as acts of sabotage of political
opponents. In order to rescue the party, scapegoats where needed.
The Great Terror stopped when Yezhov had to step back as chief of
the NKVD. The state of exception was abandoned and “socialist legality”
restored again, whereas the troijka and the NKVD became scapegoats
for the excesses of violence that happened. The troijka were abolished;
many members were convicted and sentenced to death as the former
prosecutors became themselves victims of the system (Binner et al. 2009:
697-699). The NKVD was accused of using confessions as the solemn ba-
sis for convictions without substantiating the allegation with additional
evidence, for faking evidence, for distorting testimonies and coercing
false testimony (see: Binner et al. 2009: 481-482, 542ff.). Nevertheless,
Stalin himself intervened in these investigations and accusations on
behalf of the former torturers by defending the use of violence as legit-
imate in exceptional circumstances (for example against “enemies of
the people”). He argued further that the Soviet Union cannot afford to
dispose of torture when its enemies, the bourgeois intelligence agencies,
have no such moral inhibitions (see: Binner et al. 2009: 515-516).
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The Trials against Bukharin and Yezhov (1937-1940)
I will conclude the discussion of Soviet torture with the trials against the
so-called “Rightist bloc” at the end of the thirties, restricting myself to
the prominent cases against two old Bolsheviks, Bukharin and Yezhov.
One may start with Yezhov, the commander of the Great Terror, who
was arrested in April 1939. At the beginning of 1940 he confessed to be
an English and Polish spy, though later he lwithdraw this confession in
front of the USSR Supreme Court (Getty and Naumov 1999: 560-562). In
this statement, to the court, he repudiated all the accusations against
him, but remained nevertheless realistic about his conviction: “My fate
is obvious”. Quite probable that torture was used to obtain his first
confession, in particular as he begs his prosecutors: “shoot me quietly,
without tormenting”.5 Yezhov closes his statement with a last wish:
“I request that Stalin be informed that I have never in my political life deceived
the party, a fact known to thousands of persons who know my honesty and
modesty. I request that Stalin be informed that I am a victim of circumstances
and nothing more, yet here enemies I have overlooked may have also a hand
in this. Tell Stalin that I shall die with his name on my lips” (Getty and Naumov
1999: 562).
Till the very end, Yezhov was willing to believe that Stalin had nothing to
do with the accusations against him and that his death would only serve
his own enemies. Bukharin, who had been arrested inMarch 1937, began
to confess three months thereafter, but was not so naïve. In contrast to
Yezhov, he declared in a private letter to Stalin that he had no intention
of recanting his confession in public, instead he pledged for a personal
acknowledgement of his innocence (Getty and Naumov 1999: 556-560).
How to account for this split between public confession and personal
innocence? Here Žižek’s illuminating interpretation of the letter may
be helpful (Žižek 1999). Bukharin believed he was acting like a good
Bolshevik in accordance to the code of communism by sacrificing his
individual interest for the greater good of the party and the proletarian
revolution. While accepting the “objective necessity” of his death, he
still clung to his subjective innocence and personal truth, which was
inacceptable for Stalin and the party. The subordination of the individual
has to be complete, the sacrifice total and the official truth has to become
the objective truth. As the truth of the party is only loosely connected to
5 | Truth to be told, the word for torment used here, mucheniia, does not neces-
sarily imply physical torture (cf. Getty and Naumov 1999: 562, fn.15).
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a world of facts, the show trials contributed to a revision of history and
to the imagination and construction of state power.6
How did Stalin survive these paranoid purges and violent excesses
as a political leader? First of all, it seems that the people and the party
readily accepted the Manichaean narrative offered as explanation. The
never-ending revolution was conceived as a battle between good and
evil, a drama with conspiracies, treason and acts of sabotage. But even
considering the obvious mistakes and grave excesses, Stalin’s position
was pretty secure. He never appeared as the man in charge for these
persecutions, but as someone who called publicly for moderation. Stalin
also profited from a social imaginary going back to the Czarist times,
namely the narrative of the “good king”, who is surrounded by ill-willed
counselors and betrayed by corrupt enforcers (see: Stölting 1997). Even
Yezhov, who regarded himself as the victim of a conspiracy, explicitly
exempted Stalin from his allegations.
National Socialist Torture
Let me briefly address the problem of Nazi torture. In comparison to
Soviet torture, the practice of torture in the German National Socialism
has striking differences. First of all, compared with the genocide of
European Jews and Gypsies, political opponents and disabled persons,
the Nazi government did not use torture proper systematically:
“The Nazis used torture primarily against individuals from whom they needed
information, such as Resistance members, and against Jehovah’s Witnesses, to
force them to name other members of their religion. When information was not
needed, the Nazis more often used mass killings and reprisals, instead of torture,
to intimidate and control conquered people” (Einolf 2007: 111).
Apparently, the Nazi use of torture was practiced ad hoc and motivated
by a situational information asymmetry, lacking ideological functions.
According to Darius Rejali, there are two distinctive features of Nazi
torture. On the hand, “German security services showed little interest
in clean tortures”; on the other hand, these techniques had very little
systematic coherence, but “varied from region to region” (Rejali 2007:
95). The Nazis often used overt violence like whipping and beatings in
interrogations and before executions, which shows that they didn’t care
6 | The quintessence of this totalitarian imagination of torture is found in Orwell’s
1984. Here, torture is revealed as the core of the totalitarian state, a practice revealing
its absolute power and sovereign truth.
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about leaving traces.7 We can also add that “German people” as defined
in Nazi racial terms—had little to fear from the Nazi Regime if they were
not active in the political opposition to the regime (as, for example, Com-
munists were). This circumstance has its roots both in the particularism
of the Nazi ideology and in its racist imaginary: fragmentary thinking
diminished the importance of truth, an essentially universal concept,
and the definition of enemy was constructed first and foremost along
racial lines. All in all, National Socialism was not so much in need of
establishing an official truth in the Soviet sense. The relation of torture
and truth was more about information than about ideology—which is
also the case in the liberal-democratic society to which we turn now.
Liberal-Democratic Torture in the American War on Terror
Liberal-democracies differ from totalitarian regimes in many respects.
Most important is probably the existence of an autonomous public
sphere and the protection of individuals from the state by the rule of
law—not only in political theory but also in practice. Still, the rights of
individuals were first of all conceived as civil rights and not necessarily
as human rights. The discourse of civil society distinguishes sharply
between citizens and enemies (Alexander 1998); if torture is to be ap-
plied, it is generally used against “enemies” and “aliens” (see: Einolf
2007). The case in point is the use of torture in Algiers by the French—a
colonial exercise of power in a liberation war against an enemy that
was considered a different “specie”. Colonialism shares a certain racist
ideology with the Nazi Government, even if it differs in other aspects.
Jaques Massu, commander of the French troops in Algiers in 1957, gave
name and birth to the concept of massuisme—the justification of torture
as a counter-terrorist measure in exceptional circumstances. We will see
that this is a typical pattern of justification in liberal democracies: the
United States used a similar argument in the War on Terror, which will
be discussed as a case study of liberal-democratic torture.
7 | For an overview on the use of torture in Nazi Germany and the Nazi-occupied
Europe see Rejali (2007: 91-107). He points out that the most refined torture
techniques—such as the “bath tub” or electric torture—where only found in the
occupied France and actually borrowed from the French penal tradition.
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The Academic Torture Debate after 9/11
In order to understand the possibilities and the dilemmas of liberal-
democratic torture, it is helpful to take a look at the recent debates.
Steven Lukes argued in his article Liberal Democratic Torture that the
absolute prohibition of torture is indispensable for liberal democratic
societies because the practice of torture would undermine their demo-
cratic and liberal foundations (Lukes 2006). According to Lukes, there is
no such thing as “liberal-democratic torture”: liberal societies respect
individuals, and democratic societies base their political decisions on
public discourse. Torture not only violates the human dignity and indi-
vidual rights, but its open practice endangers the normative foundations
of society whereas the secret practice of torture would not be accepted in
a democracy. Though a liberal society might coexist with the secret use
of torture by the state, a liberal democratic society cannot do so. Lukes’
statement is normative rather than empirical, but it does tell something
about the moral order and communicative codes of democratic societies.
The civil sphere of liberal democracies favors openness over secrecy and
individual rights over state power (see: Alexander 2006; Alexander and
Smith 1993).
Still, the application of these and similar postulates leads to para-
doxes if important values such as “innocent lives” are at stake. Lukes
recognizes these dilemmas of an absolute prohibition of torture and
argues that in such cases torture should be personally accounted for:
though the acts of torture should be punished, the legal system might
take exceptional and mitigating circumstances into account. This, as
we will see, is a rather typical strategy of coping with the dilemmas of
liberal democratic torture: In general, Lukes tends to reify the concept
of torture while neglecting its communicative construction. The British
sociologist Geoffrey Brahm Levey responded critically to Lukes’ article
(see also: Lukes 2007). He argues that though torture might be morally
wrong, its practice is not necessary incompatible with the liberal and
democratic code. Levey suggests that torture can be rendered demo-
cratically accountable by legal procedures and political elections, for
example the “torture warrants” proposed by Alan Dershowitz (2002).
Following this line of thought, torture becomes a problem of dirty hands,
of weighing “bigger” and “lesser” evils (see also: Ignatieff 2004).
Torture and coerced confessions indisputably lost legitimacy in the
last centuries. Not only the Soviet Union, also the United States had
no use for judicial torture in a legal sense. Still, there are different com-
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municative codes in these regimes. Whereas totalitarian regimes like
the Soviet government demand painful sacrifices and public demonstra-
tions of humility from individuals, liberal democracies like the United
States try to avoid pain and death of their citizens at all costs. The only
thing that can legitimate the use of torture in liberal democracies is
therefore the prevention of pain and death. Torture in the War on Terror
was only legitimized as a discussion topic when it became a technique
of information gathering for security reasons. Though torture was ban-
ished as legal technique, it came back as a practice of the military, the
police and the secret service. Yes, torture violates liberal principles, but
this can be perceived as a “lesser evil” in certain circumstances. The
epistemic basis of torture as interrogation technique is the informational
asymmetry between the state and his enemies. Evidently, this concept
of information is different from the antique and medieval notion of a
hidden truth.
In theUnited States, the individual rights of citizens have a particularly
strong tradition. The bill of rights from 1791 guarantees that no one has
to provide evidence against oneself at the court, rendering confessions
legally useless (Amendment V), grants to everyone a speedy, public
and fair trial (Amendment VI) and prohibits any cruel or unusual form
of punishment (including torture, Amendment VIII). Individual rights
are also prevalent in political folklore devoted to moral integrity: they
say that George Washington refused to torture British soldiers in the
Independence War, whereas the British had no such inhibitions (Mayer
2008: 80-81).
Two parallel strategies of communicating torture in the American War
on Terror emerge. First, the attorneys working for the Bush administra-
tion proposed a very narrow definition of torture that would allow the
United States to use several interrogation techniques close to torture.
The respective secret memorandums were published only in the wake of
the Abu Ghraib torture scandal. Second, the harsh interrogation tech-
niques were justified by a state of exception—the War on Terror. In 1992,
Niklas Luhmann discussed the ticking bomb scenario as a hypothetical
case: should one torture in order to prevent the explosion of a nuclear
weapon in a big city (Luhmann 2008)? A long time, this problem was
merely a product of sociological imagination and philosophical reason-
ing, but with 9/11 it became a part of a wider social imaginary. Torture
became not only a legitimate topic in academic circles, but also in public
sphere and popular culture.
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US Torture Policies after 9/11
Torture did not remain a subject of academic discussions, but was em-
ployed by US forces to counter the threat of terrorism. After 9/11, the
legal ground for this practice was prepared by the attorneys of the Amer-
ican government. Two weeks after 9/11, John C. Yoo wrote a Memo to
the President that strengthened his constitutional authority:
“Neither statue, however, can place any limits on the President’s determinations
as to any terrorist threat, the amount of military force to be used in response, or
the method, timing, and the nature of the response. These decisions, under our
Constitution, are for the President alone to make” (Yoo 2005: 24).
Not only has the President the right to undertake military operations
against suspected terrorists and nations supporting them, but also to
nations that pose a seemingly similar threat (for example possessing
weapons of mass destruction). Memorandas for the detention of sus-
pected terrorists (Bush 2005), for the denial of habeas corpus to the
inmates of Guantánamo Bay (Philbin and Yoo 2005) and for depriving
the captives in the War on Terror from their “prisoners of war” status (By-
bee 2005a; Yoo and Delabunty 2005) followed. The Geneva conventions
were reinterpreted in such a way that suspected terrorists were no longer
conceived as soldiers, but were reclassified as “unlawful combatants”. As
if the framing of counterterrorism as war was not enough to signal the
state of exception, disguising of enemy soldiers as unlawful combatants
doubled this exceptionality.
The re-interpretation of torture was not a purely arbitrary act, but
became possible by the ambiguities of the prohibition itself. Let us
consider Article 5 of the “UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights”
and the “UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment”. Here, the use of torture is
explicitly forbidden under any circumstances. But the very definition
of torture as “intended to inflict severe physical and mental pain or
suffering” is quite ambiguous. What is “severe pain”? When does pain
start to become severe? What is meant by “intended”? A memorandum
to the President of the U.S. from August 2002 tries to give an answer by
concluding that torture. . .
“[. . . ] covers only extreme acts. Severe pain is generally of the kind difficult for
the victim to endure. Where the pain is physical, it must be an intensity akin to
that which accompanies serious physical injury such as death or organ failure.
Severe mental pain requires suffering not just at the moment of infliction but it
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also requires lasting psychological harm, such as seen in mental disorders like
the post-traumatic stress disorder. [. . . ] Because the acts inflicting torture are
extreme, there is a significant range of acts that though they might constitute
cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment or punishment fail to rise to the level
of torture” (Bybee 2005b: 213-214).
Note that severe physical and mental harm should be considered “specif-
ically intended” to become torture. If the interrogator is in a good faith
that he has no such intentions, he does not violate the statutes even if he
actually inflicts lasting damage upon his victim. More than that, “a good
faith belief need not be a reasonable one” (Bybee 2005b: 175). Though
the torture definition is narrowed down, Bybee continues to argue that
the outright prohibition of torture “under the circumstances of the cur-
rent war against al Qaeda and its allies [. . . ] may be unconstitutional [sic!
W. B.]” and that “necessity or self-defense could provide justifications
that would eliminate any criminal liability” even for those acts falling
under a narrow definition of torture (Bybee 2005b: 214). Exceptional tor-
ture remains as a backup strategy. The definition of torture is narrowed
down to extreme acts, whereas a significant range of cruel, inhumane
and degrading treatment is relegated to the legally unproblematic term
“harsh interrogation technique”.
The prison Camp at Guantánamo Bay in Cuba became symptomatic
for the use of torture and interrogation techniques in the War on Ter-
ror. Among the approved torture techniques for GTMO were isolation,
sensory and sleep deprivation, removal of clothing, inducing stress by
the use of dogs and female interrogators, finally the use of mild, non
injurious physical contact (Greenberg and Dratel 2005: 1239). Another
technique actually used in Guantánamo prison was waterboarding—a
torture simulating drowning. The exceptional status of Guantánamo
Bay was publicly known, but the general public was unaware of details.
This gap was filled with the ticking bomb fantasy in popular media in-
cluding movies and TV series. In contrast to the classical scenario in
which the ticking bomb was defused by the hero just in time, in the new
version the hero had to torture the villain beforehand. After 9/11, the
“torture/savior-fusion” (Holmes 2006: 128) became an important nar-
rative element, most prominently embodied in the figure of Jack Bauer
from the American TV series 24.
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Communicative Strategies of Liberal Democratic Torture
The United States government used several communication strategies to
cope with the problem of liberal democratic torture. First it used a very
narrow definition of torture that—as critics might say—refrained from
calling torture by its name and left room for the dubious “harsh interro-
gation techniques”. The Abu Ghraib scandal in 2004 showed a second,
slightly different strategy. The publicized acts of torture were quickly
framed by US army and American government as cases of “abuse”. This
terminology implied that the incidents at the AbuGhraib prisonwere not
part of a widespread and systematic torture practice, but rather some iso-
lated, if illegal, accidents. In the course of the scandal, this terminology
was more and more adopted by the American media that some scholars
feel even inclined to speak of “indexing” (Bennett et al. 2006). As the
reelection of George W. Bush in the same year has shown, the US army
and the government successfully exculpated themselves by rendering
the perpetrators of those acts individually accountable. Evidently, this
strategy was quite similar to the scapegoating of the NKVD officers in
the aftermath of the Great Terror.
A third communicative strategy aimed at rendering torture harmless
was its branding as exception and transgression.8 In the War on Terror
not only the state of exception was mobilized to justify the use of harsh
interrogation techniques and torture; these practices were also packaged
as transgressions to communicate the state of exception. The term
“transgression” is useful to account for the symbolic power unleashed by
a transgression of law. Jean Baudrilliard described 9/11 as a “death-gift”
of the terrorists, as a global event, a singular case of a huge symbolic
impact (Baudrillard 2003). He argued further that there could be hardly
an adequate response to such a gift. Stephen Holmes pointed out that
we can understand the use of torture in the War on Terror as this kind
of symbolic response to 9/11: torture works precisely because it defies
the rule of law (Holmes 2006). The actual practice of torture was—at
8 | Lukes’ normativism as well as Levey’s calculus of torture fail to account for
torture as exception and transgression. In this connection, the political theology
of Carl Schmitt (2005) and the works on the sacred by the Collége de Sociologie
deserve mentioning: Georges Bataille (2001) and Roger Caillois (2001) have shown
that transgressions occur in particular periods and do not always endanger the
general moral order. The anthropologist Victor Turner came to similar insights
arguing that social structure is often accompanied by phenomena of anti-structure
and liminality (Turner 1969). Liminality renders the ordinary rules invalid and often
reverses them; it enables for transgressions while at the same time preserving the
norm.
239
Werner Binder
least until the Abu Ghraib photographs—disclosed from the eye of the
public. Still, there was a public knowledge of these affairs. Especially
the installment of the prison camp at Guantánamo Bay in the months
following the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center, was an open
secret. Why was this shadowy camp - outside the American territory,
but under American control—widely accepted? Apparently, the worries
about national security framed by the “ticking bomb narrative”, provided
a justification for Guantánamo Bay and torture in general.
To strip alleged terrorists from their rights can be regarded as a more
or less adequate reaction to terrorist attacks in liberal societies precisely
because it transgresses liberal norms. Building camps for the interroga-
tion of alleged terrorists far from public surveillance is a symbolically
significant reaction, because it violates the norms of a democratic public
sphere. Beyond sacred prohibition and profane calculus, there seems
to be a dark fascination regarding the transgression of torture in liberal
democracies. Given the right framing, even the breach of seemingly
indispensable norms can have a positive communicative value. Not only
the application of norms is culturally set, also the recognition of excep-
tions and transgressions is shaped by cultural patterns. It is a question of
compelling narratives, convincing performances and shocking images
as the case of 9/11 shows. The change in the practice of torture was
accompanied by a cultural transformation of the social imaginary. This
is also suggested by Levey (2007), when he refers metaphorically to the
“religious change” that has taken place in America after 9/11, and Lukes
(2007) agrees.
The plausibility of the Ticking Bomb Scenario is of course dependent
on a particular relation between truth and torture. Nowadays, the me-
dieval spiritual connection between torture and truth is replaced by a
technological imagination. In the American case, the scientification of
torture established a new connection between truth and body. A good
example is the American research on psychological torture, but also
on other forms of modern “stealth torture”. The use of psychotropic
drugs and truth serums reestablishes the connection between body and
mind that was cut by the Cartesian dualism. The US military also experi-
mented with technical devices like the lie detector in order to force the
body to give reliable information. Still, the truth here are only pieces
of information that might yield some usable intelligence for the secret
services. There is no whole truth, no confession that ends the torture.
Though the ticking bomb scenario that suggests a crucial piece of infor-
mation is hidden inside the prisoners body, in principle any information
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might be of value for the torturers. This torture never stops; there is no
confession and no foreseeable death that marks an end to the suffering.
As long as the tortured body might yield further information, there is no
reason to let him go. Only the external logic of the Supreme Court or a
policy change can bring the indefinite detention to an end.
Conclusion
Hierarchies, Codes and Messages of Torture
The practice of torture seems, at least in relatively complex societies, to
be constant throughout history. But we also seen that the configuration
of torture, body, truth and pain changed in the course of history. We
can’t investigate torture as an isolated practice; we have to take the
socio-historical circumstances such as religious practices and status
hierarchies into account. Last but not least, these practices belong to a
particular social imaginary. The analysis has shown that torture is always
embedded in webs of narratives and images that give them a widely
shared sense of legitimacy. Also the social functions of torture differ:
while in pre-modern and early-modern times, torture had primarily a
legal function, modern torture seems instead to fulfill a political function.
I will summarize some findings on that with regard to social hierarchies,
cultural codes and communicative messages.
Many studies have shown that hierarchy plays a crucial role in the
practice of torture. For torture in the Antiquity, the difference between
citizen and slave was decisive and in fact reproduced by torture. In the
late medieval times, this hierarchy continued to exist and nobles were
less often tortured. Other social hierarchies became also important, for
example the social stigmatization of heretics, the suspicion towards Jew-
ish and Muslim converts during the Inquisition and the role of gender
in the witch hunts. Nevertheless, Christian religion provided an inter-
pretative frame that shifted the meaning of torture from dishonor to
spiritual cleansing which led to a more egalitarian practice of torture.
In liberal democratic societies, like France or the US, the difference be-
tween citizen and non-citizen (or enemy) is important. Torture is nearly
exclusively used against outsiders and often fueled by a racist imagina-
tion of the alien Other. What is particularly interesting about the case of
Soviet torture is its universal egalitarianism: in principle no one was pro-
tected from torture—possibly, not even Stalin himself. Hierarchies still
played an important role, but the aftermath of the Great Terror shows
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that those in high positions could end up on the dock and that some
prominent torturers have been in the end tortured themselves. Torture
is not only affected by social hierarchies, but also plays a crucial role in
reproducing those hierarchies. It not only separates citizens from slaves
and other non-citizens, it helps society to construct its hostile others
disguising them as heretics, counterrevolutionaries or terrorists.
With respect to the cultural coding of torture, we see variations in the
evaluation of pain and in the imagination of truth. On the one hand,
the evaluation of pain with regard to social groups varied; the pain of
slaves or of colonial others is different from the pain of citizens. On the
other hand, the universal evaluation of pain changed with time from
the valorization and spiritualization of pain in late medieval and early
modern times to its pure negativity in late Modernity. One can also ob-
serve different codings in the communication and imagination of truth.
According to the Ancient Greeks, truth was something to be extracted
from the neutral body of a slave, which differed from the concept of
active participation expected from the confessor in Christian Europe.
The confession of guilt focused on a religious understanding of truth in
its relation to soul and God. The scientific conception of truth is differ-
ent from the pre-modern torture imaginations: in the US, for instance,
truth is tied to the concept of information and the assumed information
asymmetry between state and tortured person is crucial. In the Soviet
State, truth was also imagined as scientific and objective: the function of
Soviet confession was not to eliminate the information asymmetry but
to symbolize the objectivity of the official truth. The truth that manifests
itself in Soviet torture was not the subjective truth of the tortured, but
the objective truth of the state. The supposedly scientific truth was in
fact a political perversion of truth.
Finally, the communication on torture conveyed varying messages
to different audiences. The antique and medieval tortures were no se-
crets at all, but widely recognized and accepted practices. Therefore the
message of torture was quite unambiguous, defined by their function
in legal procedures. The modern use of torture is much more ambiva-
lent. Even Soviet torture had to remain invisible; it was prohibited by
the law, but nevertheless frequently practiced. It was crucial for the
success of the show trials that the confessions observed by the national
and international audiences appeared not to be coerced. And when the
practice of torture was publicized, after the Great Terror (and especially
after Stalin’s death), the message conveyed exculpated its communi-
cator: torture was presented as the work of spies and traitors, as the
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grave excess of a few misguided officers, or even as the consequence
of the megalomania of a single leader. In liberal democracies, where
torture is also practiced secretly, a similar communication strategy sur-
faced during the Abu Ghraib scandal, where the systematic torture was
broken down to individual abuse cases. Still, the public rhetoric in lib-
eral democracies allows—quite similarly to the revolutionary rhetoric of
communism—for a partial recognition and justification of torture. The
existence of Guantánamo Bay was an open secret; though the torture
itself was not visible, it was a common knowledge that “harsh interro-
gation techniques” were employed there. Hence the communication
on torture in liberal democracies, and, to a lesser degree, in totalitarian
regimes, has a very distinctive message: The transgression of liberal
principles signals a state of exception.
We see that torture in different historical contexts and societies was
not only endowed with differing meanings, but fulfilled also different
social functions. In our contemporary society, torture may have lost
its legal function, but its political function is more visible than ever.
Therefore torture and its communication contributes to the imagination
of state power in totalitarian regimes as well as in liberal democratic
security regimes.
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The Lure of Fascism?
Extremist Ideology in the Newspaper Reality Before WWII
JOHN RICHARDSON
Although a great deal of research has been published examining British
fascism during the 1930s, the vast majority of this work, perhaps neces-
sarily, has focused on various party literatures as the definitive voices
of the political parties. Aside from the infamous support that Rother-
mere and the Daily Mail provided the British Union of Fascists, thus
far, there has been comparatively little examination of the circulation of
totalitarian ideologies in the wider national culture.1 Even the current
‘cultural turn’ in fascist studies tends to focus analytic attention on the
officially ratified outputs of explicitly named fascist parties (see: Gottlieb
and Linehan, 2004). Inevitably, I would argue, this impoverishes our
understanding of fascism—of its origins, its growth, its success, and the
potentials for its recurrence. In relation to the British fascist tradition,
“it is impossible to understand organised hostility to minority groups
without reference to wider cultural traditions in British society” (Kushner
and Lunn 1989: 5). And these cultural traditions need not be an epoch’s
‘big hitters’ and ‘leading lights”. Indeed, we could make a case that all
“cultural epochs depend on their backstage staff as much as their top
billers and it is often the lesser lights who contribute more fully to an
era’s Zeitgeist” (Bradshaw 2004: 145). This is because cultural and politi-
cal ‘leading lights’ are, necessarily, in some sense extraordinary; for an
1 | Notable exceptions are Pugh (2006) and Stone (2003), though Stone’s work fo-
cuses on British responses to Nazism from 1933, while the present chapter examines
texts published at the end of 1932.
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examination of the cultural and political assumptions of an epoch, it is
sometimes a good idea to try to seek out the sources that have somehow
fallen into the background. The newspaper Reality is exactly such a
source.
Britain
Cultural and Political Contexts
Like Stone (2002: 2), I am concerned to “challenge the view [. . . ] which
dismisses British fascism as a pale imitation of continental counter-
parts, and as an irrelevance in British political history”. Part of this
re-evaluation of the significance of fascism to British political, and cul-
tural, history, lies in showing that British fascism is not a mini-epochal
episode, limited to the years immediately prior to the Second World
War. In fact, in Britain, there are “well developed indigenous tradition
of ways of thinking, which, while they cannot be called ‘fascist’ [. . . ]
can certainly be called ‘proto-fascist”’ (Stone 2002: 2). For around forty
years before the First World War “the ideas that prepared the ground
for fascism were abundantly in evidence in British politics and society;
like other European countries Britain had a pre-fascist tradition” (Pugh
2006: 7). Mirroring fascist movements on mainland Europe, this British
pre-fascist tradition developed from movements of the radical right, and
drew their strength from sections of the British establishment. Largely a
loose coalition of middle and upper class ultra-conservatives, the beliefs
of the Edwardian radical right were shaped by a particular interpretation
of the ‘national interest’. They were angered by the erosion of aristo-
cratic government (and the enactment of the 1911 Parliament Act in
particular), dismayed by a widespread sense of Imperial decline (and a
corresponding desire to strengthen British Imperial power) and horrified
by increasing working class activism and enfranchisement. More specifi-
cally, “most of them supported tariff reform, compulsory military service,
an expansion of the army and navy [. . . ] an end to ‘alien’ immigration
and armed resistance to Home Rule in Ireland” (Thurlow 2006: 4). For
many on the right, motivated as it ostensibly was by “the aim of restoring
a sense of community, nationhood, kingship and hereditary leadership,
fascism presented itself as a return to English traditions, not as an alien
innovation” (Pugh 2006: 10).
In fact an opposition to ‘alien influence’ in British life was a central
rallying call of the British radical right from the beginnings of the Twen-
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tieth Century. 1901 saw the formation of The British Brothers League
(BBL), a ‘muscular Christian’ organization which, for the next 5 years,
conducted a very successful agitation against Jewish refugees fleeing
pogroms in Russia and Eastern Europe. At its height, the organization
had a membership of around 12,000, and presented a 45,000 signature
petition to parliament in 1902 demanding an end to immigration (Cohen
2006). Like later fascist parties, the stronghold of the BBL was in the East
of London, and they organised large public meetings and demonstra-
tions across Stepney, Shoreditch and Bethnal Green. At one meeting in
January 1902, over 4,000 supporters marched through Hackney, then
a significant Jewish community, holding a banner reading ‘Britain for
the British’ and accompanied by the beating of drums (Cohen 2006: 28).
And, in case the antisemitism of their provocation and intimidation were
not immediately apparent, speakers at the rally detailed an early version
of the antisemitic ‘Jewish world conspiracy theory” for the crowd: Arnold
White, a central member of the BBL, railed against “these great European
financiers [who] hold the fate of nations in the hollow of their hands and
are unanimously against any country” (Cohen 2006: 28).
The political lobbying of the BBL led eventually to the implementation
of the 1905 Aliens Act, the first piece of undeniably racist British legis-
lation, which based this racism on an economically based discourse in
support of native employment. This legislative success effectively pulled
the plug on the BBL, and membership took a steep decline. However
radical right agitation, in general, was in no way shrinking at this time.
By 1909, the Anti-Socialist Union was one of a whole slew of radical right-
ist organisations formed to reverse the hard-fought successes secured
by the labour movement. Immediately before, during and following the
First World War, additional ‘patriotic’ radical right groups were formed,
such as the National League for Clean Government, Henry Page Croft’s
National Party and H. Rider Haggard’s anti-Bolshevik, Liberty League.
By far the most significant of these was The Britons, formed in 1918 by
Henry Hamilton Beamish as a ‘patriotic’ organisation dedicated to the
eradication of ‘alien’—that is, Jewish—influences from British life. From
1922 The Britons acted as a publisher and clearing house for various
antisemitic books, such as The Protocols, and pamphlets including Jewry
Über Alles and The Hidden Hand, as did the Duke of Northumberland’s
Boswell Press, which published the newspaper The Patriot from 1922 to
1950.
Following the First World War, explicitly named fascist parties took up
the fight for “restrictions on ‘alien’ immigration, by which they usually
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meant Jewish immigration” (Lunn 1989: 150), with the British Fascists
using the slogan ‘Britain for the British’ in their 1925 Manifesto. Even-
tually, with the formation of the British Union of Fascists, launched in
October 1932 by Sir Oswald Mosley, Britain acquired a “mature form
of Fascist phenomenon” (Thurlow 1989: 92). In keeping with the stan-
dard duplicitous campaign strategy adopted by fascists elsewhere (c.f.
Mannheim 1960), Thurlow (2006: 62) argues that “from the beginning
the BUF exhibited a Janus-faced appearance: it was a movement which
was intellectually the most coherent and rational of all the fascist par-
ties in Europe in its early years, yet whose aggressive style and vigorous
self-defence attracted political violence”. It was a party that spoke, and
acted, in different ways according to who was being addressed: to the
left, Mosley emphasised the ‘revolutionary’ features of BUF political pro-
gramme, whilst to the right he emphasised authority, order and stability.
Political-philosophical arguments were employed to woo intellectual
recruits, whilst for Mosley’s ‘Biff Boys’, it was “the excitement and poten-
tial violence which the BUF seemed to offer which proved the biggest
recruiting spur” (Thurlow 2006: 67).
By the end of 1934 the BUF had consolidated a leadership cult centred
on a charismatic orator; a political programme that adopted the ‘cor-
porate state’ as its core economic policy; a paramilitary ‘defence’ force
who wore a blackshirt uniform and were billeted and trained at Black
House, at up to 200 men at a time; and employed extreme antisemitic
propaganda and violent agitation against Jewish businesses and com-
munities (Linehan 2000; Renton 1999; Williams 2007). In these ways,
the BUF exhibited many of the classic characteristics of an ‘authentic’
fascist party. Coupled with the substantial financial support received
from Mussolini (Baldoli 2003; Pugh 2006), the scale and professionalism
of party propaganda and the, at points, large number of party members,
the BUF was arguably the only fascist organisation “with any pretention
to significance in inter-war Britain” (Thurlow 2006: 61). However, as
Pugh (2006: 73) reminds us:
“Although none of them achieved a very large following, the emergence of the
British Fascists [in 1923] the National Fascisti [in 1924], the Imperial Fascist
League [in 1928] and the English Mistery [in 1930] reminds us that, well before
the emergence of Mosley’s much better-known organisation in 1932, Britain had
already generated an extensive range of experiments with fascist movements”.
Accordingly, Mosley should be viewed as the inheritor of an older reac-
tionary tradition in British politics, which he repackaged and ‘rebranded’
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as a ‘modern movement’. The sample of Reality examined in this chapter
was published immediately prior to, and concurrent with, this rebrand-
ing of British political reaction.
Reality
The Newspaper
Reality was printed by Nuneaton Newspapers LTD, for the proprietors
Richard Edmunds and R. H. Linton. Only the first 20 issues of the news-
paper appear to be extant—the first published on Saturday July 2nd, 1932,
running through to November 12th, 1932.2 Any reliable information
regarding the ownership and production of the newspaper has been im-
possible to come by: there is no record of the newspaper in Companies
House, West Midlands Newsplan, or Willing’s Press Guide, nor are there
entries for the proprietors in the biographical database of British journal-
ism, Scoop! The same is the case for the newspaper’s sale, distribution
and circulation—though, if the addresses on the letters to the editor can
be believed, Reality appears to have been distributed both across the
United Kingdom as well as in the Imperial Dominions. The reporting
themes and foci of the newspaper are squarely fixed on national and
international issues and events, particularly issues relating to the British
Empire. However, this chapter will concentrate on its reporting of do-
mestic politics. It is a professionally produced newspaper—there are
only a handful of typographical errors across the 20 issues; it includes
work from a number of correspondents, several of whom have a weekly
column, a cartoonist and two reviews editors (theatre and books), all
suggesting that it was a well resourced publication. In addition Reality al-
most definitely employed a production designer, given the development
of an increasingly sophisticated design aesthetic across the 5 months.
This chapter’s synoptic examination of Reality, picks out key ideolog-
ical and argumentative themes that relate to the development of the
British fascist tradition and its relations to wider cultural and political
contexts. However, it should be noted at the outset that Reality never
labelled itself as ‘fascist’—quite the contrary. On several occasions, ar-
ticles and editorials in the paper explicitly stated that the paper wasn’t
aligned with any particular party or ideology. Of course, as the work
of Billig (1978) and others have shown, this does mean that it wasn’t
fascist (see also: Copsey 2007, 2008; Nugent and King 1979; Richardson
2 | The British Library at Colindale also has only these same 20 Issues in its
archive (1932 LON 786; catalogue system number 013934956).
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2010; Richardson and Wodak 2009; Taylor 1979). However it does pose a
problem in identifying themes or arguments as ‘fascist’, or even ‘proto-
fascist’. This is because, as Renton (1999: 27) has noted, “many of the
[ideological] ideas that characterise fascism are not in themselves dis-
tinctive”. Indeed, “Many of the ideas of fascism are the commonplaces
of all reactionaries, but they are used in a different way” (Sparks, 1974:
16). As Billig (1978: 6) points out:
“It is possible to be a racist or an antisemite without necessarily being fascist [. . . ]
Similarly, fascism is not to be equated with traditionalism or arch-conservatism.
Conservatives might support fascist movements in the hope that a new fascist
state would be a reincarnation of past ideals. However, traditionalism is neither
a sufficient, or necessary, condition of fascism”.
Rather, fascism differs from the traditionalism or conservatism of con-
ventional right-wing parties “not so much in its ideas but in that it is
an extra-parliamentary mass movement which seeks the road to power
through armed attacks on its opponents” (Sparks 1974: 16). It is this
extra-parliamentary, or paramilitary, character of the fascist movement
that fascist ideologues have traditionally been careful of acknowledging
in print, and this is perhaps particularly the case for British variant, even
during the 1920s and 30s (Thurlow 2006). However, there is some evi-
dence, in the sample of the newspaper, of implicit support for violent
attacks on the political opponents of fascist regimes abroad—principally
on Communists—through the ways that such attacks are practically eu-
phemised out of existence. There are also some examples of writers in
Reality fantasising about, or proposing, that such attacks be emulated on
British soil. Such ambitions locate the ideological commitments of the
writers beyond the pale of (even radical) democratic political tradition
and, when coupled with further political assumptions and goals (c.f.
nationalism, anti-egalitarianism, anti-Marxism, statism and support for
the maintenance of capitalism), implicitly ally the text to a fascist politi-
cal programme. Accordingly, the following examination of newspaper
Reality is structured across three sections:
• texts which indicate an ideological commitment to radical right-
wing politics;
• texts which reveal ‘proto-fascist’ ideological sympathies;
• texts which imply fascist sympathies.
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The distinction between proto-fascism and fascism proper is often diffi-
cult to draw. To an extent, the whole notion of a proto-fascism is based
on ‘foreshadowing’, an analytic failing in which the past is read from the
standpoint of what followed (Bernstein 1994; also see: Stone 2003). After
all, what is typically assumed to make an idea, argument or movement
‘proto-fascist’ rather than ‘simply’ radical right-wing, is that this idea
(and so on) provided the ideological groundwork for a subsequent fascist
movement. Here, I use the term slightly differently: a text was taken to
indicate an ideological commitment to radical right-wing politics if it in-
cluded a constellation of ideas or arguments typical of such a movement
at this time. Thus, a commitment to eugenics may not, in and of itself,
be sufficient to ally the writer to radical right-wing politics; however,
a commitment to eugenics and Imperialism, or eugenics and a rigid
adherence to class hierarchy, invariably would (see: Stone 2001). On the
other hand, a text was considered to reveal ‘proto-fascist’ ideological
sympathies if it advocated policies, and not simply ideas, typical of fas-
cist parties (e.g. the corporative state), but did so within the bounds of
democratic discourse. Finally, a text was considered to indicate fascist
sympathies if it advanced either ideas or arguments typical of fascist
argumentation, or advocated policies typical of fascist parties, and did
so in such a way that entailed violence or a direct threat to democracy
and personal freedom.
Radical Right-Wing
Radical right-wing ideological texts in Reality were dominated by a con-
stellation of themes which branched off a central belief, and argument,
for the inequality of humans. In other words, they presupposed, or
explicitly advanced, arguments that a hierarchy exists which innately
places some human groups above others, thereby granting the ‘superior
humans’ a hereditary right to rule. From that key bedrock assumption,
there are further more detailed and specific arguments: that some peo-
ples are too stupid to be allowed to govern themselves, or even to vote;
support for Imperialism and for the British Empire as a civilising project;
a belief in biological heredity and a support for eugenics (and what we
could euphemistically call ‘selective breeding’); for racism, of both the
cultural and biological kinds; and for antisemitism.
Each of the newspaper’s bedrock radical right themes were expressed
and discussed in a variety of ways, often combining two or more ar-
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Figure 1: Radical right-wing ideological themes
guments. Some of the more striking arguments are, understandably,
the more extreme examples. For instance, Issue 7 (August 13th, 1932)
includes a remarkably racist article on Australian Aboriginal cannibals,
whom the text refers to as Australia’s most primitive savages. First, in
an implicit indexing of the policy of the lost generation, this article sug-
gests that such Aboriginal children should be taken from their parents
for their own protection. And, in case the eugenicist aims of this are
missed, the text ends by stating that there is “no hope for the ‘abo’ in
European civilisation. Only with the total disappearance of the race will
such ghastly horrors die out”. However, the presuppositions in the more
throw-away comments are no less revealing. For example, the ‘Books
of the Week’ feature in Issue 17 (October 22nd, 1932) includes a review
of Evelyn Waugh’s book ‘Black Mischief’, which the reviewer describes
as “a brilliant show up of the British weakness for teaching backward
coloured races how to govern themselves”.
The argumentation included in domestic reporting also reveals the
arch-conservatism of the newspaper, at a time when political elites were
still reeling following the enfranchisement of millions of working class
and female voters in 1918, and had woken up “to the realisation that
[their] grip on power had suddenly become greatly imperilled” (Pugh
2006: 30). Pugh (2006: 30) points out that, for conservative critics and
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commentators, this new electorate—now totalling over 21 million, up
from merely 8 million before the war—“posed a threat by virtue of the
social class, gender and even age of the new voters. [. . . ] They depicted
democracy as dangerous and perverse because it handed power to the
least able”. Such views were not only the preserve of the radical fringe,
but also advanced bymainstreamand establishment figures. An editorial
in Lord Rothermere’s Daily Mail (April 7th, 1927), for example, argued
“quite a large number of people now possess the vote who ought never
have been given it”.
The class composition of the new electorate was a matter of particular
concern, given the 1917 October Revolution in Russia, economic de-
pression, labour militancy and fears that the British working class were
susceptible to Communist influence. In the pages of Reality, this fear
frequently translated into aggressive negative stereotyping of the work-
ing class as feckless, self-interested and “Hoodwinked” by Union leaders
so ignorant of the proper workings of the world, that their new-found
power had a potentially destabilising influence on the Nation. For exam-
ple, one front page editorial argued “A situation exists to-day which is
definitely dangerous. The murmurings of the multitude can be heard by
anyone who has the desire to listen, and these rumblings of discontent
can be directly traceable to the underhand methods of unscrupulous
agitators” (The employer and the man, July 30th, 1932: 1). Another par-
ticularly virulent anti-working class article (Hope for the Welsh Coal
Industry, October 22nd, 1932: 4) employs fantasies of working class op-
ulence and decadent consumption as part of its elitist, anti-union and
anti-Marxist argumentation. The report sets up this criticism by first
detailing the development of the Welsh coal industry, and that “Local
mine owners took pride in the fact that Welsh steam coal was the finest
obtainable”. Unfortunately, with this success “came the shadow of the
Unions”—“Dangerous iconoclasts” imbued “with Karl Marx doctrines”.
Instead of meeting “in common with their masters, the repercussions of
trade stagnation” (emphasis added), these Union “leaders merely sought
the limelight and were more interested in bringing the world, including
the hated bosses, to a common level of poverty rather than of prosperity”.
The workers, meanwhile, are represented as constituted, predominantly,
by the least worthy human beings—the best of the working class having
perished in the Great War:
“With their passing, the scumof other industrial areas, whopreferred to dig rather
than to fight, invaded the fields and displaced those who had left. [. . . ] Money
flowed into the homes, but all too often was it expended upon articles of value.
[. . . ] Champagne displaced beer as the best form of liquid refreshment, while
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many women with surplus pounds in their pockets, in their pathetic uneducated
snobbery, covered their perfectly sound teeth with gold”.
No doubt a great deal of this vitriol directed towards miners, and coal
mining communities more generally, was due to their central role in
industrial disputes over the previous ten years—specifically the ‘Triple
Alliance’ of miners, railway and transport workers unions in 1921 and
the General Strike in 1926, which brought the country to a standstill, due
to solidarity and widespread support from working class communities
(Pugh 2006). The strike officially only lasted nine days, however the
miners held out for another 6 months, cementing their reputation for
provocative industrial action. Disparaging the miners in this way—by
casting doubts on their patriotism, accusing them of cowardice and im-
plying they had personally profited from the War—is clearly intended
to undermine any lingering sense of sympathy that the reader of Re-
ality may feel towards them. Coincidentally, on page 7 of this same
issue, there featured an article extolling the virtues of Champagne—a
“favourite drink of Popes and Kings”, which “still holds its place as one of
the most delectable drinks the world knows” (The Wines of Champagne,
October 22nd, 1932: 7). Drunk by “Byron, Moore and Rogers”, “the wit of
Sheridan and Curran was often quickened by France’s supreme wine”,
Champagne “is consumed throughout the world”. Though if you are a
miner in South Wales and you drink it, you should expect to be attacked
in print.
Proto-Fascism
Standing between these articles, and those we can more confidently
ascribe the label ‘fascist’, are texts which appear to advance a embry-
onic argument in favour of a Corporate/Corporative State. In these
articles, class distinctions are acknowledged, but only in order to try to
demonstrate that both employer and worker share a common interest—
the maintenance of capitalism. Industrial relations are also discussed
with reference to these two political-economic groups—employer and
worker—but in a way that individualises, and reduces the wage relation
to that of contract and wage. In the paper’s account, the Unions are
almost universally cast as a dangerous and undesirable influence on an
easily led mass—they are “fanatic”, “hysterical” and “aggressive” and a
“pernicious influence on the honest but simple-minded man” because
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their approach is apparently against the interests of workers (The em-
ployer and the man, July 30th, 1932: 1). Further, “because of the credulity
of their listeners, we must recognise these lizards to be a menace to
industrial peace.” The foundation of this industrial peace, accordingly,
lies not in “fostering class distinction by continually sectionalising Soci-
ety into WORKERS and BOSSES”, but rather in Trade Unions “creating
constructive proposals, whereby their members could, by enthusiasm
and co-operation, become managerially and financially interested in the
undertakings in which they are employed”. What is needed, the editorial
concludes, is a situation where “employer and employee get together
and solve the problem of their own business [. . . ] then we shall see the
dawn of a new era, in which BOSSES and WORKERS exist no more, but
everyone labours in a cause common to all; that of the betterment of the
Nation”.
Similarly, the front-page editorial in Issue 9 opens by noting that
the on-going Weavers dispute in Lancashire “brings one to sympathise
wholeheartedly with the capitalist outlook” (Wage cuts and dividends,
August 27th, 1932: 1). Despite the cotton industry being “admirably
equipped, scientifically and mechanically”, the Unions “have attempted
to dominate industry, and by so doing have strangled capitalist en-
terprise”. They create “havoc” through their self-interest and lack of
foresight—but then this editorial goes on to acknowledge “the other
side of the picture”. In order to maintain “paying dividends of 15 per
cent” during the economic depression, “some firms” cut their “wage bills,
amounting often to many thousands of pounds, which amply repays
their loss of turnover”. This bourgeois understanding of the zero-sum
game between wages and profits is illustrated by a cartoon accompa-
nying the text: a fat, Top-Hatted capitalist pictured on one side of the
image celebrating a 20 per cent dividend, and a Bowler-Hatted white
collar worker on the other holding the notification of his 10 per cent
wage cut.
The editorial concludes with a judgment and gentle proposal for
change: “It is successful businesses such as these, which enforce wage
cuts to keep up dividends, that are a discredit to the Capitalist system.
Capital, Labour. On both sides of the fence there is drastic need for
reform”. So, while vitriol is heaped onto the denunciation of Unions, any
similar argumentative strength is lacking when criticising such employ-
ers, and certainly not the imperatives of capitalism that structure such
unscrupulous profiteering. In fact, while such unprincipled businesses
are a “discredit” to the system, they are still described as “successful”,
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which does raise the question why they would agree to any reform—even
reform of the indefinite kind proposed in this article.
Political Antisemitism
Whilst these texts do appear to owe some debt to Fascist political-
economic theory, particularly the Italian ‘Corporate State’, they are
not explicitly aligned with or identified as fascist. As suggested earlier
in the chapter, antisemitism is also not distinctively fascist. However,
political antisemitism—proposing political or economic policy based on
antisemitic ideas, arguments or theories — is nevertheless closely allied
with British fascism, being a key feature of anti-alien, anti-Bolshevik
campaigning since the early 1920s and the central component of the
racial fascism of Arnold Leese and the Imperial Fascist League.
Several articles draw, in a casual way, on antisemitic assumptions. For
example, a book review of Leah’s Lover, suggests the plot of the book
“Deals with the age old problem of love between a Jew and a Gentile”, and
that the lead character Leah has a “quick brain and grasp of business,
inherited from her Jewish forefathers” (The best of the books, July 16th,
1932: 10). Drawing on a similar antisemitic trope, Arthur Harrington
wrote an article for Issue 10 on “Schemes of the Moneylender” which,
“for the sake of argument”, proposed a hypothetical example of “a pro-
fessional usurer” called Mr Abel who lends Mr Smith money and “sucks
the latter dry”; it also claims that dock districts of London, Liverpool
and Hull are home to female moneylenders, labelled “the female shy-
lock” (“Come into my parlour”, September 3rd 1932: 2). The front-page
editorial of Issue 14, (War and Our Imperial Destiny, October 1st, 1932: 1)
also includes a startling antisemitic aside. The editorial itself is based
on two observations and a resolving argument: first, that the League of
Nations is dead in the water; second, that war clouds continue to gather
in Germany, Italy and Japan; but, thirdly, that English speaking nations
can take the place of the League of Nations if “we can extend the spirit
of the two minutes silence [of Armistice Day] to our ordinary life and
make the horrors of another World war and its inevitable repercussions
apparent to all”. In this regard, the sentiment, if not the logic, of the
editorial is admirable. However, near the bottom of the first column is a
section which reads:
“SEMITIC USURERS
In far off New Zealand is a peace-loving pastoral community striving, in spite of
the stranglehold of semitic London usurers, to make of these chaotic post war
years a period of prosperity”.
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Nowhere else does this antisemitic stereotype figure in the article, and
even here the stereotype doesn’t contribute to the argument about cele-
brating Armistice Day across the Empire. This, perhaps more than any
other article, indicates the extent to which antisemitism, at least to some
people, was an everyday, knee-jerk response—an always-present, to be
called on in this casual, off hand way.
This antisemitism received a full-page treatment 3 issues later, where
the paper decried the Jewish menace to industry—the industry, in this
case, being furniture production (October 22nd 1932: 1). The essence
of the argument is provided near the end of the report: “The Jews are
dominating one of our finest industries. They are ruining our great
traditions of the past, and turning a great craft solely to commercial
gain”. In more detail, the author Richard Edmonds argues that the hire
purchase system, and the manufacture and marketing of furniture to
“those of slender means”
“[. . . ] has presented an opportunity for the very worst types of business men to
corner a trade for which neither their mental nor cultural upbringing has ever
fitted them. I mean by this the bulk of the Jewish population in the East End of
London. Drawn from all over Central Europe, in many instances the very dregs
of a race which in other fields can point with pride to its achievements [. . . They
are] cut price semites, employers of sweated labour, who make for the Gentile
business an economic impossibility. [. . . ] Business morality among these people
finds no place. A British code of honesty in no way binds them down. Rather it is
their advantage”.
This text trades on familiar antisemitic topoi: the Jews as a ‘race’, Jews
and economic exploitation (particularly the exploitation of Gentiles),
Jews and shoddy work, Jews and criminality, and so on, as part of an
argument that can only be seen as part of a wider vilification of Jewish
communities (predominantly, though not solely, refugees) in London’s
East End. It also utilises arguments frequently used in contemporary
reactionary discourse (and not solely of the far-right): the valorisation of
craft production, taking jobs that belong to ’Us’, and our tolerance and
“code of honesty” being used as weapons against us.
The following issue of the newspaper published four lengthy letters
from British Jews complaining about the editorial’s antisemitism (Mr
Lazarus wants an apology, October 29th, 1932: 3). One of these letters ar-
gued that Edmonds “obviously suffers from a very severe attack of racial
prejudice” whilst another picked up on the intersections of antisemitism
and class prejudice in the editorial: “It is not usual for our critics to
attack only East End Jewry and refer to these Jews as being a different
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people from those who live in the West End [. . . ] Well, sir, if you attack
the bulk of the Jewish population of the East End of London, you attack
world Jewry—Jews rich and poor—old and young”. However, providing
Jews (and only Jews) with a right of reply is used by the newspapers
as an opportunity to further drive a rhetorical wedge between Jew and
Gentile—between what they think (and do) and what we know:
“[. . . ] many manufacturers both in High Wycombe and London have congratu-
lated us upon the truth of our remarks. From the Jewish element, however, we
have received numerous criticisms, all of a somewhat wild nature [. . . ] It is an
extraordinary thing that whenever an attack is made on any section of the Jewish
community, members of the race invariably rise in defence of what in their own
minds they appear to consider as a general indictment against the people as a
whole. [. . .We] regret that Jewish readers should have so distorted in their minds
what was after all a perfectly fair and honest criticism”.
This argument—printed prior to, and therefore prefacing the letters—
shifts Reality’s standpoint in a straight-forwardly fallacious way: the
original argument was clearly directed against Jewish furniture makers,
who, by virtue of their Jewishness, were producing poor quality, cheap
furniture and pricing English artisan producers out the market. The
critical letters did not take the newspaper to task for a fallacious part-for-
whole argument, arguing it was unfair to tar all Jewish furniture makers
with the brush of a few ‘sheisters’; rather, they responded critically to the
fallacious (and indeed antisemitic) whole-for-part argument regarding
the degenerate Jewishness of Jewish furniture makers.
(Sympathising with) Fascism
The British Union of Fascists was launched at the start of October
1932 and, coincidentally perhaps, from Issue 14 (October 1st, 1932—
containing the front-page editorial War and our imperial destiny, above)
there is a noticeable change in the tone and ideological alignment of the
paper. Across the sample as a whole there is a subordinate discourse
praising the achievements of Italian fascism, however nearer the start
of the sample such comments are brief, unelaborated and uttered sotto
voce. For example, in Issue 4, Mussolini is described as acting with “more
than a little sound reasoning”. “Perhaps”, the article continues, “Signor
Mussolini recognises that no lasting good for Italy can come of his dom-
ination, unless he trains the men to carry on the work he has so ably
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begun”. The nature of “the work”, and the manner in which it was ‘carried
out’, are notable for their absence. In Issue 7, a hagiography of Signor
Dino Grandi (the then-Italian ambassador to London) praises him as
“a vigorous fighter of Socialism and Communism”; in contrast these
political opponents of fascism are described as “a destructive mob”. The
upshot of such comments, is that the systematic violence used against
the political opponents of Fascism is either ignored or euphemised to
such a point that it amounts to tacit support.
From the start of October, longer compliments and comments were of-
fered regarding the virtues of Fascism. Issue 14 itself states “Italy, in spite
of a World depression, is riding the crest of a wave of national confidence.
Mussolini has given the people a new virility, sooner or later it must find
expression” (War and our imperial destiny, October 1st, 1932). In Issue 20,
a full page article headlined Mussolini and the making of Modern Italy:
Ten years of progress (November 12th, 1932: 5), heaps praise upon praise
on 10 years of Mussolini’s fascist government—a government whose first
achievement, the text reminds us, was defeating Communism. It reads:
“Ten years ago Communism was rife throughout Italy. Many prophe-
sied an upheaval such as had taken place in Russia. That danger was
scotched. Mussolini gave Italy a new soul”. ‘Scotching’ Communists in
the UK also appear to be an ambition of the newspaper. It is argued for
in several articles in this later period of the sample, and fantasised about
in this cartoon of John Bull—the conservative national personification
of the United Kingdom—as a policeman, striking a Union leader with a
truncheon (see: Figure 2).
The cartoon relates to the National Hunger March of September—
October 1932, which arrived at Hyde Park on October 27th. The spectre
of the threat of Communism looms large in Reality’s account of the
march, and perhaps for good reason.3 The march, which was organised
by the National Unemployed Workers Movement (a front organisation
created by the Communist Party of Great Britain), attracted the largest
support for any of the hunger marches staged during the 1920s and
30s. Despite receiving very little attention from news media on their
way to London, the marchers were joined in Hyde Park by a crowd of
around 100,000 supporters (Cronin 1984). Their arrival in the capital was
met with “an almost blanket condemnation as a threat to public order,
verging upon the hysterical in the case of some of the more conservative
3 | The column Seen, Said and Done by Pall Mall in this same issue argues:
“The riots in London are symptoms of the undertow of Communism, which is far more
menacing than is generally realised” (October 29th, 1932).
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Figure 2: John Bull “speaks” with violence
Source: Reality, October 29th, 1932: 3.
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press” (Stephenson and Cook 1979: 173), in addition to the Metropolitan
Police’s “most intensive public order precautions since 1848” (Thurlow
2006: 63). The Union leader in the cartoon—having dropped his flag
declaring that he is a “Red”—is criticised by John Bull in familiar terms
for the newspaper: he has “never done any work” (rather ironic, given
that this was a National Unemployed Workers Movement), that he “only
seek[s] the limelight” and is the first to run away when it comes to “a real
fight”. The newspaper, on the other hand, appears to be itching for such
a fight.
The launch of the BUF was greeted with a cautious optimism by the
newspaper. On October 29th they gave their front-page editorial to dis-
cussing the policies of the new party, in a text that seems designed to
reassure the reader (Mosley and the future of fascism: Some sound points
in the new Party’s policy, October 29th, 1932: 1) . The editorial is compli-
mentary about Mosley in populist, anti-establishment, terms, arguing:
“none could accuse him of licking the boots of those in superior political
positions with a view to ensuring his own personal advancement”. As
the lead paragraph states: “A great deal of nonsense has been talked
regarding the British Fascists. They have been accused of bellicose na-
tionalism, indicted as revolutionaries, and have been attacked by the
Jews for anti-semiticism [sic]. In an interview with Mr Patrick Moir, a
leader of the party, he has informed us of the lack of truth in these ru-
mours”. The article itself then picks up on these points and reiterates
that they’re false—usually formulated as apparent disclaimers, using
words like ‘although’. For example:
“Although members of the party have come to blows with the Jewish element, Sir
Oswald has definitely stated that his intentions are not in any way anti-semitic”.
These manoeuvres are labelled ‘apparent’ disclaimers because the
structure of their discourse is such that the ostensible function of the
utterance—conceding a point, emoting empathy, and so on—is im-
mediately flouted by the accompanying clauses (van Dijk et al. 1997:
170). Such disclaimers are used by participants “in an effort to forestall
negative inferences by others, and to project an image of rationality,
objectivity and fairness” (Kleiner 1998: 206)—and in this case, to claim
that the party does not harbour antisemitic intentions, even while ac-
knowledging antisemitic violence. As a part of this reassurance, the
article equivocates the political end goals of the party, stating: “In their
political programme, the primary object of the party is the reorganisa-
tion of Parliamentary Representation”—not the abolition of Parliament,
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Figure 3: “Mosley and the future of fascism”
Source: Reality, October 29th, 1932.
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which Mosley argued for quite openly in his own books. This duplici-
tous strategy mirrored that of the German Nazi Party, in that they chose
to present themselves “as a virile fighting force ready to respond to a
national emergency while also insisting on their intention to acquire
power by institutional means” (Pugh 2006: 73). This virility is indexed
in this article by the phalanx of marching Blackshirts streaming past
the observer, and off into the distance on the right of the cartoon. The
final line of the article picks up on this fig leaf political reasonableness,
using a form of expression which is quintessentially of its time: “It is no
revolutionary policy, and although open in many of its views to consid-
erable argument, may be said, as far as it goes, to be well balanced and
constructive. We shall watch its future with more than ordinary interest”.
Dreaming of a Pogrom
he clearest indication of the hardening ideological line of the paper,
towards the end of the 20-issue sample Reality published texts contem-
plating violence against British Jews. Issue 15, printed a week after the
launch of the BUF, included an article headlined Jews and Fascists report-
ing the “Fascist campaign in Great Britain, heralded by the publication
last week of ‘The Greater Britain’ [. . . ] is now being extended from Lon-
don by the formation of bands of ‘storm troops” in towns throughout the
country” (October 8th, 1932: 5). The report explicitly states “most of his
blackshirts have adopted an anti-Semitic attitude [. . . ] that Jewry exer-
cises too great an influence in British and Imperial affairs”. Rather than
criticising or contradicting this point, the newspaper instead confirms it,
arguing: “Few will deny that Jewish financial interests are as powerful
in Britain today as they ever have been”. The report also approvingly
quotes Mosley’s book The Greater Britain where “he himself has some-
thing to say about ‘money power’. ‘At present we have within the nation
an influence, largely controlled by alien interests, which arrogates itself a
power above the Press”’. The text ends with the rather pregnant remark,
couched in bourgeois nicety:
“Will the launching of a Fascist campaign result in a wave of anti-Semitic feeling
throughout the Empire, such as Germany has experienced under the Hitlerites?
Tolerance towards the Jews has been the policy of England since Charles II’s time.
Within the next few months the public may be called upon to decide whether
that policy it to be continued”.
A couple of other articles were far less equivocal in arguing that the
time has come to do something about the Jews. In one article, Reality
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questions the belief of “self-complacent democrats” that “a movement
like Hitler’s is impossible in this country” (“Gentiles Only”, November
5th, 1932: 13). Quoting eight accommodation adverts stipulating “Gen-
tiles only” and “No Jews”, from one page of the Hackney and Kings-
land Gazette, the newspaper recommends “It would probably pay the
British Union of Fascists to go on a recruiting expedition round these
districts”. The front page editorial on the Jewish menace to the furni-
ture industry (October 22nd, 1932) provoked a significant response from
letter writers—the four critical letters referred to above were followed
by two letters praising their position (Vox Pop, November 5th, 1932: 5).
Together, the two letters are a textbook case of the contradictions typical
of antisemitic discourse: “the Jew” in these texts—echoing Der Jude of
Germanic discourse—is simultaneously a wealthy usurer and the “poor
unshorn and unsavoury children of the Ghetto” whose “presence is of-
ten a menace and an injury to the English working classes” (Silberner
1952: 40-41). Thus, the second letter railed against “the foreign Jew”
who, wherever they go in London, “the neighbourhood soon looks dilapi-
dated and wretched”. The first provides a more detailed, and threatening,
complaint:
“Having come in contact in business with hundreds of Jews in London, and know-
ing full well the conditions in which they work their employees, it is no wonder
that they can turn out the cheap shoddy products which we find displayed in
several retail shops in different parts of the country. [. . . ] I happened to be on
a stand at the Radio Exhibition this year, and listened to the tales of woe from
hundreds of radio retailers and factors and heard the expression used, ‘If only
England had a Hitler’ to clear some of the Jewish parasites out of the country.
[emphasis added]”.
The final line of this extract is startling, particularly given the date it
was written. Published almost three months before Hitler was made
Chancellor and significantly ahead of either Dugdale’s abridged English
translation of Mein Kampf (October 1933) or the serialisation of Mein
Kampf in The Times (July 24-28 1933), which helped bring Nazi ideology
into the popular British consciousness, this letter writer was suitably
informed to predict the planned Nazi Judenrein. But more than this,
the editors of the newspaper also recognised this prediction as accurate,
or perhaps convincing—otherwise the letter is unlikely to have been
published. Such an observation almost renders ‘foreshadowing’ an ac-
ceptable analytic position in this case: certainly, we could not suggest
that the writers, and editors, of this newspaper were aware of the full
implications of the Nazi’s ‘final solution’. However, they were at least fa-
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miliar with the Nazi’s violent antisemitism—and were content to publish
this letter calling for similar course of action in the UK.
Discussion
Throughout the sample, Reality frequently drew on, and emphasised,
a number of key ideological assumptions and arguments. The central
argumentative theme was the inborn inequality of human beings—that
personal and social characteristics derive from biological inheritance
with certain personal/social/biological characteristics being judged to
be more or less valuable. The most popular sub-variant of this heredity-
as-hierarchy dealt with ‘race’, ‘racial’ difference and its presumed import
for culture and civilisation. Such ideological arguments were typically
realized in, and through, articles on the Empire and Britain”s Imperial
Dominions: articles on particular people who played an influential role
in the formation and success of the Empire (at least, the success for
Us!); of a detailed preoccupation with the British Empire Economic
Conference that took place in Ottawa in 1932; and of apocryphal tales of
good, stout Indians who gave their lives for civilisation, protecting their
Imperial Masters (and white women) at the Northern frontier. Some of
these stories ennoble ‘the Indian’ to a degree that contradicts the racism
contained elsewhere in the paper—though, it should go without saying
that this human value is contingent on their continued sacrifice in the
service of (our) King and Country.
That said, the political content of the newspaper did change over
the 20 issues in this sample. Broadly speaking, towards the start of the
sample, articles tend to focus more on discussing ‘the problem’—in
criticising the ‘feeble minded’ and identifying a range of economic and
political problems that Britain currently faced. Later, there is a partial
shift towards offering an explanation and a solution to these problems:
the explanation centred on the influence of disruptive political and
economic elements. Domestically this was Communists and the Unions;
in Ireland it was very definitely Eamon De Valera and Irish Republicans;
in India it was Gandhi and ‘Indian agitators’. The newspaper’s solution is
couched in terms of ‘common sense’, which initially centred on greater
cooperation between worker and employer; in the final 5 issues, this
shifted, and appeared to rest with the policies of the BUF which had,
apparently, already been successfully road tested in Italy. Unfortunately
the sample ends before we can really see if this allegiance becomes more
269
John Richardson
firmly established, and the newspaper moves more fully and consistently
from the politics of the radical right and towards fascism. However, Issue
20 there featured an article written by Patrick Moir, described again as
a leader of the party. Here, he is given a quarter page to advance the
BUF view on the employment and current exploitation of youth. This,
the growing acceptance of the utility of political antisemitism and the
increasing number of complimentary articles about Mussolini’s Italy,
signal this growing convergence of the paper with fascist politics.
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Uneasy Communication in the Authoritarian State
The Case of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Kyrgyzstan
IRINA WOLF
Introduction
This article partly draws on the preliminary findings of the project on
coverage of Hizb ut-Tahrir organization (further HT) in British, German
and Kyrgyz quality newspapers in 2002-2007, and partly on findings
of the research thoroughly presented elsewhere (Wolf 2006), which at-
tempted to analyze the coverage of HT in Vechernii Bishkek (further
VB) during 2001-2005. The aim is to illustrate who gets to speak on the
pages of VB, private yet not independent national Kyrgyz daily, about
the controversial organization; what kind of message the general public
received about HT from this progovernment newspaper in critical for
Kyrgyzstan time; and, to compare and contrast how the same event—a
series of suicide bombings in Uzbekistan in 2004 allegedly committed
by HT—was covered in VB, the British daily The Times, and the German
daily Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (further FAZ). Since in Great Britain
HT operates legally, as of this writing, and in Germany and Kyrgyzstan
the group is prohibited since 2003 it would be crucial to establish how
the same event was covered in democratic and nondemocratic societies
with different legal status of HT.
For better understanding of aims and findings of the research I first
provide a short introduction to the Kyrgyz press, HT in general and HT
in Central Asia in particular. Then I explain methodology of research
that included quantitative and qualitative methods of media content
analysis as well as interviews of four VB journalists. Finally, I provide
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findings pertaining to coverage of HT in VB in 2002-2005; illustrate the
differences on how terrorist acts in Uzbekistan were covered in three
countries; and, argue that reflection of government position on HT and
related matters in its coverage in the Kyrgyz daily is a clear indication of
how the authoritarian state exercises its power in determining what the
general public would know about the controversial organization and how
journalists are constrained by the state and practices of selfcensorship.
On the Kyrgyz Press
After gaining its independence in 1991, Kyrgyzstan showed signs of open-
ing up its political and economic spheres after 70 years of a totalitar-
ian Soviet rule and, unlike other Central Asian states, was called “the
island of democracy” (Anderson 1999). The illusion of democratic de-
velopment lasted not long and in 1999 Kyrgyzstan entered the zone
of “semi-consolidated autocracy” slowly moving towards “consolidated
autocracy” (Freedom House cited in: Kulikova 2001: 45). In 2008, accord-
ing to the Freedom House rating with 1 representing the highest level
of democratic progress and 7 the lowest, Kyrgyzstan”s democracy score
was 5.93, which was very close to the score of Russia (5.96) (Freedom
House 2008). For a number of scholars Kyrgyzstan also remains to be
the authoritarian state with the authoritarian media system (Chalaby
2009; McGlinchey 2009; Schatz 2006; Gunn 2003).
Since 1991 the Kyrgyz media have undergone many important trans-
formations, but they are still far from playing a role of a fourth estate
as they should in a democratic state. Thus, the number of regularly
published newspapers grew from 50 in 1991 to roughly 250 in 2007 with
about 1000 being officially registered (Public Association “Journalists"
2008: 18); the monopoly of the only printing house inherited from the
Soviet Union was shattered by establishment of a competitive printing
house by Freedom House in 2003; the development of internet allowed
reaching out audiences and effectively shaping public opinions to the
extent of triggering mass discontents (Kulikova and Perlmutter 2007);
finally, in May 2007 the government gave up the direct ownership of the
public television as well as some media outlets. At the same time as
Manzella and Yacher (2005, 439) put it:
“the news media of the Kyrgyz Republic [. . . ] has yet to reaggregate fully into the
current social system and has yet to become fully a member of the culture of the
Western press [. . . ] Trapped as it is within the second stage of a rite of passage,
the Kyrgyz Republic media’s liminality is manifested by the lack of unified notion,
or definition, of what news is, or at least what it should be”.
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To understand media markets in the post-Soviet Central Asia, it is crucial
to highlight the differences between ‘independent”, ‘privately owned’
and ‘oppositional’ media players in the region. As Allison puts it:
“While many newspapers and media are privately owned, few are independent.
The term ‘independent’ connotes a freedom of thought or lack of bias difficult
to find in Central Asia, as media-outlets are extremely pro-governmental be-
cause their owners are members of the ruling elite. However, there are several
oppositional media outlets in each country, and many of these are owned by
oppositional politicians; thus, while their content is not progovernmental, the
journalists are still propagandistic tools of certain political figures” (Krimsky
cited in: Allison 2006: 94).
Gross and Kenny (2008) also support this argument:
“In Western journalism, ‘independence’ means that news outlets are free from
political, financial, or governmental interference [. . . ] In Central Asia, however,
an ‘independent newspaper’ is often confused with an ‘anti-government press’.
That is, to be seen as independent a news outlet often believes it must be viewed
as opposed to the ruling government, whatever its policies” (Gross and Kenny
2008, 56).
Thus, media coverage of any issue in Kyrgyzstan remains highly partisan
and increasingly sensationalist in nature with the oppositional newspa-
pers practicing what the Western press would regard as “advocacy-style
journalism” (Manzella and Yacher 2005: 433); journalists are known “for
writing stories that help their publication owners settle political scores”
(Kenny and Gross 2008: 521).
The hurdles that media face in Kyrgyzstan from the state include com-
plicated media registration and frequency licensing, censorship and
difficult access to information, often persecution for libel and defama-
tion, high taxes, etc. (Allison 2005). The situation is further exacerbated
by the low professionalism of journalists and media managers, which
has decreased since Soviet times notwithstanding the fact that Europe
and the USA spent millions of dollars “in the hopes of developing a
Western-style press in Central Asia” (Kenny and Gross 2008: 516). The
reasons for that are numerous. Freedman and Chang (2007: 358) high-
light “governmental restrains and self-censorship [. . . ] scarce resources
for independent news organizations; low salaries for journalists and
teachers of journalism; lack of media independence; low public trust
in the integrity of the media; lack of public expectations of fairness,
accuracy and balance; inadequate training; and the lingering adverse
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impacts of the Soviet model of journalism practice.” Kenny and Gross
(Kenny and Gross 2008: 517) add: “it is not authoritarian governments
alone that thwart Central Asian journalists, however. Region-wide so-
cial norms, based on the traditions of clan and family, urge reporters
toward avoiding the critical, nosy behaviour of a journalism grounded in
democracy’s public accountability. The upshot is simple, if not disturb-
ing: Journalism, the handmaiden and facilitator of Western democracy,
is languishing badly in Central Asia”. Finally, as Allison (2006: 106-107)
observes:
“Journalists play into authorities’ hands by not following laws [. . . ] Journalists
are sometimes careless, sometimes intentional in their legal infractions [. . . ] tax
evasion is rampant [. . . ] Journalists’ materials are frequently libelous by Western
standards; frequently lacking facts, they would not stand up in Western courts
any more than they do in Central Asia [. . . ] editors and journalists often violate
international codes of journalism ethics by taking paid articles, also called ‘PR’
or ‘ordered’ articles”.
Having shortly introduced Kyrgyzstan, the Kyrgyz media market and
hardships that the journalists face in Kyrgyzstan I would like to proceed
to introducing Hizb ut-Tahrir.
On Hizb Ut-Tahrir Al Islami
“Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami”, translated from Arabic, means the “Party of
Islamic Liberation”. A plenty of research papers, articles, reports and
books have been written on this organization. Those of International
Crisis Group (2002; 2003a; 2003b; 2009), Baran (2004a; 2004b; 2006),
Karagianis (2005; 2006a; 2006b; 2007), Maliach (2006a; 2006b), Bakker
(2007), Morgan (2007; 2008), Mayer (2004), Siddiqui (2004), Khamidov
(2003) are just a small selection of works available to the English speaking
community.
In short, HT is a radical Islamist organization or, in their own words,
“a political party with Islam as its ideology” (Taquiddin 1999, 23). It was
founded in the Jordanian-ruled East Jerusalem suburb in 1952 by Sheikh
Taqiuddin al-Nabhani (1909-1977), the Palestinian Islamic legal scholar
and political activist, with the aim to liberate Palestine and to re-institute
the Islamic Caliphate that was destroyed by Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) in
1924. While it is estimated that HT operates secretly in around 45 coun-
tries (Morgan 2007; Langkjer 2006), it has been banned as an extremist
organization in countries throughout Europe (Germany and Nether-
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lands), Central Asia (Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and
Turkmenistan), Middle East (Jordan, Syria, Egypt), South Asia (India and
Pakistan), Northern Africa (Tunisia and Libya) and in Turkey. In Tajik-
istan and Russia HT has been banned as a terrorist party (Borogan 2007).
While HT has been legalized in May 2006 in Lebanon (Maliach 2006a),
as of this writing it is allowed to operate freely in Great Britain, Denmark,
the United States, Canada, Australia, the United Arab Emirates, Sudan,
and Yemen. Reportedly, in August 2007 HT also re-emerged as a ‘new’
political player in Palestinian politics, bringing thousands of people on
the streets to protest against peace negotiations with Israel; according to
some political commentators, HT became a real challenge to theweaken-
ing Hamas in the West Bank (Prusher 2008). Whereas some researchers
cite HT’s headquarters being based in Jordan, the organization legally
maintains its office in London that has a tendency to speak on behalf
of the whole group and appears to be an ideological nerve centre of the
organization (International Crisis Group 2003a; Baran, Starr, and Cornell
2006; Horton 2006; Bergin and Townsend 2007; Mandaville 2007: 266).
One should not, however, perceive HT as a political party in its classi-
cal Western meaning. HT is not registered as a party anywhere; it rejects
any kind of political structure and refuses to participate in the ruling sys-
tem of the government. Aiming at reinstituting Islamic Caliphate HT set
up a three-stage program. After winning support of a sufficient number
of people who believe in the ideas of HT and forming the Party group,
HT aims to work with the Muslim community by carrying the message
of Islam in all spheres of life. The final stage is re-establishment of the
Caliphate, implementation of Islam generally and comprehensively and
carrying it as a message to the world (Taquiddin 1999). It is believed that
HT is currently in the second stage of the process at least in the Arab and
Central Asian countries (Mayer 2004; Swick 2005).
“The Caliphate will be led by a Caliph appointed by the Muslim community, who
will swear allegiance to him. The Caliph will rule according to the Koran and
the Sunnah (the practices of the Prophet that have become sanctified customs)
and he will be obligated to disseminate Islam through Da’wa (propaganda) and
militant Jihad” (Taquiddin quoted in: Maliach 2006a).
Whereas the ideas of Taquiddin appear to be utopian at the modern
time, the modernized message of Imran Waheed, the HT chief media
advisor in Britain, may sound appealing to masses, especially Muslim
immigrant communities in Europe and population of Central Asia, who
are longing for justice.
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“Our aim is to re-establish the Islamic Caliphate in the Muslim world. Our vision
of the Islamic Caliphate is one of an independent state with an elected and
accountable leader, an independent judiciary, political parties, the rule of law
and equal rights for minority groups. Citizens of a caliphate have every right to
be involved in politics and hold the ruler accountable for his actions. The role of
the ruler (caliph) is to be a servant to the masses who governs them with justice”
(Paraipan quoted in Whine 2006: 3).
However, the most controversial point about HT is its position on the
use of violence in meeting their political ends. Whereas HT claims to be
a non-violent organization that rejects terrorist means in achieving its
goals, it openly accepts carrying out militant Jihad after the establish-
ment of the Caliphate. Roy once noted that for HT “position against the
launching of jihad is purely tactical. The organization believes that the
time has not yet come for jihad, but that it is a compulsory duty for any
Muslim” (Roy 2004: 256). Meanwhile, HT has been spotted using radical
vocabulary of terrorist organizations and praising terrorist acts against
the West. Baran went to the extent of claiming that “HT today serves as
a de facto conveyor belt for terrorists” because “HT is part of an elegant
division of labour. The group itself is active in the ideological prepara-
tion of the Muslims, while other organizations handle the planning and
execution of terrorist attacks” (Baran 2004a: 11). A number of known
more radical spin offs of HT—British al-Muhajiroun and presumably
Uzbek Akramiya—certainly lend support to this argument.
On Hizb Ut-Tahrir in Central Asia
The first reports on HT in Central Asia suggested that after seven decades
of Soviet official atheism, Islamic revival filled up the vacuum left behind
by the Communist system and allowed such groups as HT easy access to
former ‘Muslim atheists’, a paradoxical expression describing a person
in Central Asia, who was born Muslim but has not observed five pillars of
Islam (McBrien and Pelkmans 2008: 87). As a Soviet legacy ‘Muslimness’
was intimately tied to national identity of Central Asians without much
of religious content in it (McBrien and Pelkmans 2008: 90; Williams
2004: 130); it changed, however, very quickly. If in 1996 55.3 percent of
ethnic Kyrgyz and 87.1 percent of ethnic Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan identified
themselves as Muslims, then in 2007 97.5 percent and 99.1 percent of
surveyed ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks respectively reported that they were
Muslims (McGlinchey 2009: 17). Currently, the scholars argue that it is
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rather bad economic conditions, low political culture, absence of civil
society to channel public initiatives, limited excess to power and a wide
spread suppression of freedom of speech that played into the hands of
HT, helping it to spread its appealing message of justice (International
Crisis Group 2003a; Karagiannis 2005; 2006a; 2006b; 2007; Khamidov
2003; Mihalka 2006).
Since HT, while operating in a certain country, attempts to meet the
demands of the local population, its activities and spheres of influence
in Central Asia differ to a great extent from those in Europe. The core dif-
ferences lie in HT helping the local populations to overcome economic
hardships by setting up mutual aid associations and charity programs
(McGlinchey 2009) as well as creating a public space for discussing ev-
eryday issues or as Baran puts it, “In a region with limited access to a free
press, HT’s discussion of everyday issues provides a much needed outlet
for news and opinion. HT continuously promotes a message of ‘justice’
against what many Central Asians view as their corrupt and repressive
state structures” (Baran 2004a, 86).
Furthermore, unlike in Europe, in Central Asia the most effective way
of recruitment of new members takes place not on the university cam-
puses but in prisons. Since HT is outlawed in all Central Asian counties,
it is enough for a local citizen to carry or keep HT leaflets to be arrested
and imprisoned. Thus, the common tactic of HT became to get arrested,
appeal to sympathy from the local populations, get publicity and start
propaganda in prisons. Because traditionally the Central Asian people,
especially in Ferghana Valley, have extended family and community
sense, an arrest of a person gets quick publicity and it evokes resentment
among local population. In this regard Baran commented:
“Since the late 1990s, prisons have become the best places to convert people
to radical Islam. The vast majority of inmates deeply resent the establishment.
There is also a serious torture problem in Central Asian prisons, especially in
Uzbekistan. After enduring such treatment, even the least religious individual is
susceptible to HT recruitment efforts. Those who are jailed for small offenses
may develop close contacts with HT members while in prison and over time
begin to identify with party ideology. By the time they leave prison, former petty
criminals can become strong Islamists tied to the larger HT” (Baran 2004a: 86).
Due to the clandestine nature of the party and the tendencies of regimes
to exaggerate extremist groups’ presence and threat as an excuse for
authoritarian responses and policies, the real number of HT members
in Central Asia cannot be ascertained (International Crisis Group 2003a:
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1-54; Esposito 2002: 113). Baran et al. (2006: 24) claimed that “HT is
numerically strongest in Uzbekistan, with estimates there ranging from
7,000 up to 60,000 members. There are 3,000-5,000 members in both Kyr-
gyzstan and Tajikistan. The number in Kazakhstan is no more than a few
hundred”. While the head of the Kyrgyz State Agency on Religious Affairs
claimed there were 15,000 HT activists in Kyrgyzstan in 2008, the ICG ex-
perts estimate the HT membership in Kyrgyzstan in 2009 to be as much
as 7,000-8,000, of whom some 800 to 2,000 could be women (Interna-
tional Crisis Group 2009: 6). Whereas the early reports on HT’s activities
in Kyrgyzstan stressed their prevalence in the Kyrgyz southern provinces
and overwhelmingly ethnic Uzbek membership of the organization1 (In-
ternational Crisis Group 2003a; Karagiannis 2005; Grebenschikov 2002),
the more recent studies indicate that HT continuously gains support
in the northern part of Kyrgyzstan—at least in Bishkek, Karakol and Ak
Terek—and that among the Kyrgyz population (McGlinchey 2009).
Research questions
RQ1: Who gets to speak on the pages of private yet not independent
Kyrgyz newspaper about the controversial organization? RQ2: What kind
of message the general public received through this pro-government
newspaper? RQ3: How was the same event—suicide bombings in Uzbek-
istan in 2004—covered in Kyrgyz Vechernii Bishkek, British The Times
and German Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung?
Methodology
Sources of Research
VB is one of a few newspapers in Kyrgyzstan that provide qualitative
political information on a regular basis. Published in Russian language
since 1974, VB has the highest circulation in the country, i.e. 8,000 issues
1 | The higher number of Uzbeks sympathizing with HT compared with those of
Kyrgyz people was explained by Grebenschikov (2002) by the fact that Kyrgyzstan
was not able to provide the population in the South with print media, textbooks at
school, and other channels, from which the Uzbek part of population could generate
information in their language. In early 2000s the informational vacuum that could not
be filled by the Kyrgyz officials have been filled by the HT leaflets, which contained
information on the urgent political, social, and economic developments in the region
and the world.
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daily from Monday to Thursday and 62,000 issues on Friday (www.vb.kg);
it is the only national newspaper that maintains electronic archives since
1998; during 2001-2005 VB published 215 articles containing at least one
reference to HT, which is considerably more than any other qualitative
newspaper in the country2; and, although this newspaper was privately
owned by different people during the timeframe of the research, it always
remained loyal to the government.3
Additionally, I analyze the articles covering the suicide bombings in
Uzbekistan and containing at least one reference to HT that were pub-
lished in the British daily The Times and the German daily FAZ from
March 30th to April 7th, 2004. These outlets were selected for the study be-
cause in comparison to other similar newspapers in respective countries,
they provided the widest coverage of the event mentioning HT.
Timeframe of the Research
The timeframe of the research—2001-2005—reflect the important years
in the Kyrgyz history. Following the terrorist attacks on the USA on
September 11, 2001 (further 9/11) the Western allies launched military
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and for that purpose established
military bases in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. ‘Combating local Muslim
extremists’ as part of anti-terrorism measures soon became high on
the political agendas of Central Asian regimes, who often found a good
excuse to implement their authoritarian policies or to suppress civil
oppositions. On March 24th, 2005 following the ousting of the former
President Akaev from his office, the feeling of democratic change was
in the air. There was a hope that the authoritative rule would seize as
Kurmanbek Bakiev won presidential elections in July 2005. The articles
published in 2001 before 9/11 and in 2005 after March 24th are also
2 | During the same period MSN, a private national newspaper with the sec-
ond highest circulation after VB, published 114 articles that contained reference to
HT (www.msn.kg). Slovo Kyrgyzstana, a state owned newspaper that maintains
electronic archives only since 2004, published 30 relevant articles in 2004-2005
(www.sk.kg). MSN and Slovo Kyrgyzstana were issued 2 and 3 times per week
respectively.
3 | In May 2001 Adil Toigonbaev, the son-in-law of Askar Akaev, at that time
the President of the Kyrgyz Republic, allegedly unlawfully appropriated the shares
of VB from the private entrepreneur Aleksandr Kim, thus, assuring loyalty of the
newspapers to the government. In August 2005, shortly after the forceful change of
the Kyrgyz government, Kim legally demanded reconsideration of VB ownership and
won the case in the court. As the new government headed by Kurmanbek Bakiev
indirectly allowed restoration of Kim’s ownership of VB, the newspaper again became
loyal to the government, that is to Akaev’s successor.
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included in the sample in order to establish whether those events had
specific influence on HT coverage in VB.
Methods of Research
The sample included every article published in VB from January 1st, 2005
to December 31st, 2005, in which the name ‘Hizb ut-Tahrir’ was men-
tioned at least once. The method of research was two-fold—quantitative
and qualitative. The classical quantitative analysis (Neuendorf 2002;
Stempel 1981) included coding articles on predefined variables ‘year’,
‘author’, ‘content’ and ‘tone’. ‘Year’ variable was encoded in five cate-
gories corresponding to the five years of the research timeframe. The
‘author’ variable first contained the last names of the journalists that
were later assigned to six categories: 1) Erlan Satybekov, 2) Shuhrat Ab-
basov, 3) Ravshan Umarov4, 4) Urii Kuzmihyh, 5) others, and 6) not
attributed articles. The ‘content’ variable first contained different the-
matic descriptions of articles that were later grouped in three categories:
1) ‘arrests’—short news articles usually about arrests of the HT members,
2) ‘informative’—articles often containing some descriptive information
about the HT organization and its activities in the region and abroad,
and 3) ‘irrelevant’—articles that contained references to HT but were,
nevertheless, irrelevant to the HT organization per se.
The ‘tone’ variable was encoded in three categories that represented
sets of terms and information used in relation to HT: 1) neutral, 2) neg-
ative, 3) very negative. ‘Neutral’ articles usually contained little or no
descriptive terms and information related to HT; they usually referred to
it as the religious or political organization aiming at building a Caliphate.
‘Negative’ articles contained such reference to HT as ‘prohibited orga-
nization’, ‘clandestine organization’, ‘spreading leaflets of an anticonsti-
tutional content’ and ‘government is concerned (or alarmed) because
of HT activities’. ‘Very negative’ articles contained such references to
the organization as ‘religious extremists’, ‘terrorists’, ‘radicals’, ‘religious
fanatics’, or ‘threat to the state and/or people’. A ‘positive’ category was
excluded from the categorization since no article fell into that category.
The qualitative analysis included closer consideration of selected arti-
cles as well as semi-structured interviews with four VB journalists who
wrote about half of all articles. Interviews with Erlan Satybekov, deputy
editor-in-chief of VB; Urii Kuzminyh, a VB journalist in charge of crime
4 | Shuhrat Abbasov and Ravshan Umarov are pseudonyms used to protect the
respecive authors’ identities.
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stories; Shuhrat Abbasov and Ravshan Umarov, VB journalists based
in Osh, the southern oblast of Kyrgyzstan—were conducted to explain
the quantitative findings and to address the issues of self-censorship
of journalists. The inter-coder reliability sample consisted of every 10th
article. Simple percent agreement for “content” and “tone” variables was
93.2%.
Findings and Discussion
RQ1: Who gets to Speak on the Pages of Private yet not
Independent Kyrgyz Newspaper about the Controversial
Organization?
Journalists
Of 215 articles, Erlan Satybekov wrote 39 (18.1%) articles, Shuhrat Ab-
basov wrote 20 (9.3%) articles, Ravshan Umarov wrote 23 (10.7%) articles,
Urii Kuzminyh wrote 13 (6.0%) articles, 12 (5.6%) were written by Asel
Otorbaeva, 15 (7.0%) by Daniyar Karimov, 13 (6.0%) by Urii Kuzminyh, 46
(21.4%) by 29 other authors, and 47 (21.9%) articles were not attributed.
As expected, the majority of articles were bylines of journalists rather
than routine reports of the press agencies. However, a small circle of
journalists wrote about a half of all articles. Satybekov, who has an un-
dergraduate degree in journalism, has lectured in the USA on religious
extremism and terrorism in Central Asia, and has traveled to Israel and
other countries to learn more about religious extremism. He joined VB in
2001 and was considered by his colleagues to be an expert in questions
pertaining to Muslim extremism. Umarov and Abbasov, VB journalists
based in Osh, southern part of Kyrgyzstan, are close relatives. They
wrote about HT as part of their job covering events in the southern part
of the country. These three journalists confirmed that they wrote articles
about HT voluntarily, and have never been requested by editor-in-chief
to submit additional artilces. Umarov and Abbasov joined VB in 2000.
Kuzminyh has been responsible for crime stories since 1995 as he joined
VB. He saw his job as reporting information he received from law en-
forcement agencies without adding analytical information. Otorbaeva
and Karimov were not interviewed since they were not available at the
time of the research phase.
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Law Enforcement Bodies
It was expected that 47 articles without attribution were either editorials
or, perhaps, the names of authors were intentionally not published for
certain reasons. Four interviewed journalists said that their names were
always published whenever they submitted a publication. Satybekov
suggested that absence of attribution was rather a technical problem.
According to him, if the same author wrote several articles on the same
page, only the last article contained information about the author. This
situation might not have been taken into account when the articles
were published on the web page. The qualitative analysis of these arti-
cles revealed, however, that the overwhelming majority of them were
short crime stories about arrests of HT members supposedly provided
by law enforcement bodies from the southern regions of the country.
Therefore, the voice behind approximately one fourth of all articles on
HT—unattributed articles and those written by Kuzminyh—was that
of law enforcement officials reporting about criminal offenses of HT
members or people allegedly supporting this group.
Hizb ut-Tahrir
Since HT in Central Asia was stigmatized as ‘a terrorist organization’
after 2001 and officially banned in 2003 it was expected that the voice of
HT itself would hardly be heard from the outlet loyal to the government.
However, publication of two lengthy interviews with HT members was
de facto giving the floor to extremists to present their views on certain
topics that they would otherwise have to spread clandestinely through
leaflets. Satybekov’s interview of Rahimjan Charikov, the imprisoned
HT member was published in VB on September 26th, 2001. Satybekov’s
questions revealed HT’s objectives, ideology and reasons of HT being
banned in many countries. Charikov’s answers presented HT views on
the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the USA, relation of the Uzbek president
Karimov to Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, and terrorist attacks in Uzbekistan
in 1999. Another interview of a HT member was published in VB on
July 22nd, 2005, i.e. shortly after the presidential elections in Kyrgyzstan.
Satybekov wrote the questions and Hamidov conducted the interview
with Diler Djumabaev, an entrepreneur and the press-attaché of HT.
Several questions of Satybekov provided basic information about HT’s
membership, strategies, objectives, and ideology. Other questions were
specifically aimed at finding out HT’s views on the presidential elec-
tions in Kyrgyzstan; the March events in Kyrgyzstan that resulted in
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seizure of the government by opposition leaders; on Andijan events in
Uzbekistan5; the American airbase in Kyrgyzstan; and, the bombings
in London. Additional research on HT coverage in VB in 2006 and 2007
revealed that the newspaper provided space for two more interviews
with HT members revealing the relations and attitudes of HT to Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan and HT strategy of cooperation with mass
media in Kyrgyzstan.
Whereas publication of interview with HT members was seen by Saty-
bekov as an opportunity “[. . . ] to hear the voice on the other side, and at
the same time to increase the popularity of the newspaper” (Interview
with Satybekov), the second interview was published only three weeks
after the Kyrgyz law “On preventing extremist activity” was adopted. Ac-
cording to this law, the mass media were not allowed to spread extremist
materials or to undertake extremist activities. Although publication of
interviews with HT members openly spreading their message might be
seen as giving a platform to extremists, Satybekov stated that neither he
nor the VB editor-inchief were approached by state officials.
In comparison, in Germany where the organization is banned since
January 2003, the quality press often published very informative arti-
cles about HT but never in a form of interview with the German HT
members.6 In Britain, where the organization is legal, interviews with,
refutations by, and articles of the HT members appeared more often.7
Thus, notwithstanding the fact that Germany is a democratic state with
independent media and HT members were never imprisoned there, the
public space was never given directly to HT. In Kyrgyzstan, where people
get arrested for merely having an HT leaflet in a pocket, the press, in
5 | In May, 2005 the governmental forces of Uzbekistan massacred several
hundreds of protestors in the main square of Andijan, who gathered to protest
against the unfair trial over 23 businessmen allegedly belonging to Akramiya group,
a spin off of HT.
6 | This statement is based on quantitative analysis of 226 articles that con-
tained at least one reference to HT and were published in tageszeitung, Frankfurter
Rundschau, Süddeutsche Zeitung, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and Die Welt in
2002-2007. Preliminary findings of qualitative analysis revealed that in 2005 Die Welt
published one inerveiw with the Briton of Pakistani origin, who started his Islamist
path from joining HT at the age of 17 (Taseer 2005), and one narrative report of
German journalist, who met HT member in Kyrgyzstan shortly before the presidential
elections in Kyrgyzstan (Quiring 2005).
7 | This statement is based on quantitative analysis of 396 articles that contained
at least one reference to HT and were published in The Daily Telegraph, The Times,
The Guardian, The Financial Times and The Independent in 2002-2007.
287
Irina Wolf
Figure 1: Content of articles (N=215)
a paradoxical way, allowed HT to speak to the wide audience from its
pages.
RQ2: What kind of Message the General Public Received through
this Pro-Government Newspaper?
Content
Of 215 articles, 49 (22.8%) articles were about arrests of HTmembers, 109
(50.7%) articles were ‘informative’, and 57 (26.5%) articles were mainly
‘irrelevant’ to the topic. Of 109 ‘informative’ articles written during five
years, 58 (53%) articles were primarily focused on describing activities
of HT in the Central Asian region, 30 (17.8%) articles provided general
information about the HT organization, and 21 (12.5%) articles, apart
from providing relevant information on HT, focused on how to combat it.
Of 57 articles mainly irrelevant to HT, six (10.5%) contained references
to HT in the titles or ledes of the articles, but nowhere else in the bodies
of articles, 51 (80.5%) contained references to HT in their bodies; 29
(50.95%) of these 57 articles contained references to HT in the context of
terrorism. For graphic presentation see: Figure 1.
The qualitative analysis of articles about ‘arrests of HT members’ re-
vealed that they were mainly once corresponding to Wright’s (1997: 104)
term “the front-end/back-end stories”. Those are stories that covered ar-
rests of HTmembers or supporters but usually had no follow up coverage
of whether those people were later imprisoned, acquitted or immedi-
ately released. Although the number of ‘informative articles’ was high,
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VB published only 10 articles during 2001-2005 providing exhaustive
information on the organization, including historical information on
the origin of HT, its ideology and objectives, the types of its activities,
reasons why it has been banned in various parts of the world, location of
its headquarters, and/or its attitude towards violence and various forms
of government. The rest of articles were rather a mixture of use of HT
name and a description of HT organization with various degrees of rele-
vance to the focal points of articles. However, as was pointed out earlier,
the authors of more than half of mainly irrelevant articles mentioned
HT name purely in ‘terrorism’ context. As expected, coverage of HT was
event-driven and the number of articles mentioning the group increased
at the times of important international or national events.
The content of articles was carefully weighted and discussed prior to
publication by Abbasov and Umarov in Osh. They tried to avoid men-
tioning such delicate questions as the ethnic identity of HT members.
Being ethnic Uzbeks themselves, they explained during interviews that
highlighting the Uzbek ethnicity of HT members might have escalated
conflict between the Kyrgyz and the Uzbeks and lead to violence. Indeed,
although revealing the fact that majority of HT members were at that
time the ethnic Uzbeks was not prohibited by any official regulation of
the state, the journalists at VB did not write about it. In fact, in 2001 and
2002 there were no references to HT members being Uzbeks. In 2003
in two articles it was mentioned that HT leaflets were in both Kyrgyz
and Uzbek languages and in one that HT usually propagated among the
Uzbek population in the south. In 2004 there was one reference to an
arrested HT member being identified as the Uzbek, and one reference
to expropriated HT leaflets in the Uzbek language. In 2005 two articles
contained references to HT leaflets published in the Uzbek language.
Umarov said that possession of arms by HT members was another is-
sue to be considered before publication since it had not yet been proved
by law enforcement bodies. However, in a number of articles journal-
ists referred both to discovery of arms and to HT, although they did
not directly accuse HT of possessing arms. Such references were done
obliquely, so that readers could themselves infer that the discovered
arms belonged to HT. In this connection, Umarov stated that in VB there
were only two people who have a real grasp of HT issues—Satybekov
and himself—and some journalists from the north of the country lacking
in-depth knowledge of the organization are sometimes too harsh in their
references to the group.
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Figure 2: Content by tone (N=215)
Tone
Of 215 articles, 20 (9.3%) contained neutral references to HT, 48 (22.3%)
contained negative and 127 (68.4%) contained very negative references
to HT. Of 49 articles about arrests of HT members, three (6.1%) articles
contained neutral references to HT, 13 (26.5%) contained negative refer-
ences and 33 (67.3%) very negative references to HT. Of 109 informative
articles, 8 (7.3%) articles contained neutral references to HT, 23 (21.1%)
contained negative, and 78 (71.6%) contained very negative references
to HT. Of 57 articles mainly irrelevant to HT, 9 (15.8%) articles contained
neutral references to HT, 12 (21.1%) contained negative, and 36 (63.2%)
very negative references to HT. The relationship between tone and con-
tent was not statistically significant. For graphic presentation of data
see: Figure 2.
Of 10 articles published in 2001, none of them contained neutral
references HT, 1 (10.0%) contained negative references, and 9 (90.0%)
contained very negative references to HT. Of 48 articles published in
2002, 4 (8.3%) contained neutral references, 4 (8.3%) contained negative
references, and 40 (83.3%) contained very negative references to HT.
Of 50 articles published in 2003, 4 (8.0%) contained neutral references,
9 (18.0%) contained negative references, and 37 (74.0%) very negative
references toHT. Of 55 articles published in 2004, 1 (1.8%) contained neu-
tral reference, 14 (25.5%) contained negative references, and 40 (72.7%)
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Figure 3: Tone by year (N=215)
contained very negative references to HT. Of 52 articles published in
2005, 11 (21.2%) contained neutral reference, 20 (38.5%) contained neg-
ative references, and 21 (40.4%) contained very reference to HT. The
relation between variables “tone” and “year” was statistically significant
(χ2(8,N = 215)= 32,445,p < .01) with the tone of articles becomingmore
neutral over years. For graphic presentation of data see: Figure 3.
As mentioned, the category ‘positive’ tone has been excluded from
the coding book because none of the articles contained any positive
remarks about HT. Positive attitude toward the organization could have
been expressed through mentioning that members of this organization
help each other in addressing such issues as unemployment, religious
education, funerals, medical care, etc. Satybekov and Umavrov noted
that there were some positive aspects about HT that could be covered.
They said, for example, that in the southern part of Kyrgyzstan the group
was known for charitable activities. There was a case when members
organized a big meal for the local population. HT members can count
on the financial support from the organization in case of emergency or
medical need. The referents said that such information could not, how-
ever, be published in VB because “[. . . ] the end goals of this organization
are well known [. . . ]” (Interview with Umarov) and “[. . . ] VB doesn’t
do promotion of the HT organization” (Interview with Satybekov). To
compare, similarly to the Kyrgyz press the German press contained no
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references to any positive activity of HT unlike the British press, in which
such references were rare but present.8
The assumption that articles became more neutral over years because
the number of articles about arrests of HT members has also grown over
years was not supported. Although such articles provided little or no
information about HT’s goals, activities and they were almost never neu-
tral in tone except in 2005, when the articles with neutral tone could be
observed regardless of the content of the articles. Apparently, that such
difference in coverage of HT could be attributed to the change of the Kyr-
gyz government and VB directorship in 2005. The four interviewees were
of the view that changes of the Kyrgyz government in March 2005, and of
the VB directorship in August 2005, influenced neither the content nor
the tone of references to HT in VB (Interviews with Satybekov, Abbasov,
Umarov, and Kuzminyh). However, the quantitative analysis shows that
in 2005 VB coverage of HT was more balanced, with the number of the
articles written in a “neutral tone” having drastically grown. The quali-
tative analysis of articles reveals that after the opposition seized power,
VB stopped referring to the former opposition having contacts with and
support of, the HT organization.
RQ3: How was the same Event—Suicide Bombings in Uzbekistan
in 2004—Covered in the Kyrgyz Vechernii Bishkek, British The
Times and German Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung?
A series of suicide bombings by four women in Uzbekistan in spring
2004 that took lives of more than 40 people was quickly attributed by
the Uzbek president Karimov to Islamist terrorists, including the Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan and HT. As VB covered the event, the sources
of information used by journalists were primarily those of the press
service of the Uzbek president and the Uzbek security service. Such
articles obviously contained pure propaganda against the HT group,
although the HT’s denial of their participation in the bombings was
mentioned once. Thus, among other articles there were a reprint of the
then president Karimov’s statement about the terrorist acts, the report of
the Uzbek security services about criminal activities of HT in the region
and the interview with the worker of the press service of the Uzbek
president.
At the same time the British daily The Times published five articles
8 | Of 396 examined articles from the British press 11 contained remarks about
positive activities of HT.
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on the topic that referred to HT: four by Giles Whittell from Tashkent
and one by Richard Beeston from Britain. The general tendency was
that the authors mentioned blames of the Uzbek government against
HT quoting or referring to the Uzbek authorities; HT’s denial of having
anything to do with this violent event, in particular, and claims of being
a peaceful organization in general; HT being legal in Great Britain and
them blaming the Uzbek authorities for violence. The authors also
referred to human rights organizations stressing how the Uzbek regime
exercised routine torture against thousands ofMuslimdissidents. Finally,
the journalists highlighted several times that the Americans should be
embarrassed if they decide to release more than USD 50 million in aid
for Uzbekistan that is dependent on human rights improvements in the
country. Finally, in the last article on the topic, Whittell (2004) provided a
lengthy emotional and detailed report of cases of torture of HT members
in the Uzbek prisons, the report that would hardly ever see publication
in Kyrgyzstan.
“The woman closes her eyes and explains how it got there. ‘He didn’t want to
confess to praying five times a day because he didn’t consider it a crime, so they
put long metal spikes in a canvas bag and beat him with it. Still he didn’t confess,
so they attached electrodes to his abdomen. Still he didn’t confess, he didn’t die.
So he was put into 25 litres of boiling water, in a bath. When his skin was off they
poured disinfectant on him. They removed his fingernails and broke his nose
and teeth. There was nowhere on his body that was not covered with bruising
and signs of torture.’ His name was Muzafar Avazov. Hers is Fatima Mukhadirova.
She is one of several thousand mothers whose sons and husbands have been
taken from them for defying the authority of the flatly unrepentant Government
of Uzbekistan [. . . ] Avazov’s crime was to have been linked to those radicals;
specifically to the Hizb ut-Tahrir sect, which seeks to replace Uzbekistan with an
Islamic caliphate under the Sharia Muslim legal system” (Whittell 2004: 6).
The coverage of the event in the German daily FAZ was not as emotional
as in The Times. However, similar to the British daily, the frame of the
poor records of Uzbekistan in human rights prevailed over the frame of
HT being the state’s enemy number one. Thus, FAZ covered the bomb-
ings mentioning HT in three articles by Markus Wehner from Moscow.
Similar to the British coverage, the journalist first illustrated the general
situation in places of bombings and referred to the Uzbek authorities
blaming HT for violence. He mentioned HT’s official response denying
the involvement, stressed their official rejection of violence in meeting
their goal of Caliphate restoration in Central Asia and quoted HT saying
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that the tyrannical Uzbek regime has staged such events in the past
as well in order to supress the legitimate Islamic political opposition.
(Wehner 2004a: 7) Wehner mentioned the case of Avazov only shortly
and referred to it in the context of records of Human Rights Watch about
7000 sympathizers of HT in the Uzbek prisons and routine torture prac-
tices by the Uzbek authorities. Noteworthy is the fact that in sub-title of
one of three articles Wehner takes position and blames the Uzbek gov-
ernment for provoking extremism that it fights later on (Wehner 2004b:
10).
It appears that the different legal status of HT in Britain and Germany
hardly had any impact on how HT-related event happening abroad was
covered by the press. Perhaps the proximity of Kyrgyzstan to Uzbekistan
and dependence of the former on the natural resources on the latter
influenced on how the controversial issues are portrayed in the press.
This proposition, however, only reinforces the argument that the press
in Kyrgyzstan is heavily dependent on state politics and willingly or
unwillingly supports it on its pages.
Conclusion
The aim of this study was to establish who was allowed to speak on the
pages of private yet not independent Kyrgyz daily about the proscribed
organization HT during 2001-2005. Further, it was necessary to establish
what kind of message the general public in Kyrgyzstan received from
this pro-government newspaper. Finally, it seemed relevant to find out
how the same event—suicide bombings in Uzbekistan in Spring 2004—
was covered in democratic (British and German) and non-democratic
(Kyrgyz) societies. It appears that about a half of all articles mentioning
HT at least once were written by a small circle of journalists, one of which
was editor-in-chief, another was a reporter on crime stories, and two
were close relatives based in the Southern part of Kyrgyzstan, who were
cross checking material on HT prior to publication in order to avoid
controversial or sensitive remarks. Material for about a quarter of all
articles was supplied by law-enforcement officials and was mainly about
arrests of HT members or sympathizers. Another quarter of articles were
mainly irrelevant to HT organization often mentioning it in the context
of ‘terrorism’. While half of articles were more or less informative on
HT, only ten of them provided detailed information about the origin
and goals of the organization. The overwhelming majority of articles
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were written in very negative tones, i.e. referring to HT as religious
extremists, terrorists, radicals and/or religious fanatics. Whereas not
a single positive aspect of HT activities (like charity or employment
activities) was covered, even the number of articles that referred to HT
in neutral terms—Muslim religious or political organization aiming at
building a Caliphate—was very low. The growing number of articles with
the neutral references to HT over years was attributed to the changes of
the Kyrgyz government and the VB directorship in 2005.
While the personal positions of the journalists seem to have influ-
enced on how they portrayed the HT, the role of the Kyrgyz government
in setting the agenda for the private yet not independent newspaper
should not be underestimated. The comparison of how VB covered sui-
cide bombings in neighbouring Uzbekistan in spring 2004 with coverage
of the same event in the British The Times (where HT is legal) and the
German FAZ (where HT is banned) lent support to the argument that
coverage of Htrelated issues depends not so much on the legal status
of the organization as on independence of media and journalists from
state’s pressures to write about the banned organization in very negative
terms and covering only those aspects of the events that are in line with
the wider state’s policies. The further investigations and broader analy-
sis of HT coverage in three countries would shed more light on uneasy
communication between HT, mass media and states.
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Afterthoughts on “Totalitarian” Communication
ANDREAS LANGENOHL
The essays in this volume are united in the attempt to disentangle the
notion of totalitarian communication from that of totalitarianism, that
is, from totalitarian social and political orders. This is, to be sure, a
formidable task since the attribute “totalitarian” has been designed in
political theory to refer to societies or political orders in toto. According
to Friedrich’s and Brzezinski’s (1965: 17) early work Totalitarian Dic-
tatorship and Autocracy, the former “emerges as a system of rule for
realizing totalist intentions under modern political and technical con-
ditions.” Hannah Arendt, who attempted to track down the historical
predecessors of totalitarian rule, made explicit its totalizing and holistic
tendencies by arguing that “total domination is the only form of gov-
ernment with which coexistence is not possible” (Arendt 1966: xi-xii).
Abbott Gleason, in reconstructing the history of concept “totalitarianism”
startingwith the rise ofMussolini, notes: “There is some overlap between
‘totality’, grasping/understanding the world as an integral whole, and
‘totalitarianism’, making it a whole” (Gleason 1995: 9) In this tradition,
the notions “totalitarian societies” or “totalitarian political orders” have
always tilted toward pleonasm, because the qualifier “totalitarian”, if
taken seriously, could signify nothing less than societies or political or-
ders as wholes. Therefore, any strategy to retain the “totalitarian” while
abandoning the notion of society or political order has to take issue with
the idea that elements of totalitarianism could not be decoupled from
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their respective totalizing order, precisely because those elements only
gain their meanings as parts of that order.
No other concept than “communication” could have fit better into
the announced radical departure from the holistic understandings of
totalitarianism. Communication, in a very basic sociological sense, en-
compasses not only intentions of the sender or the content and structure
of the message but also the ways messages are being perceived, as well
as the ways they are put to work. In this sense, the notion of commu-
nication is different from the concepts such as “discourse”, which can
perfectly do without the idea that perception is important, precisely
because they are imagined as being effective per se. A social-scientific
communication model that includes the idea of perception is very much
at odds with some very fundamental features of the notion of totalitar-
ianism, as the latter, by virtue of its holism and functionalism, cannot
but imply a consonance, or at least a match, between what is articulated,
what is understood, and what are the effects of communication.
A corollary of this is the impossibility to use the qualifier “totalitarian”
for the noun “communication” except than in quotation marks. “To-
talitarian” is derived from “totalitarianism” as indicating a society and
political order as a whole, not just communication or any other of its
parts. If one still wishes to use the attribute “totalitarian” for analytical
purposes without plunging into functionalism, one probably has to leave
behind the synchronous order in which the functionality of totalitarian-
ism was deemed to come to surface, and search for entry points beyond
that order and synchrony itself.
1
The intention of the remarks at hand is to give an example for such strat-
egy, namely, to observe “totalitarian” communication from the stand-
point of its overcoming, its remnants, and its afterlife. Empirically, the
reference is made to the traces of certain “totalitarian” patterns of public
communication in post-Soviet Russia. What is the gain of viewing this
communication patterns as post-“totalitarian” for understanding their
social meaning in their contemporary context and for coming to terms
with their “totalitarian” predecessors? I will start with an example from
the public debates about the meaning of the “Great Patriotic War” mem-
ories for post-Soviet Russia, as they were articulated during the 1990s (cf.
for the next three paragraphs: Langenohl 2000, 2002, 2005).
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At the end of the 1980s, the latent contradiction between official and
non-official remebrance of the Great Patriotic War typical the memory
dynamics between the end of war and the end of the USSR (Tumarkin
1994; Zubkova 1995), erupted into a conflict. The critique of Stalinism
served as a catalyst. As the official myth of the “cult of personality”, in
which the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was portrayed as the ma-
jor victim of Stalin and his entourage, has made its public debut (which,
among other things, led to the 1991 ban on the CPSU), the official nar-
rative of the Party’s collective sacrifice on behalf of a better social order
has become questioned. One can roughly distinguish between the two
competing interpretations of the Great Patriotic War since perestroika.
First, intellectuals of the communist or the so-called “national-patri-
otic” creed insisted on deriving a civic and religious set of norms and val-
ues (love for the motherland, a willingness to make sacrifices, the feeling
of have fought for the right thing) from the war experience and the USSR
victory. This interpretation, in regard to its content, continued the offi-
cial commemoration rituals and semantics of the Soviet Union and saw
them as a prototype of such identifying memory. Its followers accused
their opponents of being traitors and desecrating the memory of the war
dead. The death in war was thus interpreted as sacrifice; historical per-
sons (for instance, the Marshal Zhukov) served as heroic identification
figures. By commemorating the war in their writings and statements, the
intellectuals like Aleksandr Panarin, Vladimir Bogomolov, Kseniia Mialo
or Gennadii Gusev, identified nation (natsiia, narod) and government
with a strong, autonomous and self-sufficient state (gosudarstvennost’)
the “natural” unity of which had to be expressed by a war remembrance.
Alternative interpretation was promoted by the intellectuals denying
to the Soviet order any legitimacy. They stressed the political, military
and moral failures of the Soviet leadership during wartime, which in
their opinion “unnecessarily” and dramatically increased the number
of deaths in the war. One of the main catchwords was the “clumsy
war” [bezdarnaia voina] which, according to this interpretation, costed
Soviet troops and civilians an extraordinarily number of unnecessary
deaths, for which Stalin and the political-military elite should have been
held responsible. The most radical position in this respect was held by
writers like Georgii Vladimov (General i ego armiia, 1994) and Viktor
Astaf’ev (Prokliaty i ubity, 1992), who almost iconoclastically denied
any significance of the Soviet victory. According to them, millions of
soldiers and citizens did not sacrifice their lives on behalf of a greater
good, but became victims (and involontary saviors) of a terrorist regime,
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strenghtened by its victory over Nazism, they even strengthened. Such
views entailed an opposition between people and polity, the climax of
which was seen in the Great Patriotic War. The opposite views were
branded by this group as biased in favor of “Stalinism”.
2
In order to highlight the communicative specifics of the public discus-
sion outlined in the last section, and to relate it to the question of “to-
talitarian” communication, it is worth making some theoretical and
methodological remarks. Let us start with theory. In order to understand
about what contemporary communicative practices tell us about former
“totalitarian” communication we need a theory of time and tradition.
This does not necessarily imply that we need a model of how “totalitar-
ian” communication evolves and disintegrates. Such a model would still
operate within the limits of systemic functionalism, and we might feel
bound to misinterpret the collapse of the Soviet Union as an example of
”adaptive upgrading” as envisioned (or hallucinated) by Talcott Parsons:
“This system may evolve toward an approximate equivalent of the British
parliamentary system of the eighteenth century” (Parsons 1971: 127).
Rather, we might ask the question what the remnants of Soviet system
tell us about its functioning. That is, we might search for the imprintings
of totalitarianism in the post-totalitarian development.
Postcolonial literary theory gives us the first hint. Homi Bhabha, for
instance, holds that the full social and cultural meaning of certain as-
pects of colonialism becomes only apparent in a cultural, political and
epistemic space that bears the consequences of colonialism after its
demise (Bhabha and Comaroff 2002). He refers to psychoanalysis and
the notion of the symptom in order to project historical colonial con-
stellations against the backdrop of their cultural (particularly literary)
consequences at the present time. One may receive inspiration from
this reference without being necessarily confined to a psychoanalyti-
cal model of temporality: a theoretical notion of time might be of help
in coming to terms with ”totalitarian” communication from the van-
tage point of what came after. One may, for instance, ask how a certain
communicative style of public address, common among contemporary
post-Soviet intellectuals, might be interpreted as the consequence of the
end of totalitarianism - in particular, the end of some of its communica-
tive structures. In other words, in order to understand the working of
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“totalitarian” communication, we ought to see what totalitarianism has
left behind, and why.
3
Now pone could move on to methodology. It is possible to account
for the totalitarian structure of empirical communicative constellations
through investigating it as a particularmold of some general communica-
tive features. While working on public communication in Post-Soviet
Russia (s. section 1), I have used a sociological model of communication
that focused on the transformative (“performative”) effects of communi-
cation in interactive and institutional settings. This model both depicts
certain key features of communication, and projects those features on
post-“totalitarian” communication in Russia. This paves the way for the
third, and final, step, in which the structures of public communication
in Russia will be interpreted as a remnant of the Soviet public sphere, or
a product of its communicative mechanisms.
In this, I am referring to the work by sociologist Max Miller, who has
tried to combine the speech act-based grounding of sociality in lan-
guage, as developed by Jürgen Habermas, with theempirical research on
communicative interactions within children groups (Miller 1986: 1990).
Miller’s aim was to shed empirical light on the socialization processes
in which, according to Habermas, subjects acquire the ability not only
to act according to norms, but also to reflect on them and thus arrive at
a “post-traditional” (Habermas 1998), or “reason-based” (vernünftige),
identity (Habermas 1976). While Habermas, referring to the models of
socialization into norms and value judgments, developed by George
Herbert Mead, Jean Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg (Habermas 1984:
67-69; Habermas 1987: 58-60, 97-100, 174), writes the possibility of
post-traditional type of socialization and identity into the context of the
macro-societal processes of systemic differentiation (Habermas 1987),
Miller’s fine-grained conversation analysis makes such processes empir-
ically visible not as individual achievements but as collective learning.
The notion of learning, in Miller’s approach, is not tied to any theory of
personality development, a passage through stages of moral conscious-
ness, or any other path-like concepts of individual personality. He sees
interactional processes neither as mere extensions of pre-existing com-
municative, cultural, social, or other frames, nor as collisions among
individually tempered psychic structures, but as a dynamic commu-
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nicative process in which the normative grounds of communication be
altered in the process of interaction (Miller 1990: 92). Learning, in this
approach, has a decisively sociological meaning. Far from being en-
scribed into an perennial social “frame” or into the individual’s psychic
economy, learning lurks in a precarious setting of mutual interaction.
Even if collective learning may be inhibited by certain social frames
or the personality traits of interlocutors, the social process in which
learning takes place follows an interactional logic.
Miller develops his theory of collective learning from the vantage point
of three special types of learning which he jointly calls “communicative
blockades of learning” (kommunikative Lernblockade, Miller 1990: 92).
The default functioning of collective learning processes is an interac-
tive process in which the normative grounds of communication can be
altered and rearticulated while interaction is going on. Further, these
grounds are given perspective through the introduction of one-sided
learning process privileging certain highly specific ways of collective
learning. What distinguishes encompassing learning processes is pre-
cisely the absence of those learning blockades. These “blockades” are
learning processes in their own right, because they may very well lead to
a reformulation of the moral grounds of the conversation. What turns
them into “blockades” is, according to Miller, their non-communicative
rationality - that is, their tendency to eschew argumentative reasoning.
The notion of the blockade is not designed to denounce certain commu-
nicative patterns, but rather to highlight the empirical preconditions of
collective learning based on communicative rationality. This clearly sets
Miller apart from that of Habermas, since he is much more interested
in facts of communicative rationality than in its potentiality (cf. Miller
1986: 13).
Miller distinguishes between the three specified learning mechanisms,
or “blockades” of collective learning that prevent communicative ratio-
nality frommanifesting itself (Miller 1990: 92-3). “Authoritarian learning”
inhibits the argumentative reformulation of the normative and cognitive
grounds of the interaction on the basis of an identification of truth with
power. “Ideological learning” labels any contrary position as being cor-
rupted by non-argumentative reasoning ( for instance, special interests),
robbing it of the possibility to be true. Finally, “regressive learning” puts
obstacles to communicative rationalization because it allows for deem-
phasizing obvious contradictions between different value judgments,
which are instead claimed to form a single, coherent, and homogeneous
position.
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4
It is this sociological understanding of learning that makes Miller’s con-
cept applicable to the analysis and of private conversations and public
discussions alike (cf. Miller 1986: 24). In studies devoted to the dis-
cursive remembrance of the Great Patriotic War in post-Soviet Russia, I
have argued that what characterizes the post-Soviet debate about the
Great Patriotic War has been (in the 1990s at least) an ideological learn-
ing blockade separating anti-Soviet and pro-Soviet camps (s. section
1). Those two positions not only presented interpretations of War dia-
metrically opposed each other, but also denied each other the right for
public expression by ascribing to the opponent special interests incom-
patible with truth. Without going into much detail, it is interesting to
pose the general question: in what sense could this ideological block-
ade of collective learning be interpreted as a remnant of “totalitarian”
communication in the Soviet Union, and what does it tell us about the
latter’s structure?
The most important thing here is that it is only ideological learning
that has persisted from the Soviet to the post-Soviet phase. There is a
certain plausibility in assuming that, in the context of the Soviet Union,
ideological learning was saturated with both authoritarian and regres-
sive forms of learning. As for the former, there existed institutions and
persons to whom authority in ideological disputes about the truth was
ascribed, the most prominent and efficient of which being Stalin (cf.
Yurchak 2006). With respect to the latter, glossing over some crucial
contradictions always inherent in Soviet doctrine was an everyday busi-
ness in the regulated public sphere of the Soviet Union. It was only
ideological learning that survived the demise of the Soviet Union and
the disentanglement of political and discursive power that came with it.
5
It seems that in order to return to a grandly holistic picture of totalitari-
anism, we have taken a long detour in which all three learning blockades
add up to a monolithic structure that allegedly governed the whole of so-
ciety, polity, and culture of the Soviet Union. Still, upon closer inspection,
we can see that only ideological learning has survived until post-Soviet
Russia, having been less weakened by the dramatic institutional shifts
accompanying the demise of the Soviet Union than the two other forms.
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Concequently, it is the most useful of all the three for understanding
the communicative structure of the Soviet public sphere. This adapt-
ability of ideological learning has to do with the fact that its enabling
conditions reside neither in its societal or political institutionalization
(as with authoritarian learning) nor in the semantic content of what is
articulated (as with regressive learning). While authoritarian learning
was stripped of its influence with the demise of the party/state institu-
tions of the USSR, regressive learning sank in glaring criticism once the
authoritarian framework was removed. In contrast to both, the resources
for ideological learning seem to reside in the performative gain that two
or more parties can accumulate in a mutual ideological argumentation.
Indeed, it may be reasonable to continue (or reengage in) ideological
learning even after the authoritarian power structures are gone and the
semantic patterns radically changed, because all the parties in a dis-
pute can benefit from it. While in the Soviet Union ideology-criticism
was contingent upon party power and state intervention, during the
1990s it has been grounded in the positive-sum game between opposing
political positions and attitudes, for instance, between defenders and
deniers of the glory of the victory in the Great Patriotic War. Both sides
benefited from the ideological structure of the argumentation, with the
profit consisting mainly in the agonal consolidation of public agencies.
Admittedly, ideological blockades are able to constitute relationships
and positions in the public sphere merely on the basis of their com-
municative reciprocity, jointly raising the heat by denying each other
the right to speak. In this sense, ideological structures display a higher
degree of performativity than an authoritarian or regressive learning. Au-
thoritarian learning depends on the availability of power resources other
than communication. Regressive strategies in a dispute are directed not
so much at one another as iat followers that have to be sold convincing
stories. Regressive learning, in its turn, has the communicative structure
of a sermon, not of a conversation. Only ideological learning has the
performative potential to constitute mutually consolidating positions
by the sheer force of dispute. Ideological learning, thus, is the most self-
sufficient of learning blockades, one that is able not only to go on after
drastic institutional changes, but also to realize its socially constitutive
potential in an environment free of totalitarianism proper.
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6
This brings usback to the theoretical context of this short essay, namely
to the concept of temporality that is needed to understand “totalitar-
ian” communication beyond the functionalist approach tototalitarian-
ism.The provided survey of the (post-)“totalitarian” communication in
the USSR and in post-Soviet Russia shows that the ideological learning
blockade is not only the most self-sufficient communicative structure
of public communication at our times, but that its potential to gener-
ate positions solely through communicative acts has only flourished
after the disappearance of the authoritarian and the regressive learn-
ing blockades. In other words, while all three blockades of collective
learning were at work in the Soviet political and societal order—albeit
to different degrees and under different historical circumstances—the
potential power and performative productivity of ideological learning
had been conditioned by regressive and authoritarian learning. If, thus,
one accepts the argument that structural features of society may only
become visible in their social and cultural meanings affecting later soci-
etal constellations, one comes to a conclusion that ideological learning
not only preserved but radicalized the communicative structure which
was controled before by other communicative constellations.
Picturing Soviet social and political order as an always precarious, and
changing, regime of checks and balances between ideological, authori-
tarian, and regressive learning, this interpretation gives another blow to
the holistic understanding of totalitarianism. The hermetically sealed
and functoinally regulated environment that traditional totalitarianism
theory had made us believe has never existed. The analysis of “totali-
tarian” communication interfers with this fiction, reminding us of the
precariousness of political and social orders which upheaval radicalizes
some of their features while letting others down.
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